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A B ST R AC T. Do the Erie Doctrine and its "reverse-Erie" mirror require state and federal
courts to apply one another's statutory interpretation methodologies when they interpret one
another's statutes? Surprisingly, the courts have no consistent answer to this question -even
though state and federal courts constantly interpret one another's laws. What's more, exploring
this application of Erie reveals that one of the most important jurisprudential questions about
statutory interpretation also remains entirely unresolved: namely, are the rules of statutory
interpretation "law," individual judicial philosophy, or something in between?
This Article argues that many federal courts are getting the Erie question wrong - or at
least that they are unaware that the question exists in the first place. The Erie inquiry also makes
clear that federal courts treat both state and federal statutory interpretation methodology as
much less "lawlike" than they treat analogous interpretive principles, without acknowledging or
justifying the distinction. Federal courts routinely bypass state interpretive principles when they
interpret state statutes, but almost always look to other state methodological principles,
including state rules of contract interpretation, choice of law, and constitutional interpretation.
Further, unlike in those other areas, the U.S. Supreme Court does not treat even its own
statements about federal statutory interpretation principles as "law" and does not give them
precedential effect. This practice has licensed an interpretive freedom for state and lower federal
courts when those courts interpret federal statutes -a freedom that facilitates federal-law
disuniformity that the Court generally does not tolerate in other contexts. This Article challenges
the notion that statutory interpretation is sufficiently different from other decisionmaking
regimes to justify these distinctions.
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Here is the puzzle: why do federal courts interpreting state statutes
routinely look to U.S. Supreme Court cases for the appropriate principles of
statutory interpretation rather than citing the interpretive rules of the relevant
state? This, arguably, is where statutory interpretation theory should meet the
Erie doctrine. Erie, after all, requires federal courts to apply state law to state
legal questions.' But federal courts do not seem to think of statutory
interpretation methodology as "law" in the first place, much less as law subject
to Erie.
To put the point more concretely:
* Assume that the only question in a diversity case before the Sixth
Circuit is how to interpret a Michigan tort statute. Assume also that
the Michigan Supreme Court recently decided a case holding that
the "rule against absurdities" -which directs courts not to construe
statutes literally if doing so would bring about absurd results -
should no longer be applied to Michigan laws. The federal courts,
however, often apply that rule in interpreting federal statutes. Can
the federal court apply the rule against absurdities to the Michigan
statute?
* Now here is a twist: does the answer change if the exact same state-
law question is presented in federal court, not under the diversity
jurisdiction, but instead embedded as part of a federal-question
case?
Despite decades of incessant talk about statutory interpretation, the federal
courts have no answers to these inquiries. Indeed, the entire area is something
of a doctrinal mess. Neither the federal nor the state courts have any consistent
or well-articulated approach to the question of whether they are required to
apply one another's interpretive methodologies to one another's statutes.
What's more, this phenomenon has gone mostly unnoticed, or no one seems to
care.2
1. Stated more formally, "Erie is . . . a limitation on the federal court's power to displace state
law absent some relevant constitutional or statutory mandate." Henry P. Monaghan, Book
Review, 87 HARv. L. REV. 889, 892 (1974); see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. For related work, see, for example, Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Interpretation of
Federal Statutes, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1501 (2006), which details state court approaches to state
and federal statutory interpretation methodology during the Founding era; Wayne A.
Logan, Erie and Federal Criminal Courts, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1254-55 (2010), which
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And in fact, this Erie muddle makes apparent something even more
important about statutory interpretation in general: namely, that statutory
interpretation's most fundamental jurisprudential question-whether statutory
interpretation methodology is "law," individual judicial philosophy, or
something in between-remains entirely unresolved. The U.S. Supreme Court
generally does not treat its statements about statutory interpretation
methodology as law. Five votes in agreement with respect to the interpretive
principles used to decide one case do not create a methodological precedent
that carries over to the next case, even where the same statute is being
construed. In contrast, some state courts do treat their rules of statutory
interpretation like any other substantive legal doctrine,' a development that
further complicates any understanding about the legal status of statutory
interpretation methodology.
Interestingly, at least some of this uncertainty in statutory interpretation
derives from the same kinds of jurisprudential ambiguities that motivated Erie
itself. Erie culminated a sea change in how judges view law; it reflected a move
from the idea of a body of "natural," general, or universal legal principles to a
more positivistic understanding of law as something specific, a policy choice
linked to a particular jurisdiction, and a choice that can vary from one
discusses federal court application of state criminal laws as first-order questions in Fourth
Amendment cases and the relevance of Erie in that context; Alex B. Long, "If the Train
Should Jump the Track . . .": Divergent Interpretations of State and Federal Employment
Discrimination Statutes, 40 GA. L. REv. 469 (20o6), which examines state interpretation of
parallel or "borrowed" federal employment statutes; and Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing into the
Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards State Judges Should Use To Ascertain Federal Law,
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1173-76 (1999), which shows how state courts interpret
federal statutes independently from federal-court precedents. See also Curtis A. Bradley, The
Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of
International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 534-36 (1997) (questioning whether states must apply
the Charming Betsy canon of interpretation); Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1 (20o6) ("[R]everse-Erie is the critical missing piece in the big puzzle of the
relationship between state and federal law."); Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of
Law, 42 UCLA L. REv. 651 (1995) (exploring the "prediction" model of lower-court
decisionmaking); cf Paul J. Katz, Standing in Good Stead: State Courts, Federal Standing
Doctrine, and the Reverse-Erie Analysis, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1315, 1333-37 (2005) (describing
how, in the special context of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the Court has
"provid[ed] the most extensive application of reverse-Erie principles"). An important
exception is Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation
Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863 (2008), which directly addresses the Court's failure to give
statutory interpretation methodology stare decisis effect.
3. I detail these developments in Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory





jurisdiction to another.4 But in the context of statutory interpretation, Erie's
jurisprudential impact has not been thoroughgoing.
Applying the Erie doctrine to statutory interpretation brings into focus
these open questions about the legal status of methodology. Erie requires
federal courts to consider whether a state legal principle is a "rule of decision"
and, if it is, to apply that state principle in the absence of governing federal
law.' And so we need to understand what statutory interpretation methodology
is and how it affects cases. In the opposite situation, often loosely called
"reverse-Erie" - when state courts interpret federal law - the inquiry is slightly
different and implicates the Supremacy Clause: state courts must ask whether
there is any federal "law" on point that binds them.' And so, there, we need to
know whether there is, could be, or should be a federal common law of
statutory interpretation, compulsory under the Supremacy Clause, to control
state courts' methodological choices when they construe federal statutes.
This Article examines a decade's worth of state and federal cases in which
the courts interpreted one another's statutes," and it submits that many courts,
including the U.S. Supreme Court, are getting the Erie question wrong. Or, at
a minimum, they are not sufficiently aware that the question exists in the first
place. Consider some of the doctrinal inconsistencies that we shall identify: in
diversity cases, federal courts sometimes apply federal statutory interpretation
principles to state statutes but sometimes apply state principles, and they
4. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945) ("Erie ... did not merely overrule a
venerable case. It overruled a particular way of looking at law . . . "). This shift is, of course,
but one aspect of the complicated Erie story, cf EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 3 (2000) (arguing that Erie's "'philosophical'
content" has been "overemphasized" and that the decision's "more vital concern lay in
broader ideas about judicial lawmaking and separation of powers"), and some
commentators have argued that the link between Erie and a new legal positivism is greatly
overstated, see Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism,
84 VA. L. REV. 673 (1998).
5. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. Erie construed the Rules of Decision Act, the federal statute that
requires that "[t]he laws of the several states ... shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(20o6).
6. The Erie inquiry furthers, but may not necessarily resolve, these inquiries. For example, a
conclusion that Erie does not require the application of local methodology to local statutes
would mean that statutory interpretation is not a "rule of decision" but not necessarily that
it is not "law." Many legal doctrines that unquestionably are law-such as rules of
procedure -fall outside of Erie.
7. See Clermont, supra note 2, at 20.
8. See infra Part II for elaboration of this Article's case-selection methodology.
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almost never explain the basis for their choices. On the other hand, when state
statutes are presented as part of federal-question cases, many federal courts
routinely neglect state interpretive principles. But in many of these federal-
question cases, the state statutory questions are analytically distinct from the
federal-law issues, and so there is no reason that they should be interpreted in a
manner that differs from how they would be interpreted in diversity cases.'
In still other cases, federal courts diverge from state practice for completely
different reasons apparently grounded in federalism concerns, most notably the
notion that they are not "equal" interpreters of state law. They often refuse, for
example, to apply widely accepted statutory interpretation doctrines-most
conspicuously, the canon of constitutional avoidance-to state-law questions,
despite the fact that federal courts often apply those doctrines in federal cases
and despite the fact that state courts themselves apply those canons in their
own cases.
The other side looks very different. In federal statutory interpretation cases
heard in state courts, the state courts aggressively assert their independent role
in interpreting federal statutes. But this, too, raises concerns. Without a federal
"law" of statutory interpretation handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court
(which would bind state courts under the Supremacy Clause), most state
courts feel free to select from a wide array of interpretive principles. The
problem is that the regional federal courts of appeals are in the same position:
they too must interpret federal statutes with only loose methodological
guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court. As a result, state and federal courts
within the same regional circuit can reach different interpretations of the same
federal statute based on different chosen rules of interpretation. And because
the state supreme courts are coordinate (not inferior) to the federal courts of
appeals on matters of federal law, state courts have no obligation to harmonize
their interpretive choices with the decisions of their local federal courts of
appeals."o The consequence? Intentional disuniformity-different case
outcomes - among geographically linked courts on identical federal statutory
questions.
9. I do not mean to include in this reference to state statutes interpreted in federal-question
cases the supplemental jurisdiction cases, which are more straightforward. Rather, I mean
cases such as federal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, alleging that a state official acted under color
of state law, but in which there is a preliminary dispute about what the state statute actually
says before the federal court can determine the federal-law question. See, e.g., Dean v.
Byerley, 354 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2004); infra notes 167-172 and accompanying text (discussing
Dean).
l0. See Colin E. Wrabley, Applying Federal Court of Appeals' Precedent: Contrasting Approaches to
Applying Court ofAppeals' Federal Law Holdings and Eric State Law Predictions, 3 SETON HALL




Courts are usually far more careful than this. At a minimum, courts
typically take pains to explain the basis for diverging from standard practice or
for proceeding inconsistently. It is difficult to imagine, for example, the
Seventh Circuit, in a Wisconsin contract-law case, ignoring the fact that
Wisconsin has adopted a particular version of the parol evidence rule. And yet
we routinely see analogous principles -for example, how a state treats extrinsic
evidence such as legislative history- overlooked without justification when
federal courts interpret state statutes.
It is possible that this practice is not the result of mere judicial oversight.
Federal courts may be deliberately resisting a more lawlike approach to
statutory interpretation methodology, perhaps to retain decisionmaking
flexibility, or perhaps because they cannot agree on the governing principles
themselves. At the same time, however, even if the federal courts are
consciously avoiding a more lawlike conceptualization of their own interpretive
principles, that does not fully explain why federal courts would nevertheless
not follow state-court practice when they are interpreting state statutes. It may
be just as likely that federal courts are simply not thinking about statutory
interpretation in the same way in which they think about other types of
interpretive and decisionmaking methodologies.
What follows, then, is an essential question: is statutory interpretation
really all that different from other methodological principles? Consider not
only contract interpretation but also other analogous interpretive or
decisionmaking regimes such as trust interpretation, choice of law, and even
specific doctrinal frameworks of constitutional law (such as the tiers of
scrutiny)." Each of those areas shares similar characteristics with statutory
interpretation methodology, but in those areas, the courts do recognize that the
operative decisionmaking principles differ across state and federal systems, do
carefully analyze them under the Erie doctrine when applied to state law, and
do treat them as "real" law on the federal side. This Article submits that
statutory interpretation should be no different.
The discussion proceeds in five Parts. Part I outlines the assumptions of the
current system, including a summary of the principles underlying the Erie
doctrine. Parts II and III use a large number of case studies to analyze
ii. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 5 (2001) ("A distinctive
feature of the Supreme Court's function involves the formulation of constitutional rules,
formulas, and tests, sometimes consisting of multiple parts."); Mitchell N. Berman,
Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 167 (2004) (distinguishing "statements of
judge-interpreted constitutional meaning from rules directing how courts should adjudicate
claimed violations of such meaning" and calling the latter "constitutional decision rules").
This point is elaborated in Parts I and IV.
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empirically the crossover cases and the problems that they cause. Part IV
describes how analogous interpretive frameworks are viewed as more lawlike
and argues that statutory methodology is more similar to those frameworks
than it is different from them.
Part V moves beyond the Article's core questions about doctrinal accuracy
and the legal status of methodology and begins to explore what it means to
have a self-consciously "intersystemic" statutory interpretation paradigm. 1 2
That is, once we clarify which interpretive rules should apply in which cases,
what kind of intersystemic relationship should develop? Is the answer to keep
the worlds of state and federal interpretation as separate as possible (through,
for example, aggressive use of allocation doctrines such as certification and
abstention), or instead might there be an opportunity for a productive
intersystemic conversation? The idea of such a "dialectical federalism"" has
long been extolled in other contexts in which state and federal courts intersect 4
but seems mostly absent from statutory interpretation. Part V argues that the
development of such a dialogue might profit both systems.
Two final points. First, this Article takes Erie as its starting place and
accepts as valid the norm that Erie implements and the way in which courts
have applied it to other types of methodologies. The Article's focus, therefore,
is not on debating the merits of Erie or debating the deeper systemic question
(one much broader than statutory interpretation) of whether any legal doctrine
constrains judicial decisionmaking. Rather, the Article's focus is on why, given
the presence of lawlike methodological doctrines across most analogous areas
of law and their attendant subjection to Erie, statutory interpretation has
remained outside the door. But this is not to say that Erie is always the
dominant principle. Erie requires the application of state rules of decision only
insofar as the Constitution allows, and so there will certainly be circumstances
in which the Erie default rule - here, that federal courts should apply state rules
12. State and federal courts interpret one another's statutes every day. Indeed, some might be
surprised to learn that most federal statutory interpretation takes place in state court. See
Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 35
IND. L. REV. 335, 362 (2002).
13. Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the
Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977).
14. For examples of the extent of recent scholarly writing on the interaction of state and federal
courts across many other areas of law, see WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM,
LOCALISM AND PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY (Kathleen Claussen et al. eds., 2008); and
Symposium, The New Federalism: Plural Governance in a Decentered World, 57 EMORY L.J. 1,
1-310 (2007).
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of statutory interpretation to state law questions- should not apply." The
critical point is that no court is actually making those kinds of arguments to
justify the inconsistent approaches that have developed, likely because the
courts are not thinking of statutory interpretation methodology as real doctrine
in the first place.
Second, it should be emphasized that the question of the legal status of
statutory interpretation methodology need not be resolved in the same way
across all courts. Some states might treat interpretive methodology as law, and
others might not. And recognizing that a state court treats its own state
interpretive methodology as law does not instruct whether the federal courts
must do the same with respect to their methodology for federal statutes."
Because of the possibility of these differences, the Article's suggested answer to
the Erie puzzle -that federal courts should apply state methodology to state
statutes -illuminates but does not resolve the question of what the legal status
of federal statutory interpretation methodology should be. Accepting the
plausibility of more than one answer to that question, however, the Article
aims to illustrate why, as a matter of both doctrine and theory, there are
compelling reasons to reconceptualize federal statutory interpretation
methodology as law.
1. INDETERMINACY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND
FEDERALISM'S ARCHITECTURE OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
Until now, almost all of the academic and judicial talk about the rules of
statutory interpretation has been about what their content should be" and not
about the source of the judicial power to craft them or the legal status of the
15. The most obvious circumstance would be when a state interpretive rule conflicts with a
federal constitutional principle. The Seventh Amendment presents an example of an area in
which the Court already has held that state substantive law sometimes must give way to
other constitutional norms -in that context, the right to a jury trial. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
16. Thanks to Judith Resnik for helping me clarify this point.
17. I include in this category arguments about what the proper role of judges should be in this
endeavor-for example, whether they should be "faithful agents" of the legislature or
"partners" in the elaboration of statutory meaning-as those arguments go directly to the
content of the rules themselves. Compare STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY
WORK: A JUDGE'S VIEW (2010) (arguing that federal courts act in active partnership with
Congress in elaborating statutory meaning), and Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and
Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 225, 253-54 (1999) (same), with John F. Manning, Textualism
and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (2001) (arguing that the federal courts'
role in interpreting federal statutes is to serve as faithful agents of Congress).
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rules themselves. This Part introduces these latter topics and the current
assumptions about them.
First, and most critically, the legal status of interpretive methodology
remains unresolved. The U.S. Supreme Court generally does not treat its
methodological statements as "law," and scholars talk about statutory
interpretation methodology in a varied vocabulary in which the rules of
interpretation are described along a spectrum ranging from rules of thumb to
actual federal common law. At the same time, however, there has been
something of a statutory interpretation revolution in the states in that at least
some state courts and legislatures now explicitly treat statutory interpretation
methodology as binding law.
Second, however, the issue of whether federal judges are permitted to
create statutory interpretation principles does not appear to be in any dispute.
This makes statutory interpretation very different from other debates in the
literature about federal courts and the propriety of post-Erie federal common-
lawmaking. Erie proclaimed the end of federal general common law -a fact
that has called into question the validity of some pre-Erie principles (for
example, the intense debate over whether customary international law is
proper federal common law'). But no one has yet used those concepts to
challenge the validity of statutory interpretation methodology. Indeed, Justice
Scalia, one of the most vocal critics of federal common-lawmaking, is viewed
by many as the creator of the "new textualist" statutory interpretation
18. For an overview of that debate, see, for example, Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith &
David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie,
120 HARv. L. REV. 869 (2007); Daniel J. Meltzer, Customary International Law, Foreign
Affairs, and Federal Common Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 513 (2002); and Ernest A. Young, Sorting
Out the Debate over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 365 (2002). For an outline
of the general debate over federal common-lawmaking, see RiCHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL.,
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM ch. VII (6th ed.
2009) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. Compare Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as
a Safeguard ofFederalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1454-55 (2001) (disputing the validity of much
federal common-lawmaking and arguing that valid rules of that nature are best understood
not as federal common law but rather as deriving from a constitutional requirement), with
Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REv. 881,
884 (1986) ("[T]he bounds of federal common law are potentially much broader than is
generally supposed."), and Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers ofFederal Courts, 52
U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 3-7 (1985) (articulating a broad definition of federal common-lawmaking),
and Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 8o5, 838 (1989) ("[T]he
fashioning of federal common law . . . not only cannot be illegitimate, but rather is within




methodology." He is certainly one of its most emphatic proponents and has
never questioned judicial authority to create such rules of interpretation.
The problem here, rather, is of a different sort, occasioned by precisely this
taking for granted of the judicial ability to create and apply rules of statutory
interpretation. Because the legal status of those rules has not been explicitly
considered, there remain open questions about whether judges should be
subject to any methodological restrictions when they interpret statutes from
jurisdictions other than their own."o
A. The Unresolved Legal Status ofFederal Interpretive Methodology
The U.S. Supreme Court seems to accept, and perhaps prefers, the
unresolved legal status of federal statutory interpretation methodology. The
Court has never decided with finality what interpretive methodology applies to
federal statutes21 and does not treat its interpretive pronouncements as law. As
a result, the same methodological debates continue to be repeated in case after
case. When can extrinsic evidence of legislative purpose be consulted?" When
ig. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990). For a
notable exception to Justice Scalia's objections to federal common-lawmaking, see Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504-13 (1988).
2o. Two previous articles have briefly referenced the Erie question posed here. Both assumed
that federal courts routinely apply state methodology to state statutes, see Foster, supra note
2, at 1888 n.119; Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, us
HAuv. L. REV. 2085, 2108 (2002), but Foster also posits that "adherence to this rule may not
be uniform," Foster, supra note 2, at 1888 n.119.
21. But cf William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 352 (1990) (arguing that the Court uses a fairly predictable
array of interpretive tools, even though it does not rank them and moves back and forth
among them).
22. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1070 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that he
was persuaded to join the Court's textual analysis "because an examination of the
provision's legislative history convinces me"); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214,
243 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I write separately to emphasize ... that the relevant
context extends well beyond . .. purely textual devices."); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of
Educ., 55o U.S. 81, 1o6 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("There is no reason why we must
confine ourselves to, or begin our analysis with, the statutory text if other tools . . . provide
better evidence of congressional intent."); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S.
581, 590-91 (2004) (relying on "social history" and the legislative history of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act). For cases from the most recent completed Term in
which the Justices wrote separate opinions to argue over the propriety of the use of
legislative history, see Samantar v. Yousuf 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2287 n.9 (2010); id. at 2293 (Alito,
J., concurring); id. at 2293 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
id, at 2293-94 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini,
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text is unclear, to which source should courts turn next -legislative history or a
canon of construction?23 When multiple canons are applicable, how should
courts select among them?' These questions are often raised but, with limited
exceptions ,2 never ultimately decided.26
The specific reason for this repetition is simple: the Court does not
generally give formal stare decisis effect to its statements about statutory
interpretation methodology. Even when a majority of Justices agrees on an
interpretive principle in a particular case (e.g., "committee statements are not
reliable legislative history"), that principle is not viewed as "law" for the next
case. The Justices either believe that they cannot bind other Justices' (or future
Justices') methodological choices 7 or have implicitly concluded that it would
not be wise to do so.
Kramer & Ultrich, LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1626, 1627 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
in the judgment); Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. United States ex rel.
Wilson, 130 S. Ct. 1396, 1411 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment); id.
at 1412, 1414 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); and Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz v. United States, 130
S. Ct. 1324, 1341-42 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 129 S. Ct. 1079 (2009) (debating with the dissent whether
legislative history or the rule of lenity best resolves statutory ambiguity); Ali, 552 U.S. at 214
(debating with the dissent whether textual canons or legislative history best resolves
ambiguity).
24. See Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 50-51 (20o8); cf Cass R.
Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 498 (1989)
(arguing that interpretive practices should be ranked to make interpretation more
predictable). Divisions also remain over when particular canons apply in the first place. For
differing approaches to the use of the ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis canons, see, for
example, Ali, 552 U.S. at 230-31 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Dolan v. U.S. Postal Service, 546
U.S. 481, 495 (20o6) (Thomas, J., dissenting); and Graham County Soil & Water
Conservation District, 130 S. Ct. at 1402-04. For differing approaches to the applicability of
the presumption against preemption, see, for example, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-
95 & 11-3 (2009); id. at 1229 n.14 (Alito, J., dissenting); and Engine Manufacturers Ass'n v.
South Coast Air Quality Management District, 541 U.S. 246, 256 (2004).
25. See infra text accompanying note 31 for a discussion of the exceptions.
26. Based on her first Term, Justice Sotomayor's appointment seems to have invigorated the
interpretive debate and, in particular, highlighted the fact that the Justices still disagree
about the use of legislative history and do not view prior Court statements about the validity
of legislative history as law that binds them for the next case. See supra note 22.
27. See Rosenkranz, supra note 20, at 2144-45 ("[M]any cases feature clear majorities that
explicitly ratify the use of legislative history. But Justice Scalia never concedes that he is
bound to that methodology by stare decisis." (citation omitted)); Jonathan R. Siegel, The
Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REv. 339, 389
(2005) ("lS]tare decisis effect attaches to the ultimate holding . . . but not to general
methodological pronouncements, no matter how apparently firm."). Along the same lines,




I have previously argued that this state of affairs is problematic: among
other things, it wastes resources, deprives Congress of an incentive to
coordinate its drafting of statutes with the Court's interpretive methods, and
provides little guidance to the lower courts.s Indeed, even when the Court
does resolve a lower-court split related to statutory construction, the Court
resolves only the specific statutory-law question (e.g., whether the statutory
term "vehicle" includes a "bicycle") but does not make formal legal statements
with respect to the statutory interpretation rules used to decide that question
(e.g., whether text, legislative history, or canons of construction should be
consulted and in what order).2' As such, these decisions ensure no greater
uniformity among lower courts choosing among the same interpretive rules in
the next case. This makes statutory interpretation disputes different from
ordinary substantive-law disputes, which the Court does at least attempt to
resolve with some finality."o
This is not to say that there are not some interpretive canons on which the
Court has implicitly reached agreement or even a few exceptional areas of law
for which the Court has effectively settled on a single interpretive approach-
like the Chevron regime, which sets forth when courts should defer to agency
statutory interpretations, or the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) and Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA) contexts, in which the
Court has predefined the relevant interpretive principles for those specific
statutes."' But the Court has never acknowledged that it distinguishes among
different interpretive rules in this manner, has offered no coherent principle to
explain why it has chosen to resolve the few areas it has, and has never
provided any explicit statement that this limited set of interpretive rules is
more binding than others. Indeed, even Chevron-perhaps the most clearly
established canon of statutory interpretation- is itself exceedingly
indeterminate because step one of the Chevron inquiry requires the courts to
consult "traditional tools" of interpretation," and the Justices remain divided
over what those tools actually are."
28. Gluck, supra note 3, at 1767.
29. See Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 76 (2000) (calling
"interpretive choice" a "focus upon means, rather than ends").
30. See infra text accompanying notes 244-246 for further discussion of this point.
31. See infra Section IV.C.
32. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)-
33. See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1505-o6 (2009); id. at 1516,
1518-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing over whether courts can use legislative history to
clarify text and so prevent agency deference).
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1. Methodology as "Rules of Thumb"
Some interpreters (including, occasionally, the Court itself) contend that
this state of affairs is exactly as it should be: that the rules of interpretation are
mere "rules of thumb," and so the use of those rules in one case should not
bind judges in any other case.14 Under this logic, one could argue that as a
formal matter, state and lower federal court judges are free to apply whatever
interpretive principles they like, even ones different from the Court's. But as a
practical matter, adopting such an approach -for example, if the Tenth Circuit
or the Supreme Court of Ohio were to start giving more weight to committee
reports than to statutory text-would be courting reversal." There is at least
some constraint at work.
2. Methodology as Federal Common Law
Others have implied instead that the Court's statutory interpretation
principles are common law. 6 Yet no one has really addressed why this
common law of statutory interpretation is not routinely deemed binding on
other judges and other courts in the same way that common law ordinarily is.
Instead, what these scholars (and perhaps the "rule of thumb" camp as well)
really seem to be talking about is a form of general common law, a set of
universal principles that apply across all courts and all cases. Federal courts
themselves often refer to "universal" interpretive principles, or "traditional
34. Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992) ("[C]anons of construction are no
more than rules of thumb . . . ."); see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory
Interpretation, go COLtJM. L. REV. 609, 662 (1990); Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting the Revival of
Theory in Statutory Interpretation: A Lecture in Honor of Irving Younger, 84 MINN. L. REV. 199,
206 (1999); Jerry Mashaw, As IfRepublican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685, 1687 (1988).
35. For this reason it also is unhelpful to think of the rules of interpretation as something that
the Supreme Court hands down to the courts through its supervisory power (its power to
fashion rules of evidence and procedures for the lower federal courts), because the Court
holds a supervisory power over only federal courts, not state courts. See Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 345 (20o6).
36. Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Making ofFederal Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. REv.
825, 832-33 (2005) (arguing that the definition of federal common law is broad enough "to
encompass certain judicial determinations about the propriety of different methods of
interpretation"); Merrill, supra note 18, at 5 ("[F]ederal common law is not qualitatively
different from textual interpretation, but rather is an extension of it . . . ."); George
Rutherglen, Reconstructing Erie: A Comment on the Perils of Legal Positivism, 1o CONST.
COMMENT. 285, 294 (1993) ("The new federal common law can be defined as judicial
decisions, subject to change by Congress, about how to implement basic principles of




tools of statutory construction." 7 But Erie, of course, proclaimed the end of
federal general common law, " and, although some have argued that there still
may be a place for some limited general common law of the pre-Erie sort, 9 this
is not the prevailing view.
In the post-Erie world, most agree that legal principles previously thought
of as general common law must attach to a particular sovereign source - that is,
they should be understood as "federal common law" and/or as fifty different
bodies of state common law. Some, however, have understood the Rules of
Decision Act (the statute construed in Erie) to severely limit federal-court
power to create any federal common law, be it for state or federal legal
questions. This strong reading of the Rules of Decision Act poses a question
separate from whether local methodology follows local statutes - namely,
whether federal courts even would have the power in the first instance to create
federal common-law rules of statutory interpretation if they so desired.
As stated at the outset, the general principle that federal courts can devise
statutory interpretation methodologies has never been earnestly contested"o
and is probably too deeply entrenched to challenge seriously.4' But we do need
to situate statutory interpretation within the debates about the general
propriety of federal common-lawmaking because otherwise we cannot answer
the key overarching jurisprudential question: namely, whether the Supreme
Court's methodological statements might be thought of as "real" law that
binds the state and lower courts.
It is useful as a thought experiment to accept the broadest reading of the
Rules of Decision Act and assume that the U.S. Supreme Court does not have
the authority to create any federal common law of statutory interpretation.
37. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9; Cooper v. FAA, 596 F.3d 538, 550 (9th Cit. 2010);
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 241 (3 d Cir. 2009); United States v. Villanueva-
Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234, 1236 (D.C. Cit. 2008); Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel, Inc., 188 F.3d 172,
179 (3d Cir. 1999); Farish v. Courion Indus., 722 F.2d 74, 77 (4 th Cir. 1983).
38. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
39. Young, supra note 18 (arguing that customary international law is best conceived as "general
common law" of the pre-Erie variety). Part IV counters the argument that statutory
interpretation methodology is, in fact, general common law.
40. Some specific canons, such as the application of the Charming Betsy canon in the customary
international law context, seem to have been singled out for special (contested) treatment.
See Craig Green, Repressing Erie's Myth, 96 CALiF. L. REv. 595, 629 (20o8) (noting that some
charge that the canon gives "courts flexibility to interpret customary international law using
techniques that look much like unauthorized common law").
41. Cf Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM, L. REV. 731, 779 (2010)
(describing the "conception of an unmoored 'general law"' as a "Lost World" that "has all
but disappeared from our thinking").
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What happens then? Under the Rules of Decision Act, if there is no federal
law, state law provides the rule of decision. Thus, if there is no federal common
law of statutory interpretation, the federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme
Court, would look to state-created rules of interpretation even when
interpreting federal statutes.4 ' Hypothetically, there could be fifty different
bodies of state common law of statutory interpretation, with the consequence
that federal statutes could mean different things even within each federal
circuit .4 So, too, Congress might have to draft statutes with many potentially
different interpretive regimes in mind." The implausibility of this scenario and
its intolerable on-the-ground effects help to prove why it cannot be so. In fact,
these are precisely the kinds of circumstances in which the U.S. Supreme
Court -and even most scholars who read the Rules of Decision Act broadly -
have justified an exception to Erie's prohibition on federal common-
lawmaking.
Consider how well the Court's typical arguments justifying federal
common-lawmaking apply to statutory interpretation methodology. There is a
uniquely federal interest involved (the meaning of federal statutes); it is
grounded in a federal source (federal statutes) ;4' and there is a clear need for
federal-law uniformity. As with other types of approved federal common-
lawmaking, this type also would be restrained: it would be limited to filling
interstitial gaps in a statutory scheme.** And, similar to arguments made for
42. See Bellia, supra note 36, at 886-88.
43. This possibility stems from the fact that there is more than one state per federal circuit. That
said, it is highly unlikely there would be fifty state variations, but the ones that might exist
could be significant.
44. To the extent that methodological choice would be viewed entirely as a state-law question,
there might also be the anomalous result that such decisions would become effectively
isolated from U.S. Supreme Court review, except perhaps as to questions of preemption. Cf
Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 11i HARv. L. REV. 1824, 1832
(1998) ("[T]o treat determinations of customary international law as questions of state law
would have rendered both state court and federal diversity rulings effectively unreviewable
by the U.S. Supreme Court[,] . . . rais[ing] the specter that multiple variants of the same
international law rule could proliferate among the several states.").
45. See Bradley et al., supra note 18, at 879 ("[T]here is widespread agreement that federal
common law must be grounded in a federal law source."); see also Field, supra note 18, at 887
(arguing for a broad understanding of federal common-lawmaking authority but still
acknowledging that the "limitation ... is that the court must point to a federal enactment,
constitutional or statutory, that it interprets as authorizing the federal common law rule").
46. See Tex. Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) ("[T]he Court has
recognized the need and authority in some limited areas to formulate what has come to be
known as 'federal common law.' These instances . . . fall into essentially two categories:




common-law authority in other areas, the source of federal judicial authority to
create these interpretive principles derives from the power-given to the
federal courts by the jurisdictional statutes and Article III- to adjudicate
statutory cases." In fact, this same kind of inherent authority is used to justify
the Court's methodological work in the constitutional law context.
a. Comparisons to Federal Common-Lawmaking for Constitutional
Interpretation
Notably, however, the constitutional interpretation context looks very
different. As has been pointed out by others, the Court has, in fact, created
"real" legal doctrines to guide itself and lower courts in interpreting the
Constitution. We have many decisionmaking frameworks that apply to
subareas of constitutional law, including the tiers of scrutiny, the three-
pronged dormant Commerce Clause test, and the various First Amendment
frameworks. Whether one views these frameworks as defining substantive
constitutional rights, as implementing constitutional norms4 as
"constitutional common law,"49 or as "constitutional decision rules,""o they are
and those in which Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive law."
(citations omitted)); Bradley et al., supra note 18, at 921 ("[T]his sort of statutory gap-
filling, guided by congressional intent, is probably the most common (and uncontroversial)
type of federal common law.").
47. See Rutherglen, supra note 36, at 294; see also Merrill, supra note 18, at 42-44 (calling this
"implied delegated lawmaking"); cf Note, The Competence of Federal Courts To Formulate
Rules of Decision, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1084, 1090 (1964) ("The exercise of this judicial
competence is premised on the inevitable incompleteness of legislation. . . . In these cases it
is the task of the judiciary to fill in the legislative lacunae . . . .").
48. FALLON, supra note 11, at 5-6 ("A distinctive feature of the Supreme Court's function involves
the formulation of constitutional rules, formulas, and tests, sometimes consisting of
multiple parts. . . . [J]udicially prescribed tests do not . . . always reflect the Court's direct
assessment of constitutional meaning, but sometimes embody the Court's judgment about
an appropriate standard of judicial review . . . ."); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially
Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1274, 1316 (2006)
("Courts do not customarily divide their analyses into two parts, one involving
constitutional meaning and the other doctrinal design. ... But the failure of courts explicitly
to bifurcate their analyses hardly demonstrates that no useful distinction exists between
inquiries into constitutional meaning and the construction of doctrinal tests.").
49. Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1975).
50. See Berman, supra note 11, at 9; see also Foster, supra note 2, at 19oo-ol (pointing out that
contract and constitutional interpretation offer examples of rules that "tell judges 'how to
think"').
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indisputably viewed as "real" doctrine and not an ultra vires exercise of
improper federal common-lawmaking.
To be sure, the Court has not decided with finality on an overarching
methodology for constitutional interpretation (for example, choosing
definitively between originalism or living constitutionalism). But that is not
the point. The point is that the Court certainly has made final decisions that set
out reasoning regimes for many constitutional subareas like the ones outlined
above. To make the analogy to statutory interpretation, then, our discussion of
the legal status of methodology need not be about whether general interpretive
theories such as textualism or purposivism could or should be treated as
binding law. That question may be too broad or its stakes too high. Rather, as
in the constitutional context, we can envision that the Court could act in a
variety of more specific ways.
For example, the Supreme Court remains divided on whether legislative
history can be considered to elucidate statutory meaning and so prevent
application of the rule of lenity or Chevron deference (both of which the Court
generally turns to only when the statute is ambiguous)." The Court could
surely resolve that question and bring more clarity to those cases. So, too, the
Court could make definitive pronouncements about the credibility of legislative
history (or specific types of it), either in general or for particular statutes,
thereby settling ongoing questions about when legislative history will be
consulted. Some of these rules could be transsubstantive; some might be
intrasubstantive. The possibilities are many, and they deserve their own
separate treatment. The claim is not that the Court must apply any specific
rules, or that they need to be formalistic, or even that they must be uniform for
all statutory questions - after all, the Court does not require that we use the
same considerations to adjudicate equal protection claims as we use to
adjudicate public-forum doctrine claims. And fluid interpretive regimes would
be as valid as formalistic regimes as candidates for a common law of statutory
interpretation. The claim is simply that the Court has the power to decide these
kinds of questions and also that the Court could take relatively small steps
toward clarifying the doctrine without committing to a single overarching
interpretive regime for all statutory cases.
There are, of course, deeper philosophical debates about the merits of
doctrinal clarity or the ability of "judgment" or "interpretation" to be truly
si. See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009); id. at 1518-20 (Stevens, J.,




objective." Those debates go to all kinds of interpretation (not just statutory
interpretation), and this Article does not engage them. That said, as Mitchell
Berman has pointed out, one can believe in the indeterminacy of language but
still accept the idea of doctrinal rules that tell judges how to go about engaging
in their interpretive tasks consistently." In fact, despite those philosophical
debates about the character of law, we accept second-order rules that constrain
judges all of the time outside the statutory interpretation context, in the public-
law as well as the private-law context. Indeed, Erie itself rejected the idea that
federal courts need unrestricted flexibility to reach the "right" decisions and
instead favored a norm of consistent doctrinal decision rules. The goal of this
Article is to ask why statutory interpretation does not fit into this landscape.
3. Methodology as Something in Between
Finally, let us acknowledge that the term "law" might be too monolithic to
describe all of the different legal doctrines that judges create and follow. It is at
least in part for this reason that constitutional law scholars have struggled with
the nomenclature for the decision rules in that context. 4 In the statutory
interpretation arena, likewise, perhaps we need not agree that the rules of
interpretation are as lawlike as, say, the operative provisions of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act to acknowledge that they are more than matters of individual
judicial preference.
Indeed, federal courts already approach law on something like a spectrum
in the context of stare decisis. Federal courts give "super-strong" stare decisis
effect to substantive statutory precedents (what federal statutes mean, not what
methodology is used to interpret them) and a lower level of stare decisis to
constitutional law holdings." Methodological rules likewise might occupy a
place on that spectrum of law, perhaps meriting lower precedential weight in
52. Cf Eskridge, supra note 34, at 614 (applying Hans-Georg Gadamer's theory to statutory
interpretation).
53. Berman, supra note II, at lo.
54. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2008) (observing that stare
decisis "'ha[s] special force in the area of statutory interpretation"' (quoting Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989))); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P.
FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 642-45 (4th ed. 2007).
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order to give judges the ability to evolve interpretive doctrine over time and
respond to changes in the legislative process56 -but they might still be "law."57
The possibility that methodological rules are law, but of a different sort,
also opens up inquiries about dicta and the relationship between interpretive
rules and case holdings. The following Parts of this Article illustrate how
methodological choice can be outcome-determinative and so affect case results.
But the dicta question is something of a red herring: numerous other kinds of
interpretive frameworks that some also might call dicta-not only
constitutional frameworks but also Title VII's burden-shifting regime, the
rules of federal contract interpretation, federal choice-of-law rules, interpretive
regimes for admiralty, and so on'8 -are already viewed by state and federal
courts alike as real federal law that binds them under the Supremacy Clause in
federal-question cases. 9
56. In other words, one can acknowledge that there may be a benefit to retaining some
interpretive flexibility, cf Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI.
L. REV. 149, 152 (2001) ("[T]he expectations that legislators and judges develop about the
behavior of other actors in the lawmaking system prove self-defeating rather than self-
fulfilling, causing a cyclical pattern of continuous mutual adjustment that never reaches a
stable equilibrium."), but still believe that the rules of interpretation should be conceived as
law rather than mere judicial preference. There are plenty of legal standards that are flexible;
this does not make them not law. And even if courts retain some flexibility to change a
lawlike interpretive doctrine, what emerges after that change is still law, just new law. Cf
Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, REPRESENTATIONS, Spring 1990, at 13,
28 ("In the American legal system this authority [of the Constitution as law] appears both
flexible and inevitable. It is not disabled even if in certain cases we deny its mandate and
break with the principle of stare decisis. That is because when . . . precedent is . . . overruled,
a new decision must be announced, and . . . will be respected in accordance with the
principle of stare decisis.").
57. Mitchell Berman has made the same suggestion in the constitutional law context. See
Berman, supra note 11, at 100 ("[I]t is at least plausible ... that stare decisis should apply
with different force to operative propositions and decision rules. Courts might feel
themselves freer to be more avowedly experimentalist when announcing doctrine candidly
described as decision rules." (citation omitted)).
s8. Cf Pierre N. Leval,Judging Under the Constitution: DictaAbout Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249,
1264-65 (20o6) (arguing that all such court-created frameworks are dicta).
sq. See also Field, supra note 18, at 907, 910 (arguing that courts engage in federal common-
lawmaking when they "creat[e] contract rules to govern section 301 labor disputes ... [and]
rules for interstate disputes" and also when the Court implies a federal cause of action);
Peter L. Strauss, The Perils of Theory, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1587-89 (20o8)
(discussing more federal common law regimes); cf Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95 (1962) (holding that not only federal but also state courts must be bound by




B. Different Questions Raised by Statutory Interpretation in the States
Underlying the question of whether state and federal courts should apply
one another's interpretive methodologies to one another's statutes is the
assumption that there may be a difference between those methodologies. This
question previously may have been given short shrift based on an intuition
similar to the "general common law" gloss discussed above -namely, that all
courts apply the same interpretive rules. That assumption, however, is
mistaken. In a previous article,6 o I illustrated that some state courts have
diverged from federal interpretive practice in significant ways. Some courts, for
example, have imposed multistep frameworks that dictate what interpretive
tools, in what order, courts should consult when they interpret statutes. 6' A
number of state courts also give their methodological statements stare decisis
effect. In Oregon, for example, the state supreme court has held that courts
may not use a "substantive canon" of construction- such as the rule of lenity,
the canon of constitutional avoidance, or the presumption against implied
repeals -unless the court has first examined text and legislative history and still
found the statute ambiguous. In contrast, many federal judges, particularly
those who call themselves textualists, would, if left to their own devices, apply
such a canon before (or to the exclusion of) consulting legislative history. As
another example, in Michigan, between 1999 and 20o6, use of the canon that
statutes shall not be interpreted to reach absurd results (the rule against
absurdities) was not permitted at all. 6 ' But the rule against absurdities was in
play in the federal arena throughout the entire period.63
Another state development of particular note is the large number of state
legislatures that have enacted statutes setting forth rules of construction to
govern the state courts' statutory interpretation processes.6 4 Most outsiders
surely would regard such interpretive statutes as "law." And yet, in a surprising
6o. Gluck, supra note 3.
61. See, e.g., Petersen v. Magna Corp., 773 N.W.2d 564 (Mich. 2009); Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Bureau of Labor & Indus., 859 P.2d 1143 (Or. 1993), modified, State v. Gaines, 206 P.3 d 1042
(Or. 2009); Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); State ex rel. Kalal v.
Circuit Court, 681 N.W.2d 11o (Wis. 2004).
62. See Cameron v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 718 N.W.2d 784 (Mich. 20o6) (reinstating rule);
People v. McIntire, 599 N.W.2d 102, 107-09 (Mich. 1999) (banning rule).
63. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2387, 2389 (2003) ("[T]he
absurdity doctrine has been one of the few fixed points in the Court's frequently shifting
interpretive regimes.").
64. See generally Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J.
341 (2oo).
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twist, many state courts are not following those legislative directives. One state
court has opined that legislated interpretive rules violate separation of
powers." Many other state courts leave these legislated interpretive rules on
the books but ignore them.6 "
Clearly, these state developments further confound the "what is
methodology" question. The state courts that impose controlling interpretive
frameworks and give their methodological statements stare decisis effect treat
judicially articulated rules of interpretation as "real" common law. But the fact
that there also are states that do not have such frameworks means that it might
be the case that the legal status of statutory interpretation methodology
currently differs across various states -a complicating factor for federal courts
trying to apply state law.
So too, the existence of legislatively enacted principles of statutory
interpretation demonstrates that at least some state legislatures conceive of
these principles as law that can be legislated. But even in states that have made
these moves, the legal status of methodology is not entirely clear. For example,
if the state courts' rules of interpretation are ordinary common law, then state
legislatures should be able to override them with legislated rules of
interpretation. Indeed, this is precisely what the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) does: it overrides any contrary common law principles of contract
interpretation and imposes its own interpretive rules. State courts do not object
to this display in the U.C.C. of legislative interpretive authority. But in the
state statutory interpretation context, legislated laws of statutory interpretation
appear to be laws of which courts particularly disapprove.
65. Evans v. State, 872 A.2d 539 (Del. 2005).
66. See Gluck, supra note 3, at 1782-97 (describing the Oregon, Connecticut, and Texas supreme
courts' evasion of legislated rules concerning extrinsic aids). For examples of many more
state courts ignoring state statutes abolishing canons such as the rule of lenity and the
presumption that statutes in derogation of the common law be strictly construed, see Hayes
v. Continental Insurance Co., 872 P.2d 668, 676-78 (Ariz. 1994); Brodie v. Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board, 156 P.3 d 1100, 1107 (Cal. 2007); Thomson v. City of Lewiston,
50 P. 3d 488, 493 (Idaho 2002); State v. Dullard, 668 N.W.2d 585, 595 (Iowa 2003); Sunburst
School District No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 165 P-3 d 1079, 1091 (Mont. 2007); Burke v. Webb Boats,
Inc., 37 P- 3d 811, 814 (Okla. 2001); Everhart v. PMA Insurance Group, 938 A.2d 301, 307 (Pa.
2007); and Zachary Price, The Rule ofLenity as a Rule ofStructure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885,
904 (2004) (summarizing the responses of state courts to legislative abrogation of the lenity
canon). Cf Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
2162, 2203-06, 2268 & nn.359-60 (2002) (summarizing the phenomenon of states legislating




C. The Architecture of Concurrent Jurisdiction and the Erie Doctrine
Finally, to understand the courts' approach to statutory cases that involve a
crossover between federal courts and state law, or vice versa, it is important to
appreciate the baggage that courts bring to them. Many courts place what I will
argue is an undue emphasis on the structural differences between the
authoritativeness of state and federal courts when they interpret one another's
statutes. This Section sets out those structural differences and provides a brief
overview of what an Erie analysis of statutory interpretation methodology
looks like.
1. The Asymmetrical Structure of Concurrent Jurisdiction
For most questions of statutory interpretation, state and federal courts
share jurisdiction. As elaborated below, federal courts hear state statutory
claims in many different postures, ranging from diversity cases in which no
question of substantive federal law is presented to federal-question cases in
which the dominant question is one of federal law but a state statutory
question is embedded.6 7 And state courts, with the limited exception of cases
over which there is exclusive federal-court jurisdiction, 8  sit with equal
authority and duty to hear any federal statutory claim, regardless of whether
there is a state-law issue in the case.69
Yet despite this shared authority, there is an asymmetry in the procedural
architecture that governs state and federal judgments in these crossover cases.
There are two primary reasons for this. First, whereas state courts are as
authoritative as federal courts on questions of federal law,7 o federal courts are
inferior to state supreme courts on state-law questions7' and "long have
67. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (20o6) (federal-question jurisdiction); id. § 1332 (diversity
jurisdiction); id. § 1367 (supplemental jurisdiction).
68. For areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction, see, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (20o6) (federal
criminal prosecutions); 28 U.S.C. 5 1333 (admiralty); id. § 1334 (bankruptcy); and id. § 1338
(patents, copyrights, and trademarks).
69. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
70. See Martin H. Redish, Supreme Court Review of State Court "Federal" Decisions: A Study in
Interactive Federalism, 19 GA. L. REv. 861, 890-91 (1985).
71. King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am., 333 U.S. 153, 157 (1948); Angel v.
Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 186-87 (1947).
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understood state courts to be the authoritative interpreters of state law."7
That, of course, is one key holding of Erie.
Second, whereas a state supreme court's construction of a federal statute is
reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court, a federal court's construction of a state
statute is not reviewable by the state court of last resort. State supreme courts
do not have jurisdiction to review the rulings of federal appellate courts, even
when those rulings are on state-law questions. Nor does the U.S. Supreme
Court generally review questions of pure state law 7 -even when those
questions are decided by lower federal courts.74
Of course, because the U.S. Supreme Court accepts so few cases for review,
the practical effect of this asymmetry is quite small. In reality, state supreme
courts, like the federal courts of appeals, are able to offer the last word in most
federal-law cases, even though those decisions cannot bind the U.S. Supreme
Court or other federal tribunals. Yet despite this reality, as we shall see, state
and federal courts alike give enormous weight to the formal structural
differences: federal courts are sometimes extremely restrained state statutory
interpreters, whereas state supreme courts are typically independent federal
statutory interpreters.
2. The Erie Doctrine
The core components of the Erie doctrine and the problems it aims to
address are familiar territory and so merit only a brief summary here. Erie and
its progeny have established a bifurcated inquiry for cases in which federal
courts are required to interpret state law. Where there is no federal statute or
rule on point, federal courts face "the typical, relatively unguided Erie
choice."76 In this situation, courts follow the Rules of Decision Act, which
provides that "[t] he laws of the several states . . . shall be regarded as rules of
decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
72. Robert A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1399, 1408 (2005).
73. See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
74. Cf SUP. CT. R. 10 (listing the grounds for certiorari and not including questions of pure
state law).
75. See James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of
Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 191, 233 (2007) (stating that, because of
the rarity of U.S. Supreme Court review, "state courts now exercise final authority in
virtually every federal question case that comes before them").




apply."" In deciding whether state law provides a "rule of decision," courts are
to consider whether "the outcome of the litigation in the federal court [would]
be substantially the same . . . as it would be if tried in a State court";' whether
the state-law rule was "intended to be bound up with the definition of the
rights and obligations of the parties";" and whether the application of state
law would further "the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum
shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws."so
On the other hand, when there is a valid federal statute or promulgated
rule on point, the federal statute or rule controls, provided that Congress has
the power to enact it. Because Congress's rulemaking authority is limited by
statute to procedural matters, the Court will apply an enacted federal rule if it
can be rationally characterized as procedural."
Two clarifying points are in order about how these principles apply to
statutory interpretation methodology. First, the relevant question in this
context is not what most people think of as the typical Erie statutory question.
If a federal court hears a statutory tort dispute between citizens of New York
and New Jersey, the Erie question that comes immediately to mind is whether
the New York, New Jersey, or federal tort statute governs the dispute. But this
Article's focus is on the next step, namely, what happens once whichever
statute is chosen must be construed. Once the New York tort statute is chosen,
for example, the question may arise whether the conduct at issue involves a
"vehicle" as defined by that statute. This Article's concern is how, if at all, the
Erie doctrine affects the federal court's decision whether to look to a dictionary,
the legislative history, a canon of construction, or some other interpretive tool
to decide that question.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006); see Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States:
Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1459, 1491 (1997); Adam N.
Steinman, What is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It Mean for the Contemporary Politics of
Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 245, 265 (2oog).
78. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
79. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 536 (1958).
8o. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468; see also Clark, supra note 77, at 1491 (quoting Erie and describing
the doctrine).
81. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442 (2010)
("Congress has ... undoubted power to prescribe rules for the courts it has created, so long
as those rules regulate matters 'rationally capable of classification' as procedure." (citing
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472)). The Rules Enabling Act provides: "The Supreme Court shall have
the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure . . . for cases in the United
States district courts . .. and courts of appeals." 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a).
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As a second clarifying point, there are currently no "Federal Rules of
Statutory Interpretation.""s Thus, interpretation of state statutory law sits
squarely within the first prong of the Erie doctrine-when there is no federal
rule on point-and so the focus for Erie purposes is on whether state
interpretive methodology provides a "rule of decision"; that is, whether it is
outcome-determinative and whether applying it serves Erie's "twin aims." As a
matter of doctrinal precision, therefore, we need not now resolve whether a
particular canon of interpretation is "substantive" or "procedural" -that
inquiry, as previously noted, applies only when courts must determine whether
an enacted federal rule or statute can displace state law. Nevertheless, because
for many judges Erie is (as understood at a high level of generality) about
substance and procedure, in Part IV, this Article offers some arguments
supporting the view that many, if not all, rules of statutory interpretation are
"substantive."8 ,
11. FEDERAL COURTS AND STATE STATUTES
A lack of precision about the legal status of methodology and exaggerations
about institutional differences have produced a vast doctrinal muddle on the
ground. This Part uses a large number of case studies to illustrate the problem
and its implications for intersystemic statutory interpretation.
Most importantly, the federal courts are wholly inconsistent about whether
state or federal methodology applies to state statutes. They either do not seem
aware that there is a choice to be made at all or are resisting the application of
state methodology for reasons that they do not explicitly acknowledge.
Moreover, even when federal courts do engage state methodology, other
puzzles emerge. For example, even those federal courts that sometimes look to
state methodology in diversity cases do not always recognize that many state
statutory interpretation questions presented in nondiversity cases should be
82. See Rosenkranz, supra note 20. There is a Federal Dictionary Act, but it covers only the
simplest interpretive conventions and its application is optional. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (20o6)
(allowing the Act to be ignored if "the context indicates otherwise" and covering matters
such as "words importing the plural include the singular; words importing the masculine
gender include the feminine").
83. It is of course possible that some rules of statutory interpretation might be more substantive
than others, although a canon-by-canon analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. Even so,
such a conclusion would not diminish the point that courts should be engaging in the Erie
analysis in the context of statutory interpretation methodology. Nor would a conclusion that
some rules of statutory interpretation are more procedural than substantive mean that those





interpreted in the same way, with reference to state interpretive principles. Nor
do the federal courts seem to reflect on the implications of their state statutory
work for their own federal interpretive efforts. For example, even when federal
courts recognize that some states treat methodology as "law," they never seem
to question why federal methodology does not get the same treatment.
The focus of this Part is descriptive and doctrinal; the Article takes up the
theoretical implications of these cases in Part IV, as well as counterarguments
to the view that Erie applies in this context. This Part likewise defers until Part
IV the larger jurisprudential question of what statutory interpretation "is" and
from where it "emanates" -because, notably, the courts themselves do not
acknowledge that question as one that drives their behavior in these cases. In
other words, the federal courts do not argue that methodology is not law or
that it is rooted in Article III in order to justify their inconsistent approaches or
their bypassing of state statutory interpretation methodology. Instead, the
federal courts generally do not acknowledge that there is an inconsistency,
much less an Erie question, to explain in the first place.
The Article's own methodological approach to these crossover cases is
empirical but not comprehensive. Review of a decade's worth of crossover
cases revealed significant inconsistencies in the ways in which the federal
courts approached the Erie questions discussed. The cases described in this
84. With the exception of limited earlier work on state courts, see Gluck, supra note 3; see also
Elhauge, supra note 66 (discussing state-legislated rules), and one preliminary study of
statutory interpretation by federal courts of appeals, see FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 180-200 (2009), there are no inclusive studies
that generally describe the statutory interpretation practices of state and lower federal
courts. As a result of my prior work, which identified distinctive interpretive methodologies
in five states, the question naturally arose whether the corresponding five federal circuit
courts had taken note of those distinctive approaches and were using them when
interpreting state law themselves. Using the Westlaw Key Numbers database, I reviewed all
federal appellate decisions for those five circuits (the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Ninth) over the past decade that Westlaw coded as both "Statutes" cases and "Federal
Courts/State Laws as Rules of Decision" cases. Cases coded in this manner are generally
those in which courts explicitly discuss statutory interpretation methodology. I also
searched for relevant cases in different ways, including searching for any federal case that
cited the leading statutory interpretation opinions from the five states as well as searching
through the general Westlaw "Statutes" Key Number database for any case from those
circuits referring to the five states' names in conjunction with the term "diversity." As a
result of that research, I expanded my inquiry to all of the circuits and the U.S. Supreme
Court, using the same search strategies, and to the state supreme courts for the reverse-Erie
research. Two previous articles facilitated my reverse-Erie research. See Wrabley, supra note
to; Zeigler, supra note 2. Both discuss which states refuse to defer to the federal-law
decisions of their corresponding federal circuit courts in making substantive-law decisions
(not focusing on choice of interpretive methodology). For this Article's purposes, I
examined the methodological choices in those state cases that considered federal statutory
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and the next Part offer examples but not the full scope of such imprecision. At
the same time, they do not appear to be outliers. Also included are examples of
where the courts (in the author's view) got the Erie question right. The
purpose simply is to show that the courts are approaching these cases
inconsistently and, at least some of the time, incorrectly.
A. Three Ways in Which State Statutes Come to Federal Court for Interpretation
State statutes arrive in federal court for interpretation in many postures,
but there are three basic case patterns that cover most of the relevant statutory
interpretation terrain: diversity cases, federal-question cases that may turn on
an issue of state law, and cases challenging the federal constitutionality of state
statutes. 5 (There are other case patterns, such as state claims that are
supplemental to federal questions, but most such cases can be analyzed under
the framework of one of the three categories provided.86 ) It is important to
remember that the Erie doctrine applies in federal-question and federal
constitutional cases, just as it does in diversity cases, provided that an
analytically separate question of state law is presented."
In all three types of cases, notwithstanding their different jurisdictional
postures, the underlying question - what the state statute means - remains the
same. Thus, so should the interpretive method. In other words, if one agrees
that, in the straight diversity case, state methodology should be used to
interpret state statutes, then once we distill the fact that many nondiversity
cases present essentially identical questions of state statutory interpretation,
Erie makes clear that the same approach should apply. Current practice,
however, does not reflect this intuition.
questions and also cited the state's leading reverse-Erie case (the case establishing what, if
any, deference the state court accords federal court decisions on federal law).
85. Constitutional challenges are, of course, federal-question cases too, but as we shall see in
Subsection II.C.3, in the context of methodological choice, these crossover constitutional
cases often get different treatment.
86. For example, supplemental jurisdiction cases usually will be analyzed using the same
template as diversity cases because the supplemental claim typically involves questions only
of state law, even though the head of jurisdiction is the "arising under" (federal-question)
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (20o6).
8. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 18, at 563; PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR.,
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 21 (6th ed. 2008); 19
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4520 (2d ed. 1996 &





At least four distinct methodological problems arise when federal courts
interpret state statutes in diversity cases, and these problems sometimes arise
simultaneously within a single case. First, some federal courts, in seeking to
"predict" how a state court would decide the statutory question, use the same
methodology that federal courts use for common-law cases - consultation of
other jurisdictions' practices, treaties, etc. -rather than simply applying the
state supreme court's statutory interpretation methodology. Second, some
federal courts apply federal statutory interpretation principles or a mix of
federal and state interpretive principles to construe state statutes. Third, federal
courts often must navigate the difficult situation of interpreting a state statute
when the state's highest court itself evades state-legislated rules of
construction. And fourth, some federal courts refuse to interpret state statutes
"dynamically"88 (that is, to update them through interpretation to reach
unforeseen problems), even in situations in which it is assumed that the state
supreme court would do so.
i. Problem i: The Tools that Courts Will Use To "Predict" State Law
In the most straightforward diversity case, in which there is no potentially
applicable federal rule or statute to complicate matters, the Rules of Decision
Act and the Erie line of cases require federal courts to apply state law. No
federal court disputes this fundamental principle. If the state law at issue is a
statute, and the state supreme court has previously decided the precise
statutory question raised in the diversity case, there is universal agreement that
federal courts must follow that state supreme court decision.8 ' But when the
state supreme court has not yet applied the relevant statute to the question at
hand, the federal court must figure out how to do so itself, or utilize a
procedural mechanism (such as abstention or certification, discussed later in
the Article) to send the case to the state supreme court for decision. If they do
not certify or abstain, most federal courts take the position that they must
"predict" the result that the state supreme court would reach.9o
88. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
8g. See, e.g., World Harvest Church, Inc. v. GuideOne Mut. Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 950, 957 (11th
Cir. 2009); Golden W. Ref. Co. v. SunTrust Bank, 538 F.3d 1233, 1237 (9 th Cir. 2008);
Savedoff v. Access Group, Inc., 524 F.3d 754, 762 (6th Cir. 2008); HOK Sport, Inc. v. FC
Des Moines, L.C., 495 F.3 d 927, 934-45 (8th Cir. 2007).
go. Although commentators dispute whether this "prediction" approach is the correct one, see,
e.g., Clark, supra note 77, at 1461; Dorf, supra note 2, at 705, the federal courts agree on it, see,
1927
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The first-order question here, as many federal courts see it, is what sources
they should consult to help them in that predictive task. The federal courts
have a long-established tradition of using for this purpose an eclectic set of
materials, what is sometimes referred to as the "all available data" test.91 Under
that practice, federal courts look to:
"decisions of state intermediate appellate courts, of federal courts
interpreting that state's law, and of other state supreme courts that have
addressed the issue," as well as to "analogous decisions, considered
dicta, scholarly works, and any other reliable data tending convincingly
to show how the highest court in the state would decide the issue at
hand."9
It is questionable, however, whether such an eclectic methodology should
be used for matters of state statutory interpretation. Unlike in common law
interpretation (and perhaps not even there), neither state nor federal courts
typically use so many extrinsic materials in statutory interpretation. Instead, it
seems that the federal courts should ask whether the highest state court would
look to those same extrinsic materials. Of course, using a state court's
interpretive methodology is itself one way of predicting which sources the state
courts will consider to decide a case. 93 But many federal courts do not approach
the state cases in this way.
e.g., Berrier v. Simplicity Mfg., Inc., 563 F.3d 38, 45-46 (3d Cir. 2009); Baltzell v. R & R
Trucking Co., 554 F-3d 1124, 1130 (7th Cir. 2009); Pennington v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 553 F.3d 447, 450 (6th Cir. 2009); Ashley Cnty. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659, 665 (8th
Cir. 2009); Andrew Robinson Int'l, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 547 F.3d 48, 51 (1st Cir.
20o8); STL 300 N. 4 th, LLC v. Value St. Louis Assocs., L.P., 540 F.3d 788, 792 (8th Cit.
20o8); Giles v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 494 F-3d 865, 872 (9 th Cit. 2007); Wade v.
Emcasco Ins. Co., 483 F.3d 657, 666 (soth Cir. 2007).
91. Dorf, supra note 2, at 697-98; see Benjamin C. Glassman, Making State Law in Federal Court,
41 GONZ. L. REV. 237, 264-67 (2005-o6) (discussing and compiling cases); Logan, supra note
2, at 1254-55 (same).
92. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Basell USA Inc., 512 F.3d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Koppers Co.
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 144o, 1445 (3 d Cit. 1996)). For other examples of
substantially the same test, see Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., ss F.3d 383, 392 (5th
Cir. 2009); Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 635 (7th Cit. 2007); Giles, 494
F.3d at 872; Progressive Casualty Insurance Co. v. Engemann, 268 F.3d 985, 988 (ioth Cir.
2001); and Leon's Bakery, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 990 F.2d 4 4, 48 (2d Cit. 1993).
93. Cf Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects ofInferior Court
Decisionmaking, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1, 20-21 (1994) ("[T]he federal courts frequently consult
various predictive data beyond traditional sources of positive law within the relevant state,




Consider, for example, Combs v. International Insurance Co., in which the
Sixth Circuit had to construe Kentucky's statute-of-limitations borrowing
statute.94 After setting forth that Erie required it to predict how the Kentucky
Supreme Court would decide the statutory question, the Sixth Circuit
articulated the all-available-data approach as the methodology that it would
use to construe the state statute. The court then proceeded to examine (in
order) a wide array of extrinsic interpretive aids: federal-court statutory
interpretation precedents from other circuits; Idaho law; the common law
history of statutes of limitations, various treatises and law reviews, several U.S.
Supreme Court cases, and the laws of five other states with similar laws. It then
engaged in a broad discussion about the purposes of borrowing statutes. 9s
Only after that did the Sixth Circuit cite one Kentucky case for a possible
methodology -namely, the proposition that courts should not add text that has
been omitted. But unnoted by the Sixth Circuit was the fact that this very
Kentucky case derived from a line of Kentucky Supreme Court cases
prohibiting Kentucky courts from consulting nontextual evidence before first
engaging in textual analysis and making a threshold finding of ambiguity. 6
The Sixth Circuit instead engaged in much wider-ranging nontextual analysis
(the all-available-data test) than is typically used by the Kentucky Supreme
Court. And it ultimately based its conclusion in the case on factors that the
Kentucky Supreme Court likely would not have relied upon-namely, that
"other state supreme courts have read [plaintiffs' suggested language] into
borrowing statutes that lacked such express language."" Other federal courts
likewise routinely apply the same type of common-law, eclectic approach to
resolve state statutory questions.98
This federal-court approach is puzzling when state law itself provides the
answer to the prediction question. If the state court already has set out its
94. 354 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2004).
9s. Id. at 577-80.
96. Id. at 592 (citing Flying J Travel Plaza v. Commonwealth, 928 S.W.2d 344, 347 (Ky. 1996));
see also Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 689 S.W.2d 14 (Ky. 1985).
97. Id.
g8. See, e.g., Williams v. United Parcel Serv., 527 F. 3d 1135, 1140-41 (loth Cir. 2008) (using
"language, . . . decisions of other state appellate courts, and ... the evident purposes of the
statute" and first looking to ten other state courts' decisions before returning to the purpose
of the Oklahoma statute at issue and citing an Oklahoma case for the proposition that a
legislature's purpose is important); Vasquez v. N. Cnty. Transit Dist., 292 F.3 d 1049, 1o61
( 9th Cir. 2002) (looking to treatises and laws of other states to interpret questions of state
law); Fieger v. Pitney Bowes Credit Corp., 251 F. 3d 386, 399 (2d Cir. 2001) (construing a
Connecticut statute and considering as "[o]ther data ... relevant case law from other
jurisdictions" and scholarly writings).
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decisionmaking process in the form of a predefined statutory interpretation
methodology, then state law provides a path to approximating how the state's
highest court would resolve the case." And even if the state applies an eclectic
approach, a federal court seeking to predict how that state's highest court
would interpret a state statute should use precisely that approach; a different,
less eclectic approach (e.g., textualism) is less likely to produce the same result.
Indeed, as Michael Dorf notes, "Erie has been generally understood to
require federal court adherence to state 'meta' principles of law."oo As an
example (one used by Dorf as well), consider choice of law, a methodology that
has important similarities to statutory interpretation. Like statutory
interpretation rules, choice-of-law rules are decisionmaking (meta) regimes;
they provide courts with a reasoning process to determine which state's laws
control.'o' Of course, the U.S. Supreme Court held long ago in Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. that, in a diversity case, Erie requires that the
forum state's choice-of-law principles govern the federal-court decisionmaking
process."o2 The driving notion behind Klaxon is the idea of state-/federal-court
decisionmaking-process uniformity. This idea also has great purchase for
statutory interpretation. In other words, at least in some cases, Erie is not only
about reaching the same result as the home court, but also about using the
home court's methods. o3
2. Problem 2: Mixing Federal and State Methodology
Even in diversity cases in which the federal courts do not use the common-
law all-available-data test, examples abound in which the federal court still
relies on something other than state statutory interpretation methodology-
usually federal statutory interpretation cases-to decide the applicable rules of
construction. But these choices are not consistent, even within each circuit.0 4
99. Dorf, supra note 2, at 710.
ioo. Id. at 713.
10i. In this sense, the choice-of-law inquiry is one step further removed from the ultimate
decision than is the statutory-interpretation-methodology inquiry.
102. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,496 (1941).
103. The importance of this principle is also evident in recent scholarly criticism concerning the
practice of states not applying other states' choice-of-law regimes. See, e.g., Michael S. Green,
Erie's Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2011) (criticizing that some states
"do not use the predictive method when interpreting the unsettled law of sister states").
104. Compare Parish Oil Co v. Dillon Co., 523 F. 3d 1244, 1248-54 (ioth Cir. 20o8) (holding that
because the court was "sitting in diversity and construing a Colorado statute," it had to give




The Fifth Circuit is apparently the only court expressly and consistently to hold
that Erie requires it to use state methodology for state statutes in diversity.105 A
few examples will illustrate the problem.
a. Using Federal Methodology
Consider, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court's most recent Erie decision,
Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.,1o6 which
overlooked the fact that there might be Erie questions related to the choice of
statutory interpretation methodology in addition to and apart from the
"regular" Erie question in the case. At issue in Shady Grove was a typical Erie
question: a purported conflict between a New York statute and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. (Specifically, the question was whether a New York
statute prohibiting class actions to recover state-law penalties conflicted with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23's class certification requirements."o') But a
critical, initial aspect of the case actually turned on a question of state statutory
interpretation: in order to decide which prong of the Erie framework was
implicated in the case, the Court first had to decide whether there was a
conflict between the New York statute and Rule 23. Both the majority and the
dissent construed the New York statute in deciding that question.o 8 Justice
federal statutory interpretation cases to justify its chosen rules of construction), with Ward
v. Utah, 398 F.3d 1239, 1248 (loth Cir. 2005) (holding that the court must "interpret state
laws according to state rules of statutory construction" and looking to state law to determine
the governing rules). Some federal courts at times apply state methodology without
explicitly stating that Erie is the reason that they do so. See, e.g., In re W. Iowa Limestone,
Inc., 538 F.3d 858, 863 (8th Cit. 2008); Volvo Trademark Holding Aktiebolaget v. Clark
Mach. Co., 51o F.3d 474,482 (4 th Cir. 2007); Gershman v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa., 251
F.3 d 1159, 1162-63 (8th Cir. 2001).
105. See In re Whitaker Constr. Co., 439 F.3d 212, 222 (5th Cir. 2006); Occidental Chem. Corp. v.
Elliott Turbomachinery Co., 84 F.3d 172, 175 (5th Cit. 1996) (relying on a passage from
Graham v. Milky Way Barge, Inc., 824 F.2d 376, 381 (5th Cir. 1987), itself expressly based on
Erie). Other Fifth Circuit decisions do not explicitly cite Erie but nevertheless hold that the
federal court is required to apply the state canons of construction in diversity cases. See, e.g.,
Wright v. Ford Motor Co., 508 F. 3 d 263, 269-70 (sth Cir. 2007).
io6. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).
107. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 20o6).
lo8. This part of the opinion (Part II-A) garnered a majority, and the question that it was
addressing should not be confused with Justice Scalia's arguments for a plurality in the next
part (Part II-B) in which the inquiry was different and the importance of state statutory
interpretation was in dispute. In the latter part, once Justice Scalia identified a conflict
between the New York statute and the Federal Rule, he argued that any issues of state
statutory construction were irrelevant and all that mattered for an Erie inquiry under the
Rules Enabling Act was whether the Federal Rule "really regulat[es] procedure." 130 S. Ct.
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Scalia's opinion for the Court gave the New York statute a textual reading and
argued that such a reading put it in direct conflict with Rule 23.09 Justice
Ginsburg's dissent, in contrast, argued that, under a purposivist construction
of the New York statute, there was no conflict; the statute's purpose, even if
not its literal language, was only to restrict remedies and did not concern the
question of class certification.o10 Neither side, however, considered whether
New York's highest court would consult legislative history and purpose (as
Justice Ginsburg did) or whether it would favor a literal approach (as Justice
Scalia did). Instead, each looked only to federal statutory interpretation
111cases.
In fact, Justice Scalia's reasoning for the Court in Shady Grove seems to
challenge the entire premise of this Article, in that it implies that it might never
be appropriate for federal courts to apply state interpretive methodology. In
critiquing Justice Ginsburg's purposivist approach, Justice Scalia argued that, if
consultation of state legislative intent were required, "federal judges would be
condemned to poring through state legislative history-which may be less
easily obtained, less thorough, and less familiar than its federal counterpart."112
Indeed! Many state courts do routinely consult legislative history."' And if Erie
requires federal courts to apply state interpretive methodologies to state
at 1442; see id. at 1444 (describing "the framework we apply-which requires first,
determining whether the federal and state rules can be reconciled . . . and second, if they
cannot, determining whether the Federal Rule runs afoul of [the Rules Enabling Act]," and
disputing Justice Stevens's insistence, with respect to the second inquiry, that the character
of the state law also should be considered); id. at 1444-47 (arguing that Justice Stevens's
approach conflicts with Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) and Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
312 U.S. 1 (1941)). This aspect of the opinion (and of Erie) is not our concern here. Once a
federal rule is found to be on point, as discussed in Part I of this Article, supra note 81 and
accompanying text, the Erie inquiry changes and becomes a Rules Enabling Act inquiry, in
which the focus is on the character of the federal rule (not the state rule), rather than a Rules
of Decision Act inquiry. This Article is concerned with the kinds of questions presented in
Part 11-A of Shady Grove: the initial question-before the Rules Enabling Act is even
implicated -about whether the state and federal laws are in conflict. Critically, both sides in
Shady Grove construed the state statute to make that initial decision. But Shady Grove never
directly faced this question about the relevance of state statutory interpretation methodology
in diversity litigation.
log. See 130 S. Ct. at 1440 (focusing on the "literal" terms of the New York statute and refusing
to allow statutory purpose to override textual evidence).
no. Id. at 1467 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see id. at 1465 ("The Court, I am convinced, finds
conflict where none is necessary.").
ill. See, e.g., id. at 1440 (majority opinion); id. at 1469 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 1441 (majority opinion).





statutes, federal courts should be consulting state legislative history often
because many state courts do.
As it turns out, Justice Ginsburg's dissent (although it did not cite the state
cases) better approximated the generally purposive approach of the New York
Court of Appeals. It therefore is not clear that the question of the purported
conflict between the state law and federal rule -and so the outcome of the
case-would have been resolved in the same way had the case been heard in
state court instead or had the majority of the Court itself applied the Erie-based
analysis advocated by this Article. 14 Cases like this may consequently present
interesting legisprudential dilemmas for judges who, like Justice Scalia,
forcefully defend the proposition that Erie requires federal courts to apply state
law as they find it but may fundamentally disagree with what they find (such
as routine recourse to evidence of purpose and legislative history).
b. Using Both Federal and State Methodology
Another typical scenario is one in which the federal court cites both federal
and state cases for each of its methodological choices. From a doctrinal
perspective, this practice of citing state and federal cases together is confusing.
When, for example, the Ninth Circuit refuses to interpret a California statute
to render part of it superfluous and cites directly to both a federal and a
California case in support,"' what is it telling us about the legal status of the
rules of interpretation? Federal courts that follow this practice appear either to
view the rules as universal or to feel the need to buttress their state
methodological choices with federal authority-or perhaps are just uncertain
about which court's rules apply.
A different kind of concern arises when federal courts, even as they do cite
the state cases, cite cases that are outdated from a methodological perspective.
A number of state courts, for example, are more textualist now than they were
twenty years ago, and so older cases do not always accurately represent the
114. Cf Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice ofLaw in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and
Shady Grove 67 (U. Pa. L. Sch., Pub. L. Res. Paper No. lo-28), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1665092 (arguing that determining the meaning of the
New York statute in Shady Grove effectively predetermined the outcome by deciding into
which prong of Erie the case falls and stating that "Shady Grove is important because the way
the Court interprets ambiguous state statutes will affect outcomes").
115. Golden W. Ref. Co. v. Suntrust Bank, 538 F.3 d 1233, 1239 (9th Cit. 2008); see also Diaz-
Ramos v. Hyundai Motor Co., 501 F. 3d 12, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2007) (concerning the repeals by
implication doctrine, citing one Puerto Rico case and three U.S. Supreme Court cases).
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state's current methodology."' These citation choices are likely due to errors by
law clerks or lawyers or to the tendency of courts to rely on the same
(sometimes outdated) set of boilerplate precedents from case to case, and we
should assume that they are unintentional. But there is always the remote
possibility that something more is going on. Is it possible, for instance, that the
federal courts are attempting to push back against state-court tendencies
toward textualism by preferring older, less textual state precedents?
(Admittedly, this is unlikely.) A more plausible alternative is that the federal
courts are not training close attention on state interpretive methods because
they do not view them as doctrine.
3. Problem 3: Conflicts Between State Courts and State-Legislated
Interpretive Rules
The next problem arises when federal courts are confronted with a rule of
interpretation that has been enacted as a statute by a state legislature but that
the state's supreme court refuses to apply. So assume, for example, that a state
legislature enacts a statute directing that legislative history always be consulted
but the state supreme court ignores the legislated rule and does not consult
legislative history if the statutory text is unambiguous. Assume now that the
regional federal circuit court is asked, in a diversity case, to interpret a statute
that the state supreme court has never before interpreted. Which side of the
116. For example, in KLC, Inc. v. Trayner, 426 F. 3d 172, 175-76 (2d Cir. 2005), which construed a
Connecticut judgment-lien statute, the Second Circuit began with a discussion of English
common law and mainstream law review articles about homestead exemptions generally,
then opined: "In determining the meaning of state law, we must carefully predict how the
state's highest court would rule if confronted with the issue. . . ." The court then cited a mix
of federal statutory and pre-20o2 Connecticut cases in support of the purposive and eclectic
methodology that it chose to apply, seemingly unaware that in 2003, the Connecticut
Legislature overruled by statute the Connecticut Supreme Court's choice of a purposive
approach. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-2Z (2009); cf Gluck, supra note 3, at 1791-98
(describing the Connecticut Supreme Court's ostensible obedience to the legislated rule but
also its efforts to evade the rule). Similar errors also appear in cases in which federal courts
cite only state methodology. For example, in Tammi v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc., 536
F.3 d 702, 709-10 (7 th Cir. 2008), the Seventh Circuit relied on an older line of Wisconsin
cases emphasizing the importance of legislative intent, purpose, history, and substantive
canons. In 2003, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had announced, with intended
precedential effect, a new textualist approach-one that both the state supreme court and
the state's lower courts have almost uniformly followed. See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit
Court, 681 N.W.2d 110, 123-26 (Wis. 2004); Gluck, supra note 3, at 1799-1803. For another
example, see Combs v. International Insurance Co., 354 F. 3d 568 (6th Cir. 2004), discussed
supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
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battle - legislative history or not - does the federal court choose? This is a live
issue; such power struggles are currently underway in a number of states.
In the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the federal courts follow the state supreme
courts' practices rather than the interpretive instructions enacted by the state
legislatures. Because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (Texas's highest
criminal court) and the Oregon Supreme Court each has refused to apply its
state's legislated rules regarding legislative history use, so have the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits. 117 The Second and Eighth Circuits appear to be making the
same kinds of choices with respect to other legislated rules of interpretation."'
To be sure, a federal court that views its Erie role as standing in the shoes of
the state's highest court might justify this choice on the ground that
disregarding a legislated interpretive rule is "what the state court would do."
So, too, one can argue that state law is whatever the state's highest court says it
is (indeed, the importance of state decisional law is one key holding of Erie,
and to hold otherwise would encourage forum shopping). But perhaps it is not
so simple. In Oregon, for example, the state supreme court never actually
117. See, e.g., Int'l Truck & Engine Corp. v. Bray, 372 F. 3d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing the
Texas legislated rule for other propositions but not following it on use of extrinsic evidence
and instead following holdings of Texas's highest courts); In re CPDC, Inc., 337 F.3d 436,
442, 445 (5th Cir. 2003) (same). There are a few instances in which the Fifth Circuit appears
to apply (or at least cite) Texas's legislated rule, but they are atypical. See, e.g., Jones v. City
of Palestine, 266 F. App'x 320, 322-23 (5th Cir. 2008). From 1993 to 2009, the Oregon
Supreme Court had an established statutory interpretation hierarchy that prohibited the
state courts from consulting legislative history absent a threshold finding of ambiguity.
Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 859 P.2d 1143, 1146-47 (Or. 1993). Both
the state courts and the Ninth Circuit faithfully followed this hierarchy-even while noting
its conflict with the legislated rule-until the Oregon Supreme Court loosened the
restrictions on legislative history use in a 2009 decision. State v. Gaines, 206 P. 3d 1042,
1047-51 (Or. 2009). See Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F-3d loo1, 1114 n.7 (9 th Cir. 2003)
(assuming that the state-legislated rule did not alter the Oregon Supreme Court's statutory
interpretation framework); see also Nike, Inc. v. McCarthy, 379 F.3d 576, 581 n.4 (9th Cir.
2004) (citing legislative history but assuming that it was in compliance with the Oregon
Supreme Court's methodology because the statutory text was unclear). This saga is detailed
in Gluck, supra note 3, at 1782-85.
118. For example, in Connecticut the state supreme court consistently evades a legislated rule
that was enacted to override the court's purposive or eclectic approach. The Second Circuit
has declared that it looks to the Connecticut Supreme Court for Connecticut rules of
interpretation, Beason v. United Techs. Corp., 337 F. 3d 271, 275-76 (2d Cir. 2003), and has
never cited the legislated rule in a single diversity case and has cited it in only one federal-
question case, Morenz v. Wilson-Coker, 415 F.3d 230, 236-37 (2d Cir. 2005). The Eighth
Circuit has followed the lead of the Iowa Supreme Court in resisting application of a statute
directing courts not to apply the presumption that statutes in derogation of the common law
are to be strictly construed. See HOK Sport, Inc. v. FC Des Moines, L.C., 495 F.3d 927, 937
n.7 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing IOWA CODE § 4.2 (West 2007)).
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struck down or held inapplicable the legislated interpretive rule; it just silently
ignored it. So the legislated interpretive rule remained on the statute books and
thus remained a valid, enacted direction concerning interpretive methodology.
One therefore might argue that following that statute is precisely what the
federal court should do - that federal courts have an independent duty to
enforce state law and that the diversity jurisdiction offers a safety net for
litigants when the state courts are not doing so." 9 At a minimum, these cases
evince the particular quandary that federal courts face when the legal status of
methodology is unresolved in the state whose law is being applied. Moreover,
it seems an open question the extent to which Erie permits, or perhaps
requires, a federal court to disregard state decisional law on the basis that it
conflicts with state statutory law."1o
4. Problem 4: Dynamic Statutory Interpretation
Juxtaposed against the cases discussed in the previous section are the
diversity cases raising "dynamic statutory interpretation" questions."' Whereas
in the cases involving power struggles between state courts and legislatures the
federal courts seem willing to stand in state-court shoes, in the dynamic
cases-where federal courts are asked to interpret state statutes to reach
modern or unforeseen problems-the federal courts often take the opposite
approach.
The Seventh Circuit, for example, has made numerous statements warning
that "litigants . . . who seek to base their claims on an innovation in state law
would be well-advised to file their claims in state court,"" and that "district
courts are encouraged to dismiss actions based on novel state law."' That
court also has stated that it would adhere to "this restrictive approach to a
plaintiffs novel theory of liability under state law even where the plaintiff had
ig. Some state courts have alluded to the idea that legislated interpretive rules raise separation-
of powers concerns under state constitutions, but thus far only the Delaware Supreme
Court has struck down such a rule. Evans v. State, 872 A.2d 539, 549-50 (Del. 2005).
120. Cf Jonathan F. Mitchell, Reconsidering Murdock: State-Law Reversals as Constitutional
Avoidance, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 1335, 1361 (2010) ("[T]here is a great distance between [Erie's
recognition of the importance of state decisional law] and the extreme legal-realist view that
state law simply 'is' whatever the state supreme court declares, even when it deviates from
constitutional or statutory text or misapplies its established common-law precedents.").
121. ESKRIDGE, supra note 88.
122. Hollander v. Brown, 457 F-3 d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2006).
123. Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 636 (7 th Cir. 2007) (quoting Insolia v. Philip




no choice but to litigate his claim in federal court,""* and even where
defendants had clearly shopped for the federal forum precisely because they
knew that the federal court would employ a less dynamic approach."'
Similarly, the Third Circuit in a recent case narrowly construed the New Jersey
Product Liability Act, noting that it exercised restraint in accordance with the
well-established principle that where "'two competing yet sensible
interpretations"' of state law exist, 'we should opt for the interpretation that
restricts liability, rather than expands it, until the Supreme Court of [New
Jersey] decides differently.'"126 And the Sixth Circuit, in a case in which the
plaintiff had urged an expansive and modern interpretation of a state
borrowing statute, held that there was "no basis for even considering the pros
and cons of innovative theories.... Federal courts hearing diversity matters
should be extremely cautious about adopting 'substantive innovation' in state
law." 2 7
The implications of these seemingly innocuous decisions are potentially
quite significant. At the most basic level, they are at least sometimes at odds
with - because they are far more cautious than - the "prediction" approach that
federal courts claim that they generally employ in diversity cases. Perhaps this
is unproblematic. To some extent, we already accept this kind of practice -the
idea that federal courts have discretion to carve out certain state-law cases that
deserve a different approach -because we allow (and even encourage) federal
courts to certify or to abstain from deciding some state-law questions." But
there is something discomfiting about a federal court choosing the narrowest
possible reading of a state statute simply because it is a federal court and not
for any substantive-law reason. This is perhaps even more problematic when
124. Id. at 636 n.5.
125. Insolia, 216 F-3d at 607 (noting that the plaintiffs were "in a predicament because state law in
this area is stunted by the ability of tobacco companies to remove cases under diversity
jurisdiction").
126. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., 594 F. 3d 238, 253 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661, 680 (3d Cir. 2002)).
127. Combs v. Int'l Ins. Co., 354 F-3d 568, 577-78 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Kurczi v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 113 F.3d 1426, 1429 (6th Cir. 1997) (articulating the same rule against federal court
innovation for common law claims); Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox Co. (Pexto), 739 F.2d
690, 694 (1st Cit. 1984) (same); Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity
Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REv. 1671, 1682-83 (1992) (making the
same arguments).
128. Cf David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 6o N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
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the federal court acknowledges that the litigants have no recourse to state
court, as the Seventh Circuit did in the case above. 12 9
This is not to understate the difficulty for any court of predicting how a
superior court or another jurisdiction's court will act when new circumstances
press against old laws. But the assumed feasibility of such predictions is
precisely what underlies both Erie and the constitutional and statutory grants
of concurrent jurisdiction: the idea that federal and state courts are capable of
ascertaining and applying one another's laws. 3 o And, if anything, using the
same decisionmaking rules as the other court - such as its rules of
interpretation -should help in that prediction process. Indeed, this is precisely
what federal courts already do in the choice-of-law context, where Klaxon
dictates that Erie applies. In the choice-of-law context, federal courts use state-
court decisionmaking processes to determine what a state court would do in
the absence of any apposite state-court decisional authority.
Recall the U.S. Supreme Court's memorable statement that "[t]he very
essence of the Erie doctrine is that the bases of state law are presumed to be
communicable by the parties to a federal judge no less than to a state judge."'I'
Consider, too, the Court's emphasis in Meredith v. Winter Haven that the
unresolved nature of state law does not justify the federal courts' abdication of
their jurisdictional duty in diversity cases. And consider how at odds those
statements seem with the Seventh Circuit's argument that erroneous
interpretations of state statutes by federal courts in dynamic cases "inevitably
skew the decisions of [those] who rely on them and inequitably affect the
losing federal litigant who cannot appeal the decision to the state supreme
129. This will occur when the defendant is foreign to the state and can therefore always invoke
diversity jurisdiction.
13o. See Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function,
94 YALE L.J. 71, 73 (1984) (criticizing those who argue for abstention "as if we were
attempting to establish, on a totally clean slate, the wisest system of judicial federalism, in
total disregard of the detailed and carefully balanced existing statutory network").
131. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 238 (1991); see also Philip B. Kurland, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187,
217 (1957) ("[T]he very essence of the Erie doctrine is that a federal judge can find, if not
make, the law almost as well as a state judge.").
132. 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943) ("[T]he difficulties of ascertaining what the state courts may
hereafter determine the state law to be do not in themselves afford a sufficient ground for a
federal court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction to decide a case which is properly brought





court.""' Those concerns, if true, affect much more than dynamic cases, and
there may be no limiting principle. Federal courts may be no more likely to
interpret correctly an unresolved but nondynamic question of state insurance
law. Under the logic of the cases discussed in this Subsection, federal courts
should not be addressing any but the most straightforward of state-law
questions. (Some commentators advocate precisely this result.3 4 ) But even
accepting that there might be a limited number of cases in which certification
or abstention might be appropriate, those mechanisms cannot be the answer in
all cases involving interpretations of state law without effectively gutting the
jurisdictional grants."'
Most importantly, it should be emphasized that certifying or abstaining is
not what the federal courts always do in these cases. Instead, the courts often
decide the case themselves but pick the narrowest possible answer, usually the
one that does the least to change the status quo, regardless of its predictions of
what the state court would do. Thus, even if one believes that certification or
abstention in this context is ideal, once the federal courts accept the
responsibility of jurisdiction over these cases and choose to render a decision,
there is something unfair and improper about their reluctance to use the full
range of their decisionmaking authority to decide the cases. As others have
pointed out, such an interpretive strategy-taking the case but adopting an
especially "static" interpretive approach-has serious problems: it explicitly
encourages forum shopping and can lead to the stagnation of state-law
development because the federal court's narrow decision is not reviewable by
the state's high court." 6
133. Lexington Ins. Co. v. Rugg & Knopp, Inc., 165 F.3 d 1087, 1092-93 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Sloviter, supra note 127, at 1681).
134. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 77, at 1549-56 (suggesting presumption of certification).
135. See Meredith, 320 U.S. at 234-45 ("The diversity jurisdiction was not conferred for the benefit
of the federal courts or to serve their convenience. ... When . . . exceptional circumstances
are not present, denial of that opportunity [to assert one's rights in federal court] by the
federal courts merely because the answers to the questions of state law are difficult or
uncertain . . . would thwart the purpose of the jurisdictional act."); see also Redish, supra
note 130, at 78 (arguing that even partial abstention violates separation of powers because
"[t]he fact that Congress theoretically could delegate to the courts the power to modify
otherwise unlimited legislation ... does not mean that Congress has actually done so").
136. See Clark, supra note 77, at 1541-42. Although Clark directs his argument mostly at the
common-law context, the same considerations would seem to apply in the statutory context.
See also Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence ofErie v.
Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 292-93 (1946) (arguing that this approach "lead[s] . . . to a
falsification of the state law by erecting a single instance into a general principle to the point
where, in all likelihood, the state court eventually would refuse to go").
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C. Federal-Question Cases Requiring State Statutory Interpretation
State statutes also arrive in federal court as parts of cases in which the head
of jurisdiction is federal- cases "arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States""' rather than in diversity. But the overall federal
tint of such cases seems to have obscured the fact that, at bottom, many of the
questions of state statutory interpretation in these cases are analytically the
same kinds of questions as the state statutory questions presented in diversity
cases.
Most modern commentators agree that the Erie doctrine is not confined to
diversity cases."" In many federal-question cases, one part of the case turns on
an embedded and often preliminary question of state law. Just as in the
diversity context, then, the federal court in such a federal-question case
interprets a state statute in a decision that is unreviewable by the state supreme
court. But also as in the diversity context, if the state-statutory question is
separate from the federal question, then the ultimate expositor of that question
is the state supreme court. For example, if a federal bankruptcy statute says
that a debtor's total responsibility includes liens provided that the liens were
perfected under state law, then before the federal court can decide the total
liability, it must first look to state law and apply the state lien statute to the
liens at issue. That initial inquiry-what the state lien statute says-is
analytically separate from the ultimate federal-law question (the bankruptcy
debtor's total responsibility). As a result, a later ruling by the state supreme
court on the same question of state law would control, even if the prior federal
case had been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. Indeed, the fact that this
last point is undisputed-that even in federal-question cases, there are state-
law elements on which the state supreme court always has the last word-
should crystallize the bottom line, which is that the state-law question here can
look the same as it does in diversity even though the jurisdictional hook is
different. Thus, as this Section argues, federal courts in such federal-question
cases should proceed exactly as they do in diversity cases with respect to
matters of statutory interpretation.
Keep in mind that the state statutory questions presented in these federal-
question cases might be, but need not be, "independent and adequate" in the
Michigan v. Long sense to implicate this Article's Erie arguments."' There are
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (20o6).
138. See supra note 87.
139. Of course, Michigan v. Long is not implicated here because we are discussing federal court,




indeed some cases in which they are both-cases in which resolution of the
state statutory question makes resolution of the federal question unnecessary.
But the state-law question also can be antecedent and analytically separate
from the federal-law question even if not "independent and adequate." For
instance, in the bankruptcy example given above, the state statutory question
(how liens are perfected under state law) is necessary to the federal case but its
resolution cannot decide the case alone. At the same time, resolving that state
statutory question involves no federal-law considerations whatsoever. Of
course, there are other kinds of cases in which state law must be consulted as
part of resolving a federal-question case but that do not actually involve
separate questions of state statutory interpretation.4 o Those cases do not
implicate this Article's concerns.
Although this Section focuses on the judicial handling of these cases, it
should be noted that lawyers' briefing of them often is similarly imprecise.
Many briefs in lawsuits of this nature do cite state statutory interpretation
cases, a tendency that at least implies that the lawyers working on them
recognize the state-law issue in the case. But the briefs almost always also
provide federal citations to support their interpretive theory, likely due to the
(accurate) perception that the federal courts pay more attention to federal
interpretive principles than to state principles.
(1983) (holding that the U.S. Supreme Court should "refus[e] to decide cases where there is
an adequate and independent state ground"); Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review
of State-Court Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1919,
1947-57 (2003) (summarizing the doctrine of independent and adequate state grounds).
140. For example, some federal statutes require reference to state law but do not require federal
courts themselves to construe or determine state law. See Monaghan, supra note 139, at 1934
(calling these "characterization" cases). The federal Armed Career Criminal Act, for
instance, provides an enhanced penalty for persons three times previously convicted of a
"violent felony." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006). Federal courts often must determine whether a
state criminal conviction constitutes a "violent felony" for purposes of that federal statute. In
those cases, federal courts may look to the state's criminal statute to understand the kind of
conduct at issue (e.g., Was it violent?), but their task in such cases is not to construe the
term "violent felony" as a state court would (after all, the term "violent felony" appears in
the federal statute). Their task, rather, is to characterize the state-level conduct-that is, to
determine whether the state crime for which the defendant was convicted is a "violent
felony" in the sense that the federal statute intends. See Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct.
1265, 1269 (2010) ("The meaning of 'physical force' in [the violent felony provisions of the
Armed Career Criminal Act] is a question of federal law, not state law."); United States v.
Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 279 (2002) (holding that how the state labels the action in question is
"irrelevant"). See Monaghan, supra note 139, at 1945, for additional discussion and
examples.
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1. In the U.S. Supreme Court
Consider first Stenberg v. Carhart,14' in which the U.S. Supreme Court
heard a federal constitutional challenge to Nebraska's late-term abortion
statute. The basis of jurisdiction in that case was a federal question because of
the constitutional challenge, but the Court had to determine what the state
statute meant before it could decide whether the statute was constitutional.
Specifically, the Court began its analysis by asking a state-law question:
whether the Nebraska statute prohibited the two main types of late-term-
abortion procedures or only one type. (Under the Court's precedent, the
statute could survive the ultimate federal constitutional law challenge only if at
least one method of performing the procedure remained available. 142) The first
question, therefore, as framed by the Court itself, was not whether the state
statute was constitutional (that was the second question), but how to read the
state statute.
Nevertheless, the Court treated the methodological issues attendant to that
first question of state statutory interpretation as almost entirely federal. 143 To
be sure, the politics of abortion are such that ideology rather than doctrine
likely drives results in many of these cases, and so methodological choice might
ultimately matter little. But while that reality might explain how the individual
Justices chose to read the Nebraska statute (that is, whether it banned one or
two methods of late-term abortion), it does not-at least as a matter of the
appearance of doctrinal precision and solid opinion-writing- explain why the
Court did not rely on state interpretive principles to justify its decision about
what conduct the Nebraska statute prohibited.
For example, Justice Breyer's opinion for the majority looked to Nebraska
law to determine whether the views of the state attorney general (who had
offered a narrowing construction) bound Nebraska courts.'" But apart from
that, Justice Breyer did not cite a single Nebraska case in support of his chosen
141. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
142. Id. at 938 ("Nebraska does not deny that the statute imposes an 'undue burden' if it applies
to the more commonly used D & E [dilation and evacuation] procedure as well as to D & X
[dilation and extraction].").
143. The other opinions in the case focused on Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Planned
Parenthood ofSoutheastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), rather than on statutory
interpretation. See 530 U.S. at 946 (Stevens, J. concurring); id. at 951 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring); id. at 952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 953 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
144. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 941 (majority opinion). The majority also attached little importance to
the Nebraska courts' practice of giving the state attorney general's construction "substantial




rules of construction or indicate that he had considered Nebraska practice.
Instead, for additional reasons to reject the state attorney general's
construction, Justice Breyer relied on only federal cases for the following two
propositions: (1) that " [w] hen a statute includes an explicit definition, we must
follow that [term's] definition"145 ; and (2) that "[i]dentical words used in
different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning."146
Justice Breyer also refused to apply the canon of constitutional avoidance
(which would have pointed in favor of a narrowing construction) but cited
only federal cases to justify not doing so.'4 7 He did not inquire into whether the
Nebraska Supreme Court routinely employs that canon (as in fact it does). 14
Justice Kennedy's dissent, too, first cited only federal cases for the
principles of "commonsense understanding" 49 and extra legislative "leeway
when attempting to regulate the medical profession,"'s as well as for the
argument that the court was "required" to apply the canon of constitutional
avoidance to the statute.'' Justice Kennedy then cited a Nebraska precedent for
the proposition that the Nebraska courts would narrow the statute if given the
opportunity."' Justice Thomas's dissent referenced "ordinary rules of statutory
interpretation" and cited numerous dictionaries,' a voluminous medical
literature, federal district court cases from jurisdictions other than Nebraska,
other states' laws, and a federal case for the main rule of construction that it
used to counter the majority's argument: namely, the proposition that "the
common understanding of 'partial birth abortion,' . . . no less than the specific
definition, is part of the statute."15 4 justice Thomas then cited eight federal
cases for the application of three canons: constitutional avoidance, the whole
145. Id. at 942 (citing Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 484-85 (1987); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.
379, 392-93 n.1o (1979); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 502 (1945); Fox v.
Standard Oil Co. of N.J., 294 U.S. 87, 95-96 (1935); 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 5 47.07 & n.1o (5th ed. 1992)).
146. Id. at 944 (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). He also used dictionaries to ascertain statutory meaning without citing any
cases (state or federal) in support. Id.
147. See id. at 944-59.
148. See, e.g., State v. Hookstra, 638 N.W.2d 829, 836 (Neb. 2002).
149. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 974 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S.
25, 27 (1931)); id. at 976 (citing Broadrickv. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973)).
i5o. Id. at 976 (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997)).
151. Id. at 977.
152. Id. at 979.
153. Id. at 992, 999-1000 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 992-93 (citing United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984)).
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act rule, and noscitur a sociis.155 But he also cited three Nebraska cases for
different propositions, namely that the state courts would apply the avoidance
canon or the rule of lenity and that they would give "substantial weight" to
opinions of the state attorney general."s'
As another example, consider Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales.'" There, the
question was whether a state-law restraining order gives rise to a
"constitutionally protected property interest" in having the police enforce the
order."' As framed by the Court, the definitive federal constitutional question
was whether the restraining order conferred on its holder a "protected
entitlement.""s' To decide that federal question, the Court had to understand
the nature of the benefit conferred by the restraining order, and so it looked to
the Colorado restraining order statute. Specifically, the Court said that it
needed to know whether the police had discretion to enforce the order. Again,
although framing the federal constitutional question in that way-did the
Colorado police have discretion?-was certainly part of the federal-
constitutional inquiry, answering it was not. It was a pure question of state
statutory construction: does the state statute give discretion to police offers not
to enforce restraining orders? Once the Court determined what the Colorado
restraining order statute said, it would then take that understanding and
decide, under federal principles, whether that bundle of rights was in fact a
protected entitlement. As the Court itself acknowledged, "[rlesolution of the
federal issue begins . . . with a determination of what it is that state law
provides.""16
But despite this acknowledgement, and despite the fact that the majority
chided the lower federal court for not relying on Colorado law,161 in
undertaking its own analysis the majority did not cite any Colorado
interpretive principles either. This omission is particularly striking because the
author of the majority opinion, Justice Scalia-despite being the Court's
primary textualist -wrote an opinion arguing that the literal text of the
Colorado statute should not be followed. In support, Justice Scalia cited an
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice treatise arguing that most states' "apparently
155. Id. at 997-99.
156. Id. at 997, 1004-05.
157. 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
158. Id. at 750-51.






mandatory arrest statutes ... 'cannot be interpreted literally,""" as well as a
previous U.S. Supreme Court opinion in a case involving the Chicago police,
which held that the police had discretion not to enforce a restraining order
despite mandatory statutory language. 6 3
Justice Stevens's dissent chastised the majority for not deferring to the
Tenth Circuit's opinion,164 but Justice Stevens would have certified the case to
the Colorado Supreme Court instead of deciding it. Justice Stevens argued that
the Colorado Supreme Court might have "better access to (and greater facility
with) relevant pieces of legislative history beyond those that we have before us"
and that the Colorado "court may also choose to give certain evidence of
legislative intent greater weight than would be customary for this Court.", 6s It
is not clear why Justice Stevens assumed that a case that had been fully briefed
both in the en banc Tenth Circuit and in the U.S. Supreme Court would not
have included all relevant legislative history or explicated fully how the
Colorado courts employ it.
2. In the Circuit Courts
We see the same pattern in the circuits, and so one example from the Sixth
Circuit will suffice, with additional examples from other circuits set forth in the
notes. 66 Consider Dean v. Byerley,'6 , in which the Sixth Circuit had to construe
162. Id. at 760-61 (quoting i AM. BARAss'N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 1-4.5, cmt.
1-124 to 1-125 (2d ed. 1980)).
163. See id. at 761 (citing Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)). Justice Scalia also indicated
that, regardless, it was doubtful that an individual entitlement to enforcement of a
restraining order could constitute a property interest within the ambit of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 766-67.
164. Id. at 774 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 777 n.4. Justice Stevens also relied extensively, in conducting his own analysis, on the
interpretations of analogous statutes in other states. Id. at 784-88.
166. For example, Cal. Teachers Ass'n v. State Bd. ofEduc., 271 F.3d 1141 (9 th Cir. 2001), involved a
federal constitutional challenge to a California statute prohibiting instruction in languages
other than English in public schools. Before undertaking its First Amendment analysis, the
Ninth Circuit had to determine an issue of state statutory construction- namely, "how
much non-English will subject [teachers] to personal liability" under the statute. Id. at 1146.
Curiously, the Ninth Circuit-which in diversity cases often looks to both state and federal
interpretive methodology when construing state statutes, see supra note 115 -looked only to
federal interpretive principles in this case. Indeed, the court was rather explicit about that
choice, stating: "A federal court's duty, when faced with a constitutional challenge such as
this one, is to employ traditional tools of statutory construction to determine the statute's
allowable meaning." Cal. Teachers, 271 F.3d at 1147 (internal quotation marks omitted). (The
Tenth Circuit has made the same statement. See United States v. DeGasso, 369 F.3d 1139,
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a Michigan picketing statute before determining whether a defendant had
1145-46 (ioth Cit. 2004) (stating that the court was "bound to follow rules of statutory
construction of criminal statutes embraced by the Oklahoma judiciary," but examining other
state practices and then refusing to apply the rule of lenity because both the Tenth Circuit
and the U.S. Supreme Court had "made clear that the rule of lenity applies only in cases of
grievous ambiguity or uncertainty" (internal quotation marks omitted)).) Further, although
the Ninth Circuit's majority and dissenting opinions in California Teachers Ass'n argued over
whether the canon of constitutional avoidance could be applied to the statute, both sides
looked only to federal precedent concerning the applicability of that canon, and neither side
considered whether the California Supreme Court would apply it. See 271 F.3d at 1147 (citing
Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988); Nunez v. City of San
Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 1997) (interpreting a California statute but also citing
federal case law for precedent of applying narrowing construction)); id. at 1156-57 (Tashima,
J., dissenting) (citing a Ninth Circuit case that cited Grayned v. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104
(1972)).
As another example, in the Seventh Circuit, two recent federal bankruptcy cases turned
on the language of Wisconsin's wage lien statutes. In one, the court relied on only federal
cases invoking various textual canons. In re Globe Bldg. Materials, Inc., 463 F.3d 631, 635
(7th Cir. 2006). Unnoted by the Seventh Circuit, however, was the fact that a majority of
Wisconsin Supreme Court justices believes that courts must not apply any canons -even
textual canons -without a threshold finding of textual ambiguity. See State ex rel. Kalal v.
Circuit Court, 681 N.W.2d 11o, 128 (Wis. 2004) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (describing
and critiquing the Wisconsin Supreme Court's restriction of textual canons). In the other
case, the Seventh Circuit actually refused appellant's request to apply various canons of
construction on the ground that "a court resorts to canons of statutory construction only
when statutes are in conflict and the court cannot find an answer in the plain meaning of
statutory language," but it cited only its own case law for this proposition. In re Baker, 430
F.3d 858, 860 (7th Cit. 2005). These cases stand in stark contrast to a different Seventh
Circuit federal-question case, this one involving construction of the Wisconsin abortion
statute, in which the Seventh Circuit said that it would "apply ... Wisconsin principles of
statutory construction," Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 457 (7th Cir. 1999), and cited only
Wisconsin cases for its methodology, see id. at 470-71.
As a final example, consider Sealed v. Sealed, 332 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003), a federal-
question case in which the Second Circuit had to decide, as a preliminary (and, as the
Second Circuit itself noted, separate) question of state law, whether a Connecticut child-
welfare statute required the removal of a child from an unsafe environment. Just before the
case was decided, the Connecticut Supreme Court handed down a watershed statutory
interpretation decision, banning the "plain meaning rule" in Connecticut and announcing a
new controlling purposivist and eclectic approach. State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562 (Conn.
2003). The Second Circuit expressly recognized the new Connecticut approach but certified
the case anyway (on its own motion) based on the apparent assumption that the state court
would apply a different methodology -the state methodology -to the same case than would
the federal court. The Second Circuit stated: "The Connecticut Supreme Court has recently
indicated that it adopts a broad approach to statutory interpretation that looks beyond the
statutory text .... Thus, the Connecticut Supreme Court may well exercise more flexibility
and broader interpretive power than the federal courts in analyzing the meaning of [the state
statute]." Sealed, 332 F-3d at 59 (internal quotation marks omitted).




violated the plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights for purposes of a § 1983
action. The case turned on "the scope of the ban on private picketing" set forth
in the Michigan statute.'6" The Sixth Circuit cited only U.S. Supreme Court
cases in support of the nontextual methodological approach that it chose to
apply to the state statute: namely, that it would "not be guided by a single
sentence or member of a sentence, but [would] look to the provisions of the
whole law, and to its object and policy."''6 Unnoted by the Sixth Circuit,
however, was the fact that the Michigan Supreme Court during that period had
expressly rejected an approach to statutory interpretation that emphasized
nontextual factors (such as purpose and policy)."o The opinion prompted a
strong dissent from Judge Sutton (a former Ohio state solicitor general), who
argued for textual interpretive principles based on a mix of citations to U.S.
and Michigan Supreme Court cases, but Judge Sutton also invoked the rule
against absurdities in support of his reading."' In fact, the Michigan Supreme
Court during that period had actually banned the rule against absurdities from
state jurisprudence.7
A simple hypothetical illustrates the unworkable practical implications of
the position that federal courts can disregard state interpretive principles in
168. Id. at 547.
16. Id. (quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962)) (citing Owasso Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426, 434 (2002); Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 7 (1999);
Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div. v. UAW, 523 U.S. 653, 657 (1998)).
170. The Sixth Circuit also cited, in a footnote, a Michigan case in which the state court
consulted a preamble, but that case was decided before the Michigan Supreme Court
adopted its textual methodology. See id. (citing Malcolm v. City of East Detroit, 468 N.W.2d
479, 484 (Mich. 1991), and noting that Malcolm was cited with approval in King v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., 668 N.W.2d 357, 362-63 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003)). Malcolm was decided
before the Michigan Supreme Court adopted its textualist interpretive methodology in the
late 1990s. King, an intermediate court case, recited the correct current rule-"If the
statutory language is unambiguous, appellate courts presume that the Legislature intended
the meaning plainly expressed and further judicial construction is neither permitted nor
required" -and cited Malcolm for the proposition that the preamble could be consulted only
after a threshold finding of ambiguity. King, 668 N.W.2d at 362-63 (citing Malcolm, 468
N.W.2d at 479).
171. Id. at 565-67 (Sutton, J., dissenting). Judge Sutton cited a federal case and a Michigan
intermediate case in support of his application of the rule, but in the Michigan case, the
court declined to apply the canon and instead emphasized the need to follow plain text.
172. For a deeper discussion of Michigan statutory interpretation, see Gluck, supra note 3, at
1803-11.
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federal-question cases even if at least some of those courts would apply them in
diversity. Assume that two different panels of the Ninth Circuit are construing
an identical Oregon statute in two different cases on the same day-one in a
diversity case, one in a federal-question/state-law case. Under the rationale
employed by the cases discussed in this Section, the same Oregon statute could
be construed to mean two different things, even within the same federal circuit,
solely on account of the procedural posture in which it was presented. Consider
now what happens if the opinion in the federal-question case is released first.
Would the later-released opinion-the one in the diversity case-have to
harmonize itself to the first as a matter of intracircuit precedent even though
the first did not look to state interpretive principles? Of course not. The
impracticable consequences of this approach should help to illustrate why the
same interpretive principles should apply to both kinds of cases.
3. Special Treatmentfor Constitutional Avoidance
In some of the cases discussed in the previous Subsection, the federal courts
considered whether to apply the canon of constitutional avoidance, but they
did so as a matter of federal law-the courts did not consider whether the state
courts would apply the canon. Perhaps those cases can be explained by a lack of
attention to the Erie-meets-methodological-choice issue. But there are other
cases involving federal constitutional challenges to state statutes in which some
federal courts appear to be making a conscious decision to adopt a different
course entirely, looking neither to state law with respect to constitutional
avoidance nor to their own familiar federal avoidance principles. In these cases,
the federal courts seem to be concluding that, regardless of how the federal or
state courts normally would handle avoidance on their own, in the special
situation of federal-court constitutional review of state statutes, federal courts
generally should not construe state statutes to avoid constitutional questions.
The avoidance canon, as John Manning has written, "instructs courts to
interpret statutes to avoid serious constitutional questions if such an
interpretation is 'fairly possible.' . . . This means that courts should never
invalidate a statute if a plausible alternative interpretation would sustain the
law.""' Much ink has been spilled by academics both justifying and criticizing
173. John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV.
223, 252-53; cf Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEo. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997)
(distinguishing between "classical avoidance," in which "as between two possible
interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other
valid, [the Court's] plain duty is to adopt that which will save the Act," and "modern




this canon, 74 and this Article will not enter that debate. The canon is
indisputably entrenched in federal-court practice. But more important for our
purposes, it also is entrenched in the state courts. Forty-nine state supreme
courts have stated that they apply the canon of constitutional avoidance.17 And
serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems
unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
174. See Manning, supra note 173, at 253-54 (summarizing the debate).
175. Maladoni v. City of Mobile, 37 So. 3d 739, 747 (Ala. 2009); Bigley v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst.,
208 P.3d 168, 184 (Alaska 2009); Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court of Ariz., 120 P. 3d
1092, 1098 (Ariz. 2005); Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 308 S.W. 3d 135, 139 (Ark.
2009); People v. Sutton, 227 P-3d 437, 453 (Cal. 2010); Catholic Health Initiatives Colo. v.
City of Pueblo Dep't of Fin., 207 P.3d 812, 822 (Colo. 2009); Ziotas v. Reardon Law Firm,
P.C., 997 A.2d 453, 459 (Conn. 2010); Hoover v. State, 958 A.2d 816, 821 (Del. 2008);
Murray v. Mariner Health, 994 So. 2d 1051, 1057 (Fla. 20o8); DeKalb Cnty. v. Perdue, 692
S.E.2d 331, 333 (Ga. 2010); State v. Raitz, 621 P.2d 352, 359 (Haw. 1980); Stuart v. State, 232
P.3d 813, 818 (Idaho 2010); Irwin Indus. Tool Co. v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 938 N.E.2d 459
(Ill. 2010); Founds. of E. Chi., Inc. v. City of East Chi., 927 N.E.2d 900, 904 (Ind. 2010); In
re Young, 780 N.W.2d 726, 729 (Iowa 20o); State v. Engles, 17 P-3d 355, 357 (Kan. 2001);
Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 S.W. 3d 162, 168 (Ky. 2005); State v. Cunningham, 903 So.
2d 1110, 1116 (La. 2005); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Exec. Dir., Me. Revenue Servs., 922 A.2d
465, 471 (Me. 2007); VNA Hospice of Md. v. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, 961 A.2d
557, 569-72 (Md. 2008); Commonwealth v. Disler, 884 N.E.2d 500, 51o-11 (Mass. 2008);
Grebner v. State, 744 N.W.2d 123, 125 (Mich. 2007); State v. Mauer, 741 N.W.2d 107, 115
(Minn. 2007); Gentry v. Town of Booneville, 24 So. 2d 88, 89 (Miss. 1945); Simpson v.
Kilcher, 749 S.W.2d 386, 390 (Mo. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Kilmer v. Mun, 17
S.W.3d 545, 553 (Mo. 2000); Eklund v. Wheatland Cnty., 212 P. 3d 297, 299 (Mont. 2009);
State v. Hookstra, 638 N.W.2d 829, 836 (Neb. 2002); Mangarella v. State, 17 P-3d 989, 992
(Nev. 2001); Lamarche v. McCarthy, 965 A.2d 992, 996 (N.H. 20o8); State v. Fortin, 969
A.2d 1133, 1139-40 (N.J. 2009); State ex rel. Regents of E.N.M. Univ. v. Baca, 189 P.3d 663,
666-67 (N.M. 20o8); Matter of Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 405 (N.Y. 1995); Beaufort Cnty. Bd.
of Educ. v. Beaufort Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 681 S.E.2d 278, 282 (N.C. 2009); Seiler v. State
of N.D. Dep't of Human Servs., 780 N.W.2d 653, 656 (N.D. 2010); State ex rel. Thompson
v. Spon, 700 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ohio 1998); Conaghan v. Riverfield Country Day Sch., 163
P.3d 557, 565 n.5 (Okla. 2007); In re F.C. III, 2 A-3d 1201, 1212 (Pa. 2010); State ex rel. Town
of Westerly v. Bradley, 877 A.2d 601, 6o6 (R.I. 2oo5); State v. Pittman, 647 S.E.2d 144, 162
(S.C. 2007); Steinkruger v. Miller, 612 N.W.2d 591, 595 (S.D. 2000); Waters v. Farr, 291
S.W.3d 873, 917 (Tenn. 2009); HEB Ministries, Inc. v. Tex. Higher Educ. Coordinating
Bd., 235 S.W.3d 627, 658 (Tex. 2007); Sisk v. State, 131 S.W.3d 492, 494 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004); State v. Moreno, 203 P. 3 d 1000, ioo6 (Utah 2009); In re G.T., 758 A.2d 301, 308 (Vt.
2000); Commonwealth v. Doe, 682 S.E.2d 906, 908 (Va. 2009); State v. Eaton, 229 P.3d
704, 706 (Wash. 2010); State v. Mullens, 65o S.E.2d 169, 190 (W. Va. 2007); In re
Termination of Parental Rights to Max G.W., 716 N.W.2d 845, 852 (Wis. 2oo6); Smith v.
State, 199 P. 3d 1052, 1o68 (Wyo. 2009). Because the Oregon Supreme Court's
interpretation hierarchy essentially eliminates substantive canons, that court has only used
the avoidance canon once in the past seventeen years. See Gluck, supra note 3, at 1778 n.90.
Oregon is therefore not included in the total tally.
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with respect to avoidance's cousin, severability, forty-eight states have a
statute, a judicial decision, or both requiring courts to apply a presumption of
severability. 176
And yet, apparently due to their concern about not being able to resolve
state-law questions definitively (because the state supreme courts always have
the last word), the federal courts claim that they are disempowered, even
incompetent, to apply these rules - most often avoidance, but sometimes also
severability- to state statutes. These federal courts rarely consider as relevant
in making these decisions whether the state court would avoid or sever."' The
basic claim of this Subsection is that, despite the presence of a federal
constitutional issue, the state-law question in many of these cases is again
simply one of state statutory interpretation. Thus, federal courts should be
consulting those state interpretive principles.
Consider Allstate Insurance Co. v. Serio, which involved a First Amendment
challenge to a New York insurance statute.17' The Second Circuit began by
stating: "It is axiomatic that the federal courts should, where possible, avoid
reaching constitutional questions."17 ' The Second Circuit cited only U.S.
Supreme Court cases for that proposition and did not consider whether the
New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, similarly applies the
avoidance canon. (It does.) But the Second Circuit did not apply the avoidance
canon either. Instead, it certified the question to the New York Court of
Appeals for the confounding reason that although it was applying federal rules
of construction, it seemed to think that the New York Court of Appeals might
apply state rules of construction to the certified question and reach a different
result:
It is not the case . . . that certification is appropriate only where a
federal court, applying federal rules of construction, can see a proper
way to construe the relevant statute so as to eliminate any constitutional
defect. It may well be that the courts of the relevant state are less
constrained than is the federal judiciary with respect to statutory
176. See Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 285
(1994); see also Scott, supra note 64, at 385-87 (finding that thirty-five state legislatures have
enacted severability statutes and that no legislature has rejected the presumption).
177. Cf Dorf, supra note 176, at 286 (recognizing that severability is a state-law question). But see
David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 639 (2008)
(acknowledging that the "legislative intent" test currently governs severability but arguing
that, while constitutional avoidance is properly viewed as a question of statutory
interpretation, severability should no longer be treated as such).
178. 261 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2001) (concerning commercial speech).




interpretation. It is possible, that is, that under the applicable state law,
state courts have more flexibility and broader interpretive power than
do the federal courts. In such circumstances, federal courts ought not to
deprive the state courts of the opportunity to construe their own
statutes, using the interpretive tools, presumptions, and standards they
deem proper."'
This opinion curiously assumes that the same state statute, construed in the
context of the same case, would be interpreted under different rules depending
on which court hears the case.i"' To understand why this should not be so,
consider that when a federal court certifies a state-law question to a state court,
it does not change the posture of the federal case. It simply asks the state court
how it (the federal court) should decide the question for purposes of the
federal case. The state court, however, gives its answer based on state law and
state interpretive principles, and the federal court uses that answer for the
federal case. Because the state court gives an answer that the federal court was
empowered to give in the first instance, it makes no sense to think that the act
of certifying changes the interpretive framework-or that the federal court
should be applying federal interpretive principles if the state court would apply
state interpretive principles."'
The Sixth Circuit also has distinguished between the power of federal
courts to apply the avoidance canon in federal statutory cases and their power
to do so in state statutory cases. In Eubanks v. Wilkinson,' which concerned
the constitutionality of a Kentucky statute requiring parental consent for
abortion, the Sixth Circuit began by setting forth various precedents from both
the Kentucky Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court concerning when
the use of the avoidance canon is appropriate.8 But the Sixth Circuit then
made a startling declaration: "A federal court must always be aware of the
federalism concerns that arise whenever it deals with state statutes . . . . Federal
18o. Id. at 152.
181. This was not a situation in which anyone was claiming that the state court might interpret
the statute under its own state constitution (as opposed to the Federal Constitution) upon
certification. But even if such a claim were being made, it would not be beyond the judicial
power of the federal courts to narrow a state statute to avoid a conflict with a state
constitutional provision.
182. Moreover, if the Second Circuit instead were implying that its own application of the
avoidance canon is a matter of federal law, then state interpretive principles would seem
irrelevant because the federal principle presumably would trump under the Supremacy
Clause.
183. 937 F.2d 1118 (6th Cit. 1991).
184. Id. at 1122-26.
1951
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
courts lack authority and power to give a limiting, narrowing construction to a
state statute."'Ss In another case, the Sixth Circuit concluded that even if it
could identify "a limiting construction [that] will save the constitutionality of a
state statute . . . and the statute or ordinance is fairly susceptible to such a
construction," the only course that the federal court could follow would be to
"abstain pursuant to the Pullman doctrine." 8 6
The Sixth Circuit's position in these cases derives, in part, from the Fifth
Circuit's opinion in Hill v. City of Houston.'' In Hill, a sharply divided en banc
court considered a First Amendment overbreadth challenge to a Houston
ordinance that prevented interference with police-officer duties. The Fifth
Circuit did not look to Texas law to determine whether the Texas courts would
narrow the statute. Instead, it looked only to U.S. Supreme Court cases and
stated: "It is textbook law that the ordinance would not be invalid for
overbreadth if it were possible, applying well-established principles of
statutory construction, for us to construe it narrowly so that it does not forbid
protected speech."' 8 But the Fifth Circuit went one step further and held that
its powers were more limited because the law being construed was not a federal
statute: "Federal courts . . . may not impose [their] own narrowing
construction onto the ordinance if the state courts have not already done so."' 8
As a result, the court struck the ordinance down. Seven judges dissented,
arguing that the federal court should have saved the ordinance by construing it
to avoid the constitutional difficulty. The dissenters opined:
The notion that we are bound by authoritative state court constructions
of a statute logically has no application until the state courts actually do
give it some construction....
. . . Both the principle of federalism and our reluctance to decide
constitutional questions when they can be avoided require us to proffer
such constructions where possible and assume that the state courts will
construe the ordinance consistently with the constitutional
command. 1o
185. Id. at 1125.
186. Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, 638 F.2d 916, 926 (6th Cir. 1980), vacated
on other grounds, 456 U.S. 968 (1982).
187. 789 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
188. Id. at 1111-12.
189. Id. at 1112 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).




The Eighth Circuit, too, recently upheld an injunction against the enforcement
of a Lincoln, Nebraska sexual entertainment ordinance on overbreadth
grounds, holding that "[I]imiting constructions of state and local legislation
are more appropriately done by a state court or an enforcement agency."
On the other side of the spectrum are the Fourth and Seventh Circuits,
which do look to the relevant state court's practice in deciding whether to apply
the avoidance canon to state cases in their courts.192 And somewhere in the
middle are those federal courts that apply the canon of constitutional avoidance
to state statutes but seemingly do so as a matter of federal, not state, law. For
those courts, the presence of a federal constitutional question apparently gives
the avoidance question a federal flavor, and so the courts cite only federal case
law for their authority to apply the canon to avoid constitutional claims. 93
a. U.S. Supreme Court Origins of this Restrained Approach
Most of these appellate cases rely on U.S. Supreme Court precedents, but
some of the cases relied upon are not exactly analogous. For example, courts
often cite Gooding v. Wilson,"' in which the Court struck down a Georgia
statute as overbroad under the First Amendment. But although the Gooding
Court did not look to whether the Georgia Supreme Court generally narrows
statutes to avoid constitutional problems, it did look to how the Georgia courts
had narrowed the statute in older cases and held that they had not narrowed it
sufficiently.' 95 Curiously, a number of courts also cite to Grayned v. City of
Rockford, which involved an overbreadth challenge to Illinois's anti-noise and
anti-picketing statutes, for the proposition that federal courts lack the "power
191. Ways v. City of Lincoln, 274 F. 3 d 514, 519 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 795-96 (1989)).
192. See In re DNA Ex Post Facto Issues, 561 F.3d 294 (4 th Cir. 2009); K-S Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Am. Home Prods. Corp., 962 F.2d 728, 730 (7th Cit. 1992).
193. See, e.g., IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F. 3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2008) (addressing a challenge to
a New Hampshire statutory ban on pharmaceutical data mining and looking to New
Hampshire law to determine whether legislative history could be consulted but looking only
to federal precedent to determine whether to apply the avoidance canon); Phelps v.
Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1070 (loth Cir. 1995) (looking only to federal case law to determine
whether the court could narrow a Kansas criminal defamation statute). In both cases, the
federal court added a citation to state avoidance case law as additional, but not direct,
support. See Ayotte, 550 F.3 d at 63; Phelps, 59 F.3d at 1071-73.
194. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
195. Indeed, on remand, the Georgia courts still could have narrowed the statute sufficiently to
convict Gooding. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 23.
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to construe and narrow state laws.""' But in Grayned, the Court was reviewing
a state supreme court's construction of its own statute; it was not discussing
the federal courts' role where the relevant question appears for the first time in
federal court."'
Nor can this restrained approach be justified as limited to the First
Amendment overbreadth context, which some scholars have argued is
unique."' The federal courts take this same restrained approach to narrowing
state statutes outside the First Amendment context (and cite non-First
Amendment cases from the U.S. Supreme Court in support), so the motivating
factor cannot be the special considerations attendant to free speech."
196. 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972). The Tenth Circuit cites Grayned for this proposition most
frequently. See, e.g., United States v. Vanness, 342 F.3 d 1093 (loth Cir. 2003).
197. In another case, Frisby v. Schultz, the Court did in fact apply the canon of constitutional
avoidance to save a Wisconsin picketing statute from overbreadth and chided the lower
federal courts for running "afoul of the well-established principle that statutes will be
interpreted to avoid constitutional difficulties." 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988). The Court,
however, cited only federal cases for that "well-established principle" and did not inquire as
to Wisconsin's own practice. Id.
198. There is an ongoing debate in the literature about the extent to which "constitutionally
protected speech is likely to be 'chilled' by overbroad statutes." HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 18, at 188 n.2. One concern is that, without an authoritative construction, courts cannot
avoid the chilling effect that overbroad state statutes have on speech. Compare Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, oo YALE L.J. 853, 886 (1991) (arguing that
deterrence will differ "depend[ing] on the nature of the statute involved"), and Note, The
First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844 (1970) (arguing that an
aggressive overbreadth doctrine is necessary to protect First Amendment rights adequately),
with Monaghan, supra note 195, at 37 (disputing that overbreadth is a special First
Amendment doctrine). Thus, the argument goes, because state courts always have the last
word as to the meaning of state statutes, a federal-court narrowing construction is
inadequate to assure citizens that the law will not be enforced against them.
199. For example, Stenberg v. Carhart, the Nebraska partial-birth-abortion case, contains some
statements that appear to single out state law generally for special treatment, such as the
statement that federal courts are "without power to adopt a narrowing construction of a
state statute unless such a construction is reasonable and readily apparent," 530 U.S. 914,
944 (2000) (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330 (1988)), when in fact the Court in
other cases has indicated that the standard is the same for federal statutes, see United States
v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1590-91 (2010); cf Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 83 (1976) (refusing to sever the unconstitutional portion of a Missouri abortion
statute but not consulting Missouri severability law in making that decision); id. at ioo-o
(White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority "thereby attribut[ed] to the Missouri
Legislature the strange intention of passing a statute with absolutely no chance of surviving
constitutional challenge" and that the "question whether a constitutional provision of state
law is severable . . is entirely a question of the intent of the state legislature"); David L.
Shapiro, State Courts and Federal Declaratory Judgments, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 759, 766-67




For example, courts also frequently cite Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona"oo in support of this restrained approach. That case involved a federal
constitutional challenge to an Arizona state constitutional amendment making
English the official state language. After holding that the decision below should
be vacated on mootness grounds, Justice Ginsburg's opinion for a unanimous
Court rebuked the Ninth Circuit for deciding the constitutional question itself
rather than certifying the question to the Arizona Supreme Court.
Interestingly, the Court took this position even as it predicted what the Arizona
Supreme Court would likely do-narrow the statute to keep it within
constitutional bounds:
Federal courts, when confronting a challenge to the constitutionality of
a federal statute, follow a "cardinal principle": They will first ascertain
whether a construction . . . is fairly possible that will contain the statute
within constitutional bounds. State courts, when interpreting state
statutes, are similarly equipped to apply that cardinal principle. . . .
[T]he federal tribunal risks friction-generating error when it endeavors
to construe a novel state Act not yet reviewed by the State's highest
court.2o'
Moreover, the Court's justification for its decision - that "ffederal courts
lack competence to rule definitively on the meaning of state legislation"2 2 -has
caused confusion in the lower courts, which often quote it. Although it is true
that federal courts are not authoritative on state law questions, the Court's
statement has been read erroneously to imply that federal courts are sometimes
incompetent to decide such questions. Of course, federal courts can decide state
statutory cases - they do so all the time; and, for purposes of the individual
parties in these cases, the federal courts' opinion is (unless vacated) the final
word.203
200. 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
201. Id. at 78-79 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
202. Id. at 48.
203. Suppose, for example, that a federal court issues an injunction against enforcement of a state
statute and that the state supreme court, in a later case, issues its own construction that
moots the injunction. The parties to the earlier federal case, of course, could then go to
federal court to have the injunction vacated. That said, the federal court still decides the
case. Cf Shapiro, supra note 199, at 759, 768 n.51 ("Although it is true that a federal court
cannot render an authoritative construction of state law that will bind state courts as a
matter of stare decisis, it is also true that a federal court does have authority to construe state
law in the case before it in a manner that may avoid a constitutional issue or may
significantly affect its contours.").
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b. Are the Constitutional Cases Justifiably Different?
Do the federal constitutional questions lingering in the background make
these state statutory interpretation questions more "federal"? Or do they
somehow introduce a federal norm that trumps the Erie principle? Although
such arguments might be raised to justify the federal court reluctance to apply
state avoidance principles, they quickly raise questions.
Assume, for example, that the federal constitutional issues in these cases
make the avoidance inquiry a federal interpretive inquiry and not a state
interpretive inquiry. No one claims that the Erie rule is absolute. The
Constitution is the ultimate authority and so clearly can limit the application of
the Erie doctrine.o' Thus, if the argument is that how or whether to construe a
statute (state or federal) to avoid a constitutional question is in fact a matter of
federal law, then it is possible that such a federal principle could supersede Erie
in these cases. On this view, even if a particular state does not apply the canon
of constitutional avoidance, if the avoidance principle is constitutionally
required (or is some species of federal common law), we might see it even in
cases in which Erie would otherwise counsel the application of state
methodological rules.
But this is not what we see. If it were, we would see much more avoidance.
Instead, as the cases illustrate, federal courts do not seem comfortable applying
their own federal avoidance principles to state statutes either.
Thus, if there is an Erie-trumping federal principle in play in these cases, it
must be a different principle, one apparently based on federalism and related
concerns about political accountability, institutional competence, and the risk
that federal courts might make incorrect but unreviewable decisions about state
law. While these concerns are not trivial, one has to wonder where the
boundary lies. Taking such concerns into account, when would the federal
court not certify state-law cases? The same concerns about federalism,
accountability, institutional competence, and the unreviewability of federal-
court decisions on matters of state law apply to diversity cases as much as to
those cases arising under the Federal Constitution. And so these arguments do
not satisfactorily explain why only constitutional cases should be singled out
for special treatment.
Indeed, the fear of getting a state statutory construction question wrong
seems, if anything, particularly minimal in this context. Given that forty-nine
state supreme courts have held that they will construe a statute to save it if a




constitutional construction is apparent,o' the rule that state courts would apply
is clear, and federal courts should be as capable of applying it as they are
capable of applying state choice-of-law rules, state contract rules, and countless
other state decisionmaking frameworks -perhaps even more capable, because
federal courts are the purported experts on federal constitutional law.
One also has to ask whether this kind of federalism-inspired principle
justifies the different outcomes that are being reached in at least some of these
cases. If the federal court decides not to apply the avoidance canon, its choices
are to decide the constitutional question or certify it. Federal courts certify
many, but not all, of these cases, and putting aside for the moment arguments
about whether they should certify more,2o' let us recognize the paradoxical
consequence of the federal courts' current approach to deciding these cases: out
of "respect" (that is, the refusal to apply the avoidance canon to save state
statutes), federal courts are striking down as unconstitutional more state
statutes than federal statutes2 o7 - not to mention more statutes than the state
courts would.
To make the oddity of this approach as clear as possible, let us consider one
last hypothetical. Assume that state statute X has been construed by its own
state supreme court. That court viewed the statute as overbroad and so gave it
a narrowing construction. In a separate case, X comes before the U.S. Supreme
Court on an overbreadth challenge. The outcome in this case is now well-
settled doctrine: the U.S. Supreme Court will not second-guess whether the
state supreme court was correct to narrow the statute; it will take the already
narrowed construction as law and then engage in federal constitutional analysis
(inquiring whether the law, as already narrowed, is constitutional).208 Now,
205. See supra note 175.
206. See infra notes 336-340 and accompanying text.
207. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny
in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 823 (20o6) (concluding, in a study of all strict
scrutiny cases published between 199o and 2003, that "federal laws clearly survive more
frequently than state and, especially local, laws"); see also Adam Winkler, Free Speech
Federalism, lo8 MICH. L. REv. 153, 154 (2009) ("[T]he level of government behind a speech
law-federal, state, or local-affects the degree of constitutional protection."). Another
argument might be that federal courts strike down state statutes more than they narrow
them because of some entirely different principle - namely, some kind of implicit mistrust of
state legislatures and the sense that it is the federal courts' role to rein them in. But if this
were the case, that would actually be a very significant exercise of federal-court power and
we would not expect to see such action justified with the vocabulary of federal-court
deference.
208. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 118-20 (1990) (holding that federal courts will not
second-guess the narrowing of a state statute by a state supreme court, even if the state
statute as literally read would not give litigants any notice of how the state court would
1957
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assume that the state supreme court never heard the overbreadth challenge and
the U.S. Supreme Court gets it first. The underlying question is still the same:
what does state law have to say about the narrowability of state statute X? This
example should help to illustrate why these constitutional cases should be
treated like any other state statutory interpretation cases.
4. Exception: Voluntary Application of State Methodology
There is one final twist. Some circuits hold that they are not required to
look to state methodology in federal-question cases but do so voluntarily. The
Fifth Circuit is an example. That court has explicitly held that "reference to
[Texas interpretive rules] is not mandated by Erie . .. and its progeny [where]
subject-matter jurisdiction today is based on a federal question, not on
diversity of citizenship."o' Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit still applies state
rules of construction in most federal-question/state-law cases because
"[r]eason dictates" that "[i]t would make little sense . . to proceed to an
aberrant construction by refusing to apply state canons, canons which will in
all probability govern any authoritative construction which the statute ever
receives."2o The Tenth Circuit likewise takes this middle view.2"
It is important to recognize that even though these courts do use the state
methodologies, the position that they take -that the federal court applies state
interpretive methodology at its option or out of "common sense"-has
different implications from a holding that Erie requires federal courts, even in
federal-question cases, to apply state methodology to state statutes. Indeed, the
position taken by these courts is, doctrinally, essentially the same as the
position taken by a court that applies only federal methodology to state
statutory questions. In both, the answer to the methodological-choice question
is federal: the federal court decides, as a matter of federal law, that it has
discretion to choose the applicable methodology. Whether the federal court
decides to "borrow" the state methodology for pragmatic reasons, it is still a
eventually narrow it); Fallon, supra note 198, at 854; see also Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham,
394 U.S. 147, 155-59 (1969) (assuming that a state-court-narrowed construction of a statute
was constitutionally valid even though the conviction obtained prior to the narrowing had
to be vacated because the narrowing was not foreseeable); cf. Monaghan, supra note 195, at
26 ("Facial scrutiny by the Supreme Court in such cases does not extend beyond a
consideration of whether the state rule, as authoritatively construed by the state courts,
satisfies relevant constitutional standards.").
2og. Batterton v. Tex. Gen. Land Office, 783 F.2d 1220, 1222 (5th Cit. 1986).
210. Id.




federal decision, as much of one as a decision by a federal court to apply only
federal methodological principles.
As stated at the outset of this Part, there is one additional set of
considerations that this discussion has mostly not addressed-namely, the
larger jurisprudential issues of what statutory interpretation "is" and how it
relates to individual judges. For example, if one views textualism, or other
interpretive rules, as required by Article III of the Federal Constitution or
rooted in the individual judge, perhaps one could argue that federal judges
cannot shed those interpretive rules when they interpret state statutes - that an
Article III-based interpretive approach goes wherever federal judges go. At a
more limited level, even if Erie effectuates a presumption that federal courts
generally should apply state methodology to state statutes, there still might be
specific state interpretive rules-e.g., a state court applies a "racist" canon of
interpretation or a canon requiring the issuance of federal-law advisory
opinionsm'- that federal courts arguably should not apply because of
conflicting federal constitutional principles.
Part IV addresses these arguments directly. For now, and in the context of
our empirical survey of the case law, the point to emphasize is simply that this
is not the conversation that the federal courts are having. The possibility that
certain constitutional considerations might justify a federal court's refusal to
apply a specific state interpretive rule (or all of them) does not undermine the
argument that, when not preempted, the baseline established by Erie is that
federal courts will apply state legal principles in state-law cases. But, critically,
the federal courts do not begin from - or even acknowledge - this baseline in
choosing their interpretive methodology. Thus, even if one might raise such
constitutional arguments to justify the courts' current practices, those
arguments do not seem consciously in play in the cases themselves.
zu. For instance, one can imagine a version of the avoidance canon that would require courts to
render advisory opinions about the Federal Constitution. If a state supreme court applied
such a canon, one might argue that Article III (because it prohibits federal courts from
giving advisory opinions) might trump Erie's requirement that the federal court apply that
state's avoidance principles in that context.
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III.STATE COURTS AND FEDERAL STATUTES
Things do not look the same on the flip side. The state supreme courts are
unequivocally and unapologetically independent federal statutory interpreters.
Two key factors are responsible for this difference. First, as discussed in
Part I, the U.S. Supreme Court has not given precedential status to most of its
federal statutory interpretation principles, and so there is no prevailing
understanding that state courts, when interpreting federal statutes, are bound
under the Supremacy Clause by any particular federal interpretive rules.
Second, the state supreme courts are coordinate, not inferior, to the federal
courts of appeals on matters of federal law. For this reason, most state supreme
courts have held that they are not bound by their regional federal circuit court's
interpretations of federal statutes.' Thus, without direction from the U.S.
Supreme Court, a state supreme court can use different interpretive methods to
reach an answer to a federal statutory question that differs from the answer of a
federal appellate court (often in the same city) that already has decided the
same question."' And these are divergences with real-world impact. State
courts are more than occasional interpreters of federal statutes: simply by
virtue of their numbers, state courts hear more federal-question cases than do
federal courts, and so these state cases have a significant effect on the meaning
of federal law."'
213. See Wrabley, supra note io, at 17 (counting twenty-nine states that hold this position); see,
e.g., Abela v. Gen. Motors Corp., 677 N.W.2d 325, 326 (Mich. 2004); State v. Burnett, 755
N.E.2d 857, 862 (Ohio 2001); Commonwealth v. Jones, 951 A.2d 294, 301 (Pa. 20o8); see also
Hall v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 851 A.2d 859, 863-64 (Pa. 2004) (compiling cases
summarizing state supreme court approaches to this issue and concluding that "[a] vast
majority of state supreme courts" treats "a decision of an inferior federal court . . . as
persuasive, but not binding").
214. Some scholars and judges dispute that the state courts are correct in taking this approach.
See Clermont, supra note 2, at 31. The Ninth Circuit has argued that state courts should be
obligated to follow its federal-law decisions. See Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 736 (9 th
Cir. 1991). Some commentators have said that state courts, even if perhaps not required to,
should voluntarily follow pronouncements of federal law by federal appellate courts. See,
e.g., Wrabley, supra note io, at 28. Yet the prevailing view in the state courts is the one
expressed by Justice Thomas's concurrence in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 5o6 U.S. 364, 376 (1993)
(also cited by Justice Ginsburg in her unanimous opinion for the Court in Arizonans for
Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 59 n.1 (1997)), namely, that state courts are as
authoritative on questions of federal law as are the lower federal courts and have no
obligation to defer to them.
215. A few states adopt a variation of this independent approach. See, e.g., Dark-Eyes v. Comm'r,
887 A.2d 848, 856 (Conn. 20o6) (giving Second Circuit precedent "'particularly persuasive
weight'" for prudential reasons (quoting Szewcyck v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 881 A.2d 259, 266




This Part addresses a particular subset of this reverse-Erie hodgepodge.
Previous work has focused on matters such as divergent case outcomes-
whether state courts should attempt to harmonize their federal-law case results
with already decided cases in the lower federal courts.216 This Part deals with a
different question -namely, how courts approach the choice of methodology in
these cases and how that choice can cause the divergent case outcomes that we
see. This inquiry has three additional implications for this Article's broader
concerns. First, despite the U.S. Supreme Court's agnosticism, some state
courts clearly believe that there is something called "federal statutory
interpretation." That is, these state courts identify what they view as
methodological principles applied by the U.S. Supreme Court that are not
universal or general law but, rather, are distinct from the interpretive
methodology that the state courts apply to their own statutes. Second, it is not
atypical to see state and federal courts each utilizing what they believe to be
"federal" interpretive principles but choosing different principles, and so
reaching different results. These diverging cases thus illustrate the practical
effects of the Supreme Court's reluctance to clarify its own methodological
choices. And third, in a related vein, the choice of interpretive methodology in
some of these cases appears to be outcome-determinative, a detail of special
relevance for the ordinary Erie context."'
To be clear, these cases pose problems different from those posed by the
ordinary Erie cases (involving federal courts interpreting state law) already
discussed. Most significantly, as a matter of pure doctrine, what the state
courts are doing in the reverse-Erie context is unobjectionable: because there is
no "law" of federal statutory interpretation, as a formal matter, these state
courts are free to make methodological choices different from those of the
lower federal courts. It is worth emphasizing, moreover, that there is no
doctrinal reason that the legal-status question must be answered in the same
federal-court precedent but only if the circuits are in uniform agreement); Akin v. Mo. Pac.
R.R., 977 P.2d 1040, 1052 (Okla. 1998) ("The voluntary deference we pay to our circuit's
pronouncements prevents federal law from being dichotomized within the State of
Oklahoma into different bodies of legal norms -that applied in Oklahoma courts and that
which governs federal courts within this state."); Wrabley, supra note io, at 22, 24.
216. See Clermont, supra note 2; Glassman, supra note 91; Wrabley, supra note 1o; Zeigler, supra
note 2; cf Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Dfficulty, 96
VA. L. REV. 719, 742 (o10) ("Aside from habeas corpus, Congress has not provided for
review of state court decisions in the lower federal courts.").
217. As stated, in reverse-Erie cases, the inquiry centers around the Supremacy Clause: is there
federal law that binds the lower courts? Outcome-determinativeness is not relevant here but
is central in the ordinary Erie context. Clearly, however, evidence that the choice of
methodology seems outcome-determinative in reverse-Erie cases informs the same
conclusion in the ordinary Erie context.
1961
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
way on the state and federal sides. It might be the case, for example, that a state
court could treat its own interpretive rules as law but view the legal status of
federal interpretive methodology differently because the U.S. Supreme Court
does. Nevertheless, as this Part aims to illustrate, the on-the-ground effects of
the Court's resistance to a more lawlike approach raise significant fairness and
uniformity concerns - concerns that may justify the Court's reconsideration of
its current views.
Indeed, the federal-law disuniformity facilitated by the Court's failure to
treat federal interpretive doctrine as law is something that we do not tolerate in
other methodological contexts. Would it, for example, seem equally probable
that state courts might apply a liberal interpretive framework to imply private
causes of action in federal statutes - in direct contrast to the much narrower
framework that the U.S. Supreme Court currently uses?"' Or could state
courts devise their own, different, tiers of scrutiny for cases in which federal
constitutional discrimination claims arise in state court? Both of these scenarios
are implausible, not because state courts are more rebellious in statutory
interpretation cases than in these other kinds of cases but, rather, because the
U.S. Supreme Court has resisted giving the same definitive clarity to its
statements about statutory interpretation methodology that it has given to
these other methodological doctrines.
A. State Courts Using Federal Methodology for Federal Statutes
At least some state supreme courts distinguish between state and federal
interpretive practices more self-consciously than federal courts generally do.
The Connecticut Supreme Court, for example, voluntarily harmonizes its
methodology in federal cases to what it believes is the Second Circuit's "plain
meaning" approach on the basis of "principles of comity and consistency," even
though the Connecticut Supreme Court has stated that a plain-meaning
methodology is at odds with its own "contemporaneous renunciation" of that
218. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 18, at 706
(describing the Court's recent "[r]etrenchment" in its willingness to imply private rights of
action). Of course, Sandoval's test for implying a private cause of action is itself a
methodology for statutory interpretation; it guides courts in determining when to interpret
an ambiguous statute to include a private cause of action. This area of law is therefore one of
the limited exceptions-an area in which the Court does announce a precedential
methodology for a specific context. See id. at 706-07 (describing the test articulated in




approach for Connecticut statutes." 9 The Connecticut court also has
emphasized that the choice of methodology can be outcome-determinative and
has noted in various cases that, were it applying its own methodology rather
than the Second Circuit's, it would interpret the federal statutes differently.22 o
Other courts likewise recognize that divergent interpretive strategies can
affect case outcomes but diverge nonetheless because they disagree with a
federal court's earlier methodological choice. Consider, for example, the
Oregon Supreme Court, which, as already discussed, has imposed a tiered
statutory interpretation framework-the so-called PGE framework"' -on itself
and on the state's lower courts. The Oregon court refuses to apply the PGE
framework to federal statutes and instead applies what it discerns as federal
interpretive rules.2 However, the Oregon courts and the Ninth Circuit do not
always agree on what those federal rules are.223
In a recent ERISA preemption case, for example, the Oregon Court of
Appeals held that the U.S. Supreme Court had "reject[ed]" the "literal
textualism" that Oregon's PGE test would require for interpreting ERISA and
"look[ed] instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute."" The Oregon court
therefore used a purposive approach to decide that ERISA preempted the
common law claim at issue. (The Oregon Supreme Court declined to review
the case.) Eight months later, a case raising the identical question was filed in
Oregon state court but this time was removed to federal court. The result was a
219. Szewcyck, 881 A.2d at 266 & n.1o; cf Gluck, supra note 3, at 1791-97 (documenting the
Connecticut Supreme Court's prohibition of the plain meaning rule and its subsequent
reluctance to apply a state statute seeking to restore the rule).
220. See Szewcyck, 881 A.2d at 274 (Borden, J., concurring) (agreeing that the court was bound to
interpret the statute literally, because the Second Circuit did, but also arguing that "if [the
court] were writing on a clean slate, it would be difficult . . . to characterize the term [at
issue in the federal statute] as 'plain and unambiguous"'); id. at 274-75 (Sullivan, C.J.,
dissenting) (refusing to follow the Second Circuit and reaching a different result on the
basis of legislative history); accord Turner v. Frowein, 752 A.2d 955, 974 n.17 (Conn. 2000)
(stating that the court did "not write on a clean slate" and so following the Second Circuit's
interpretation of federal law in another case, but noting that "reliance on the fundamental
tenets of statutory construction" might support a different conclusion).
221. See Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 859 P.2d 1143 (Or. 1993).
222. See supra note 117 and accompanying text for a discussion of the recent loosening of the PGE
rules. The Oregon Supreme Court, however, still describes its current regime as the PGE
framework and holds that it binds lower state courts. Id.
223. See, e.g., Hagan v. Gemstate Mfg., Inc., 982 P.2d 11o8, 1114 (Or. 1999) ("When this court
construes a federal statute . .. we follow the methodology prescribed by federal courts.").
224. Liberty Nw. Ins. Corp. v. Kemp, 85 P.3d 871, 875 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 93 P-3d 71
(Or. 2004); see Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Krafka, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 723 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996).
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contrary decision by the Ninth Circuit, which -on the basis of different, more
literal, interpretive principles - construed ERISA to reach the opposite result
from Oregon's construction. The Ninth Circuit recognized that it had created a
conflict with the preceding Oregon state court decision (as well as an earlier
California state court decision)." In a dissent from the denial of rehearing en
banc, six Ninth Circuit judges opined: "[W]e are now faced with the
conundrum of federal courts in Oregon and California forced to allow state
remedies and state courts in those areas holding those same state remedies
federally preempted.",2
In another example, the New York Court of Appeals diverged from the
Second Circuit in its interpretation of whether the federal Davis-Bacon Act
preempts state contract law claims for prevailing wages. The Second Circuit
relied on what it called the "'elemental canon' of statutory construction that
where a statute expressly provides a remedy, 'courts must be especially
reluctant to provide additional remedies,"' whereas the New York Court of
Appeals instead applied the presumption against preemption canon and relied
on the legislative history and purpose of the federal statute in support."' Other
states present similar examples.
B. State Courts Using State Methodology for Federal Statutes
A few other state courts appear to believe that their own state interpretive
rules should apply to federal statutes, but one wonders whether these states
would maintain this position if the U.S. Supreme Court were to lay out clear
and controlling interpretive rules. For example, the Alabama Supreme Court
225. Providence Health Plan v. McDowell, 385 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2004).
226. Id. at 1176 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
227. Compare Cox v. NAP Const. Co., 891 N.E.2d 271 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2008), with Grochowski v.
Phoenix Constr. Co., 318 F.3d 80, 85 (2d Cit. 2003).
228. For example, the Alaska Supreme Court has diverged from the Ninth Circuit in interpreting
the phrase "public lands" in the federal Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act to
exclude "navigable waters." The state court based its decision on application of what the
Alaska court called the federal "clear statement" canon, for which it cited numerous U.S.
Supreme Court opinions and defined as the requirement that Congress may alter the
balance between state and federal governments only in "unmistakably clear" statutory
terms. Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d 954, 966-68 (Alaska 1995). The Ninth Circuit had
reached the contrary result based on its application of an agency-deference canon. Alaska v.
Babbitt, 54 F-3d 549 ( 9th Cir. 1995), withdrawn and superseded, 72 F.3d 698 (9th Cit. 1995)
(still relying on Chevron to reach the contrary result). For another example, see Akin v.
Missouri Pacific Railroad, 977 P.2d 1040, 1053 (Okla. 1998), in which the Oklahoma Supreme




has interpreted the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (LAD) in light of its own
state interpretive principles and has thereby created a square conflict with the
Fifth Circuit. The Alabama court said that it "recognize[d] that some federal
courts have ignored the plain meaning" rule for LAD interpretation but held
that it was bound by its own "fundamental rule of statutory construction" on
plain meaning."2 In contrast, the line of Fifth Circuit cases rejected by the
Alabama Supreme Court "decline[d] to apply [the section at issue]
mechanically contrary to the stated purposes of the statute." 2 30
Wisconsin, like Oregon, applies a tiered methodological approach to
statutory interpretation. But Wisconsin's supreme court, unlike Oregon's,
recently held that it will "employ the same methodology to interpret a federal
statute as . . . a state statute."231 (The main effect of this rule is to lessen the use
of extrinsic materials such as legislative history and to minimize the use of
canons.232 ) Wisconsin's chief justice disagrees with the majority's
methodological-choice approach to these federal-law cases and has argued that
the "majority ought to use federal methods of statutory interpretation of a
federal statute" and "ought not impose [Wisconsin's] rules of statutory
interpretation on a federal statute.""2  Iowa also appears to follow its own
interpretive rules in federal statutory cases. 3
C. Disunformity ofFederal Law
Uniformity concerns analogous to those that underlie the Erie doctrine
have a normative punch in the reverse context, too, and long have animated the
fundamental conception that most lawyers share that federal law is supposed to
mean the same thing in every jurisdiction.23s Anthony Bellia points out that the
"core purpose of the Supremacy Clause was to prevent the states from
229. Bozeman v. State, 781 So. 2d 165, 169 (Ala. 2000).
230. Sassoon v. Stynchombe, 654 F.2d 371, 375 (5th Cir. Unit B Aug. 1981).
231. Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 717 N.W.2d 280, 290 (Wis. 2oo6).
232. Id. at 302 n.15.
233. Id. at 303 n.20 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).
234. See, e.g., Top of Iowa Coop. v. Sime Farms, Inc., 608 N.W.2d 454, 460 (Iowa 2000); accord
Mason v. Schweizer Aircraft Corp., 653 N.W.2d 543, 548 (Iowa 2002).
235. Clermont, supra note 2, at 36 ("Likewise under reverse-Erie, there is a federal interest in the
uniformity of law applied in federal and state court. As to forum shopping, there should still
be some desire to avoid shopping by plaintiffs or defendants between the two systems. As to
inequitable administration of the laws, there is still an unfairness in that certain classes of
people have a choice of court systems.").
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interfering with the unified operation of federal law"236 and that there is "an
apparent constitutional presumption that a federal statute should have the
same meaning in the first instance whether enforced in a state or a federal
court.""2 7 The U.S. Supreme Court always has been assumed to be the primary
guardian of this uniformity.2
Today, however, few would contend that the Court adequately serves this
function.239 Grants of certiorari are rare, and decisions to review cases from the
state supreme courts in particular are rarer still. 0 And yet the purported
availability of Supreme Court review appears to be driving at least part of the
state courts' independence when it comes to federal statutory interpretation."
But as a result of this unrealistic reliance on the ability of the Court to
produce coherence, intra-American methodological divergences commonly
thought impossible actually exist. A decade ago, Adrian Vermeule dismissed
the intriguing idea that the various circuits could experiment with different
statutory interpretation methodologies and thus percolate the question of the
best methodology for the U.S. Supreme Court, on the ground that the "costs of
disuniformity (and the perceived injustice and arbitrariness that accompany
disuniformity) would probably prove intolerable."" Even those who have
argued that federal jurisprudence need not be uniform across the nation
typically assume that, within each region, the governing principles are. 4 ' But,
in fact, the coordinate nature of state supreme courts and federal appellate
236. Bellia, supra note 36, at 902.
237. Bellia, supra note 2, at 1554; cf D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 471-72
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("Federal law is no juridical chameleon, changing complexion to
match that of each state wherein lawsuits happen to be commenced because of the accidents
of service of process and of the application of the venue statutes.").
238. See Barry Friedman, Under the Law ofFederal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and
State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1218-19 (2004); see also Letter from Chief Justice John
Marshall to Sen. Dudley Chase (Feb. 7,1817), in 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS
AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1246 (1953)
("[I]ndependent tribunals having concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject should
concur in the principles on which they determine the causes coming before them.").
239. Cf Friedman, supra note 238, at 1220 ("Today's panacea for the inadequacy of Supreme
Court review is the idea of 'parity."').
240. See Solimine, supra note 12, at 353.
241. See, e.g., Akin v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 977 P.2d 1040, 1053 (Okla. 1998) (creating a split with the
Tenth Circuit and expressing "faith that the Supreme Court will soon see fit to settle this").
242. Vermeule, supra note 29, at 11o.
243. Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 16o6 (2008) (arguing that





courts, combined with the lack of a precedential methodology from the U.S.
Supreme Court, has actually licensed this type of intraregional methodological
disuniformity for federal statutory interpretation. And sometimes, as we have
seen, such methodological differences cause case outcomes to diverge.
To be sure, the kinds of outcome-related disunformity occasioned by these
cases pose problems for more than just statutory interpretation. The state
courts that exercise their federal lawmaking independence generally do so
across all areas of law, and so their divergent choices of interpretive
methodology present just one of the various ways in which state courts can
cause inconsistency in federal law. But statutory interpretation methodology
differs from other areas of law in one fundamental way: the U.S. Supreme
Court does not even try to impose uniformity in this context. In the common-
law context (e.g., when the Court establishes a four-step framework to
determine when a stay should be granted4), and even in much of the
constitutional context (e.g., the three-pronged Establishment Clause test that
the Court devised in Lemon v. Kurtzman4'), Supreme Court review answers
both the methodological and the specific legal question with some finality. 6
Thus, for example, if state and federal courts diverge in the application of strict
scrutiny to a protected group in an equal protection case, Supreme Court
review not only resolves the split but also decides for every future case what
level of scrutiny that group receives. In contrast, when a state court and a
federal court diverge in interpreting a federal statute based on the former's
decision to give greatest weight to expressions of purpose in legislative history
and the latter's alternative decision to apply a canon of construction, Supreme
Court review resolves the substantive statutory question presented in that case
(e.g., whether Title VII permits affirmative action); but even five votes in
agreement as to the methodological principles applied offer no guidance to
lower courts about how to handle the same conflict between legislative history
and the canon in the future. Nor does Supreme Court review finally resolve
that question even with respect to the statute at issue. Under the Court's
current practice, the methodology that the Court applies to Title VII (or any
244. See, e.g., Nken v. Holder, 129S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2009).
245. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
246. See Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision
Making, 96 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 305, 315 (2002) (arguing that the constraining effects of
"jurisprudential regimes" in freedom-of-expression cases show that "[1] aw matters" even in
Supreme Court decisionmaking).
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other statute) in one case does not carry over to the next case in which the same
statute is interpreted."
This all relates to the Court's resistance toward treating its methodological
statements as precedential. One wonders whether the Court is aware of the
trickle-down effects of that resistance. Disuniform interpretations of federal
law enabled by an open menu of statutory interpretation methodologies might
be reason enough for the Court finally to settle on some firm methodological
principles. Indeed, doing so might be a modest way to increase federal-law
uniformity, and perhaps the only way to do so absent a fundamental change in
the overarching understanding of the equal constitutional standing of state and
inferior federal courts.
Perhaps these splits are not happening frequently enough to ring alarm
bells. But they are not so infrequent as to escape even a casual perusal of the
crossover cases. Nor, it should be emphasized, are state courts the only ones
that use methodological choice to create splits on the meaning of federal law.
Federal courts, too, create circuit splits by construing federal statutes
differently on the basis of different interpretive rules.74 Those cases command
the same need for either Supreme Court review or some kind of unifying
direction from the Court on the question of methodological choice.
IV. METHODOLOGICAL ANALOGIES AND ERIE
How did we get here? And what is it about statutory interpretation that has
made these questions more difficult to answer than they have been in other
areas of law? This Part looks to other methodological frameworks, frameworks
that, are, in contrast, both more comfortably situated within the Erie doctrine
and more explicitly understood as real federal law. As we shall see, many of
these other interpretive regimes - including rules of contract and trust
interpretation, choice of law, and even some constitutional law regimes-share
key characteristics with the rules of statutory interpretation. And so we must
ask ourselves whether statutory interpretation really is different or whether
there is something akin to path dependence that has prevented its alignment
with other methodologies.
247. Elsewhere I have discussed at greater length how the Court's current approach is in tension
with rule-of-law values and described the instrumental and expressive benefits that might
be derived from a more lawlike approach. See Gluck, supra note 3, at 1848-55.
248. See, e.g., United States v. Head, 552 F-3d 640, 642-44 (7th Cir. 2009) (creating a federal
circuit split based on methodological choices, including by the refusal to adopt the same
"nontextual interpretation" adopted by other federal courts or to apply the "clerical error"




The answer, as this Part argues, lies somewhere in between. Like the
principles of contract interpretation, the principles of statutory interpretation
have long been familiar. But, unlike with contract, the idea of statutory
interpretation as a separate "field" (a kind of "law" to be considered alongside
the substance of the statute itself) postdates Erie. This and other factors
discussed in this Part may explain why statutory interpretation has never had
its crystallizing Erie moment.4 9But once attention is trained on the question,
and in particular on the comparisons to other methodologies, it becomes
difficult to understand a continuing exception for statutory interpretation- or
at least difficult to accept it without some conscious justification from the
courts for the distinction.
Moreover, regardless of whether one agrees with the particulars of the
federal courts' Erie choices-e.g., the fact that federal courts apply state
burden-allocation doctrine to state-law claims - there can be no dispute that
federal courts are treating these other kinds of interpretive regimes as "law,"
not only for purposes of the Erie inquiry but also for purposes of federal-law
cases.2"o Thus, the notion of a "law" of contract interpretation has meaning
both because, in state-law cases, federal courts follow Erie and apply the state's
rules of contract interpretation and also because, in federal-law cases, there is
such a thing as "rules of federal contract interpretation" that bind courts under
the Supremacy Clause. These comparisons thus also force the question why, in
contrast, the legal status of statutory interpretation methodology has remained
so ambiguous.
249. Cf Clark, supra note 77, at 1476 (arguing that Swift became more problematic as state courts
developed specific "commercial doctrines as a matter of state law").
25o. The one exception is stare decisis, as scholars continue to debate whether stare decisis is a
rule of federal common law or rather an inherent aspect of Article III judicial power. See
Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 828-29 (2008) (describing
this debate). Compare John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 5o
DUKE L.J. 503 (2000) (arguing that stare decisis is usually a rule of federal common law),
and Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the
Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1540 (2ooo) (arguing that stare
decisis is "a form of 'common law' followed by courts as a matter of judicial policy" and
"may be displaced by an act of Congress"), with Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent:
Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision -Making, 18 CONsT. COMMENT. 191 (2001)
(arguing that stare decisis emanates from Article III authority and cannot be affected by
congressional action), and Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay
on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 596 (2001) ("In light of longstanding
acceptance and considerations of justice and prudence, stare decisis deserves recognition as a
legitimate, constitutionally authorized doctrine beyond Congress's power to control."), and
Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspectives, 46
MERCER L. REV. 697 (1995) (identifying limits to Congress's power to prescribe court rules
where such rules affect how cases are decided).
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A. Analogous Jurisprudential Principles
The question of statutory interpretation methodology's legal status can be
explored in a variety of ways. For example, statutory interpretation
methodology can be conceived as a set of rules that helps parties and courts
predictably to resolve disputes over ambiguous language in previously
negotiated text. Contract, will, and trust interpretation provide obvious
analogies to this conception. More generally, statutory interpretation
methodology might be understood as a set of rules that provides courts with a
reasoning process. That understanding invites comparisons to other predefined
reasoning frameworks, both those related to textual interpretation -like the
various constitutional decision rules - and those related to decisionmaking
more broadly, including choice of law and stare decisis. Notably, all of those
frameworks operate in the public-law context and thereby drive home the
point that "laws" of methodology have not generally been confined to the
private-law realm.
Yet another way to characterize statutory interpretation principles, though
perhaps less obvious, is as burden-allocation devices. Many interpretive
principles - ranging from the presumption against preemption to the rule of
lenity to textual canons like inclusio unius- effectively establish default rules
that the opposing party must overcome to prevail. On the basis of this
conception, we might look for comparisons to other burden-allocation regimes,
such as contributory negligence or the McDonnell Douglas test for Title VII
cases.
The key point is that no matter which of these areas one believes to offer
the most apt comparison, all of these methodologies already are treated as
more lawlike than statutory interpretation, and Erie already applies to all of
them. In comparing statutory interpretation to each of these different types of
methodologies, this Section therefore aims to illustrate both that we need not
start anew and that, even if we could, it would make little sense to do so.
1. Analogies to Rules on Interpretation of Texts: Contracts, Wills, and
Trusts
Statutory interpretation, like the interpretation of contracts, wills, and
trusts, entails the judicial interpretation of a text previously negotiated by
others. Many of the same overarching questions arise in each of these contexts,




intent or whether a more objective interpretive perspective is warranted."'
Indeed, many rules of contract interpretation are similar-and in some states
identical-to the rules of statutory interpretation.s 2  But federal courts
routinely seek out the state rules of contract interpretation in diversity cases'
and hold that state "rules of contractual interpretation . . . [are] considered
substantive under the Erie doctrine."s 4 Federal courts likewise adhere, when
interpreting state contracts, to a state's adoption of the "four corners rule" ("if
the meaning of a written contract can be inferred from its terms the judicial
251. My claim about the comparability of these tasks -and I am not the first to notice such
connections -does not turn on whether ultimately all questions about the content of the
interpretive rules themselves are answered alike in each context. Cf Stephen J. Choi &
G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129 (2006) (arguing that boilerplate
contracts should be interpreted in accordance with statutory interpretation principles and
not general contract interpretation principles); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court,
1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1984)
(describing an approach in which "the judge treats the statute as a contract"); Curtis J.
Mahoney, Note, Treaties as Contracts: Textualism, Contract Theory, and the Interpretation of
Treaties, 116 YALE L.J. 824, 833 (2007) (arguing that textualism is incompatible with a
"meeting of the minds" approach to contract interpretation). An important new book by
Kent Greenawalt also compares the nature of interpretation across disciplines. See KENT
GREENAWALT, LEGAL INTERPRETATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM OTHER DISCIPLINES AND
PRIVATE TEXTS (2010).
252. Gentile v. SinglePoint Fin., Inc., 788 A.2d 111, 113 (Del. 2001) ("It is a fundamental principle
that the rules used to interpret statutes, contracts, and other written instruments are
applicable when construing corporate charters .... ); Thomas v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
749 N.W.2d 678, 683 n.5 (Iowa 2008) ("Cases interpreting language in statutes are
persuasive authority in interpreting contractual language."); Petersen v. Magna Corp., 773
N.W.2d 564, 603 (Mich. 2009) (Markman, J., dissenting) (listing interpretive factors for
statute and contract interpretation as interchangeable); Horse Creek Conservation Dist. v.
State ex rel. Wyo. Att'y Gen., 221 P.3 d 306, 317 (Wyo. 2009) ("As statutory and contract
interpretation principles make clear, the plain and ordinary meaning of the words
governs.").
253. See, e.g., T Street Dev. LLC v. Dereje & Dereje, 586 F.3 d 6, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Consumers
Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. P.W. & Sons Trucking, Inc., 307 F.3 d 362, 365 (5 th Cit. 2002);
Harken Exploration Co. v. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC, 261 F. 3d 466, 471 n-3 (5th Cir. 2001); AM
Int'l, Inc. v. Graphic Mgmt. Assocs., 44 F.3 d 572, 576 (7 th Cir. 1995); Underwriters at
Lloyd's, London v. Pike, 977 F.2d 1278, 1279 (8th Cir. 1992).
254. Coplay Cement Co. v. Willis & Paul Grp., 983 F.2d 1435, 1438 (7th Cir. 1993); see Progressive
N. Ins. Co. v. McDonough, 6o8 F. 3 d 388, 390-91 (8th Cir. 2010); Admiral Ins. Co. v. Ford,
607 F. 3d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 2010); Cooper Labs., Inc. v. Int'l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 802 F.2d
667, 672 (3 d Cir. 1986); Pastor v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., No. 05 C 1459, 2005 WL
2453900, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2005) ("[T]he differences in states' breach of contract
laws are important and may be outcome-determinative.").
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inquiry stops there; extrinsic evidence .. . is inadmissible"), which is essentially
the same as the "plain meaning" rule of statutory interpretation.5
The parol evidence rule presents another close analogy. That rule is
basically identical to statutory interpretation doctrines that concern when
courts may consider nontextual evidence.2S6 But the state courts that adopt the
parol evidence rule for contract actually adopt it: that decision is a "holding," is
given stare decisis effect, and is clearly followed by all state and federal courts
interpreting a contract under that state's law.2 s7
To be sure, some may perceive a difference between regulating private
rights, as most contracts do, and public rights, as some statutes do. Of course,
some statutes regulate private rights as well. But, if anything, the public-rights
distinction seems to tip the scale more heavily toward respecting state-court
interpretive rules for statutory interpretation. To the extent that we view public
rights as more policy-related than contractual rights, it seems even more
important-and more appropriate-for federal courts to defer to the home
state's rules in interpreting them.
The contract analogy is also useful in the reverse-Erie context, when state
courts interpret federal law, simply because federal rules of contract
interpretation unquestionably exist and are applied by lower courts to federal
contracts.2' Perhaps one reason for the clarity here is that the U.S. Supreme
255. Coplay Cement Co., 983 F.2d at 1438.
256. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (1981) (setting forth the parol evidence rule);
see, e.g., Ungerleider v. Gordon, 214 F- 3d 1279, 1282 (lith Cir. 2000) (defining the parol
evidence rule to hold that "'[e]vidence of a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement is
inadmissible to vary or contradict the unambiguous language of a valid contract"' (quoting
Johnson Enters. of Jacksonville v. FPL Grp., Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1309 (1ith Cir. 1998))); see
also Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its Implications for
New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195, 199, 221-42 (1998) (arguing for the
"recognition of the strong analogy between contract and statutory interpretation").
257. See, e.g., Ungerleider, 214 F.3d at 1282 ("Florida law, of course, recognizes the parol evidence
rule. . . . The rule is one of substantive law, not evidence, so it is applied by federal courts
sitting in diversity."); Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238,
1245 (loth Cit. 1990) ("Wyoming courts depart from the [parol evidence] rule only if the
evidence is used to establish a separate and distinct contract, a condition precedent, fraud,
mistake, or repudiation."); Wilson Arlington Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 912 F.2d 366, 370
(9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that the outcome of cases would be different if the court applied
California's version of the parol evidence rule as opposed to Virginia's); Schilberg
Integrated Metals Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 819 A.2d 773, 794 (Conn. 2003) (characterizing
the parol evidence rule as substantive law); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213
cmt. a (1981) (same); Alfred Hill, State Procedural Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation,
69 HARv. L. REv. 66, 107 (1955).
258. See, e.g., Miller v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 502 F.3d 1245, 1248-49 (loth Cir. 2007) ("Our




Court has made explicit rulings about it. The Court has held, for example, that
" [w]hen a contract is a maritime one, and the dispute is not inherently local,
federal law controls the contract interpretation." 259 Federal courts also have
differentiated the application of the parol evidence rule on the basis of whether
a federal- or state-law contract is at issue.2"o Numerous federal courts also have
held that "federal common law principles" govern contract interpretation when
a contract effectuates a settlement that "involves a right . . . derived from a
federal statute," such as ERISA or Title VII (although a few hold the
opposite).26
majority of other circuits."); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 270 F.3d 135, 139 (3d
Cir. 2001) (holding that federal contract law governs the interpretation of federal contracts);
Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 88o F.2d 1018, 1032 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Federal
law controls the interpretation of a contract entered pursuant to federal law when the
United States is a party."); Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 366, 370 (1988)
("[F]ederal contract law is not just a branch of the common law of contracts, but is a
separate tree."); 1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL
RESOURCEs LAw 5 9:7 (2d ed. 2010); cf United States v. Ajugwo, 82 F. 3d 925, 928 (9th Cir.
1996) ("[T]here is binding precedent in this circuit. In [an earlier case] we refused to
consider parol evidence for the purpose of adding terms to or changing the terms of an
integrated plea agreement." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
259. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 22-23 (2004) (citing Kossick v. United Fruit Co.,
365 U.S. 731, 735 (1961)).
26o. See, e.g., O'Neill v. United States, 5o F.3d 677, 684-85 (9 th Cir. 1995) (arguing that the
U.C.C.'s narrowing of the parol evidence rule "is a source of federal common law and may
be relied upon in interpreting a contract to which the federal government is a party" and
rejecting the government's reliance on other cases because they involved state, not federal,
common-law principles of contract interpretation); Mohr v. Metro E. Mfg. Co., 711 F.2d 69,
72 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding, in construing a contract under the federal Labor Management
Relations Act, that the court was "obliged to apply a uniform national parol evidence rule
rather than the parol evidence rule of a particular state").
261. Williams v. Metzler, 132 F.3d 937, 946 (3d Cir. 1997); see, e.g., Morais v. Cent. Beverage
Corp. Union Emps. Supplemental Ret. Plan, 167 F-3d 709, 711 (3d Cir. 1999) ("[It is well
settled that federal common law applies both to interpret the provisions of an ERISA benefit
plan and to resolve issues of relinquishment of rights and waiver when such side agreements
affect the benefits provided by an ERISA plan." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Snider
v. Circle K Corp., 923 F.2d 1404, 1407 (ioth Cir. 1991) ("Although Title VII settlement
agreements are contracts, . . . [f]ederal common law governs the enforcement and
interpretation of such agreements because the rights of the litigants and the operative legal
policies derive from a federal source." (internal quotation marks omitted)). But cf Dhaliwal
v. Woods Div., Hesston Corp., 930 F.2d 547, 548 (7th Cir. 1991) (repeating "earlier
expressed doubts that Title VII settlement agreements are in fact covered by general law-
federal common law-rather than by state contract law"); Bellia, supra note 36, at 843
(compiling cases).
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The comparisons here are obvious.262 The Supreme Court's view that
applying state rules of contract interpretation "would undermine the
uniformity of general maritime law," ,, 6 for example, is quite analogous to the
idea that applying state rules of statutory interpretation to federal statutes
could undermine the uniformity of federal statutory law. And if a federal
common law of contract interpretation applies to contracts derived from rights
in federal statutes, why should there not also be a federal common law of
statutory interpretation to interpret the statutes themselves?
Even the question of how the crossover cases should treat legislated rules of
interpretation is addressed in the contractual context. The U.C.C., it is worth
emphasizing, is precisely such a legislated rule. It dictates the rules of
interpretation that courts should follow. For example, it codifies the parol
evidence rule 64 and provides "general definitions and principles of
interpretation.""26 Moreover, the U.C.C. overrides the common-law rules of
contract interpretation that preceded it. Federal and state courts universally
assume that legislatures have authority to enact such interpretive rules in the
U.C.C. and dutifully follow them. The statutory interpretation context is a
close, but not perfect, comparison. There may be greater separation-of-powers
concerns about legislative interference with courts' interpretation of statutes
than about legislative interference with contract interpretation; some may view
statutory (as opposed to contract) interpretation as more central to the judicial
function.2 66 But, again, we have a line-drawing problem here: federal courts
already have accepted some legislative interpretive guidance, ranging from
262. Indeed, others have noted the comparison between statutory and contract interpretation in
service of different arguments. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory
Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2033 (2002) (applying the idea of contractual default
rules to statutory interpretation); Elhauge, supra note 66 (same); McNollgast, Positive
Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992);
Ross & Tranen, supra note 256, at 221.
263. Norfolk, 543 U.S. at 28.
264. U.C.C. § 2-202.
265. U.C.C. art. 1.
266. Alternatively, whereas the U.C.C. governs private parties -contracting parties who had
nothing to do with the U.C.C.'s drafting -legislated rules are enacted by legislatures to
apply to their own legislative work product (statutes). As such, legislative power might be
viewed as even more robust in the latter situation. Cf John F. Manning, Putting Legislative
History to a Vote: A Response to Professor Siegel, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1533-41 (2000) (arguing
that a federal legislated rule authorizing legislative-history reliance would be an
unconstitutional self-delegation but implying that other types of federal legislated rules of




definitional statutes to the Civil Rights Act of 1991's specification of which
legislative history courts are permitted to consult in construing parts of it.2 6 7
The choice-of-methodology principles governing the interpretation of wills
and trusts are almost identical to the law governing contract interpretation, so
it suffices to note that it is well settled that, under Erie, state interpretive rules
likewise govern federal-court construction of wills and trusts executed under
state law 68 and that, like contract interpretation principles, many of the
principles governing will and trust interpretation look very similar to the
canons of statutory interpretation."'* What's more, there is a clearly established
267. For examples of courts following the congressional directive that the interpretive
memorandum of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 shall be its exclusive legislative history for
purposes of construing the Act to apply to business necessity, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, § io5(b), ios Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §1981 note (20o6)), see
Graoch Associates # 33 v. Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Human Relations Commission, 5o8
F- 3d 366, 387 (6th Cir. 2007); and El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,
479 F.3d 232, 241 (3d Cir. 2007). For examples of courts following the federal Dictionary Act,
see Isaacson v. Dow Chemical Co., 517 F.3d 129, 135-36 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying the Act's
definition of "person" to include a "corporation"); United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 907
(9 th Cir. 1974) (same); and In re Application of Foster, 343 F.2d 980, 988 & n.9 (C.C.P.A.
1965) (applying the Act's rule that singular includes plural). For cases applying RICO's
instruction that it be "liberally construed," see, for example, Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985); Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3 d 541, 547 (9th Cir. 2007); and
United States v. McKinney (In re Assets ofBillman), 915 F.2d 916, 921 (4th Cir. 1990). See also
1 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (20o6) (defining how terms in federal statutes are to be interpreted); 21
U.S.C. § 854 (d) (2006) (directing that a penalty on the investment of illicit drug profits "be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes"); Civil Rights Act of 1991,
5 io5(b) ("No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol. 137
Congressional Record S15276 . . . shall be considered legislative history of, or relied upon in
any way as legislative history in construing or applying, any provision of this Act that relates
to Wards Cove-Business necessity/cumulation/alternative business practice."). RICO's
statement of findings, enacted in the Public Law and codified as a note to the statute, has the
same direction. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat.
922, 947 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 note (20o6)).
268. See, e.g., Patterson v. United States, 181 F. 3d 927, 929 (8th Cir. 1999); Estate of Heim v.
Comm'r, 914 F.2d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1990); Wisely v. United States, 893 F.2d 66o, 665
(4th Cir. 1990); Estate of Salter v. Comm'r, 545 F.2d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 1977); Teller v.
Kaufman, 426 F.2d 128, 131 (8th Cir. 1970); Waterhouse v. Hoover, 203 F.2d 171, 173 (6th
Cit. 1953) (per curiam); De Korwin v. First Nat'l Bank of Chi., 179 F.2d 347, 349 (7th Cir.
1949)-
269. See, e.g., Heim, 914 F.2d at 1325 ("Under California law, . . . [i]f extrinsic evidence renders
the language of the will susceptible to two or more meanings, the will is said to be
ambiguous . . . ."); Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 362 F.2d 444, 452 (6th Cir.
1966) ("[T]he term on repetition will be accorded the same construction throughout the
will."); Strite v. McGinnes, 330 F.2d 234, 239 (3d Cir. 1964) ("In Pennsylvania ... [the]
intention is to be discovered from a consideration of all the language in the four corners of
the instrument . . . or where legal or technical words are used and it is clear from their use
1975
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"federal common law of trust interpretation" that state and federal courts alike
apply to federal law (most commonly, ERISA).27o
2. Analogies to Other Ex Ante-Defined Reasoning Processes: Choice ofLaw,
Stare Decisis, and Constitutional Law Frameworks
Another kind of comparison can be made between statutory interpretation
and legal regimes that set forth a reasoning process, even if not always text-
related. This comparison, moreover, is clearly visible in the public-law context,
as well as the private-law context, and applies both transsubstantively and
intrasubstantively. In areas ranging from choice of law to stare decisis to
constitutional law, the courts have recognized the importance of following the
home jurisdiction's decisionmaking processes. Presumably, underlying those
conclusions is the idea not only that decisionmaking rules can be outcome-
determinative -and therefore that not following them would undermine Erie's
goal of intrastate decisional uniformity -but also that they often reflect some
kind of substantive policy judgment on the part of a state."'
Two familiar areas of transsubstantive, nontextual reasoning regimes are
choice-of-law rules and stare decisis. Erie already applies to both. The analogy
between choice-of-law rules and statutory interpretation was described in
Subsection II.B.1-and recall that the Court in Klaxon long ago brought choice
of law under Erie's umbrella.' (What's more, the Erie decision itself, together
with its progeny, sets out its own transsubstantive decisionmaking regime for
choice of law.) With respect to stare decisis, the Erie question arises in the
context of Louisiana's civil-law system. As the nation's only civil code state,
Louisiana does not use stare decisis but rather employs the statute-based civil-
that the legal or technical meaning was intended."); see also Estate of Cavenaugh v. Comm'r,
51 F. 3 d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Texas presumes that a testator would not include useless
expressions in her will."); In re Estate of Damon, 869 P.2d 1339, 1343 (Haw. 1994) ("[W]e
are guided by principles relating to the interpretation of trusts as well as those relating to the
interpretation of wills . . . . 'Each word, phrase, clause and sentence of the paragraph should
be considered in relation to each other and the paragraph itself construed as a part of the
will as a whole."' (quoting Queen's Hosp. v. Hite, 38 Haw. 494, 505 (1950))).
270. See Monaghan, supra note 41, at 760 ("[F]ar more federal common law exists than the
currently restrictive theories can account for; ERISA, for example, is soaked in a background
federal common law of trusts."); see also Alex M. Johnson, Jr. & Ross D. Taylor,
Revolutionizing Judicial Interpretation of Charitable Trusts: Applying Relational Contracts and
Dynamic Interpretation to Cy Pres and America's Cup Litigation, 74 IOWA L. REV. 545 (1989)
(comparing charitable trust interpretation and dynamic statutory interpretation).
271. See WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS
302 (3d ed. 2002).




law methodology. The Fifth Circuit has held that Erie compels federal courts to
use Louisiana's unique approach to precedent in diversity cases involving
Louisiana law."' This holding has been noted by a variety of commentators
and does not appear ever to have been contested.24
Constitutional law provides perhaps the most important example of ex ante
reasoning rules already subject to Erie and the Supremacy Clause, one that
presents both transsubstantive and subject-specific manifestations. As a matter
of transsubstantive decisionmaking, for instance, a number of state supreme
courts have set forth controlling interpretive regimes dictating when courts
should construe state constitutional provisions coextensively with analogous
federal constitutional provisions and when courts should instead diverge and
construe state constitutional provisions differently. Most federal circuits are
aware of these regimes (often called "lockstep" or "criteria" approaches) and
apply them when called upon to construe state constitutional provisions."'
Similarly, on the reverse side, state courts are well aware of the context-
specific interpretive frameworks that the U.S. Supreme Court uses to interpret
the Federal Constitution. When state courts adjudicate federal constitutional
claims, they view themselves as bound under the Supremacy Clause to apply
273. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Se. Health Care, Inc. 950 F.2d 944, 950 (5th Cir. 1991); see also
Dorf, supra note 2, at 713 (noting the same example); cf John Burritt McArthur, Good
Intentions Gone Bad: The Special No-Deference Erie Rule for Louisiana State Court Decisions,
66 LA. L. REv. 313 (206) (criticizing the effects of federal court application of Louisiana's
civilian methodology under Erie on the ground that it gives federal courts freedom to
approach Louisiana legal questions de novo instead of deferring to Louisiana courts).
274. In the reverse context, it is not clear that Louisiana explicitly views stare decisis as binding
under the Supremacy Clause when it interprets federal statutes, but the principle seems to
apply. See Coutee v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 924 So. 2d 112, 117 (La. 20o6) ("Generally,
state courts exercising concurrent maritime jurisdiction are bound to apply substantive
federal maritime statutory law and to follow United States Supreme Court maritime
jurisprudence."). The legal status of stare decisis in federal courts also remains in dispute, as
academics continue to debate whether it is federal common law or constitutionally required.
See supra note 250.
275. See, e.g., Gen. Auto Serv. Station v. City of Chi., 526 F.3d 991, 997 n.6 (7th Cir. 2008)
(recognizing that "Illinois courts apply a limited version of the lockstep doctrine" and using
it to resolve state constitutional claims); Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F. 3d
978, 983 ( 9th Cir. 2002) (applying "Washington law, [under which] courts consider six
factors in determining the propriety of independent examination of a constitutional claim
under the Washington Constitution"); Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 402 n.11 (6th Cir.
1999) (noting that the Ohio Supreme Court construes the Ohio Constitution's equal
protection clause identically to the Fourteenth Amendment); Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d
1536, 1544-45 (lith Cit. 1988) ("In relatively recent cases, the Alabama Supreme Court has
indicated that article I, § 6 provides the same degree of protection as the Fifth
Amendment."); Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine:
Case-by-Case Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499 (2005).
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those federal constitutional decision rules, including the tiers of scrutiny used
in equal protection claims; the dormant Commerce Clause test; and the various
First Amendment interpretive regimes that control commercial speech claims,
public forum doctrine, Establishment Clause claims, etc.276
The relevance of the comparison between statutory interpretation
methodology and the decisionmaking frameworks that apply to specific parts
of the Constitution was explored in Part I. Two points are worth briefly
highlighting again here. First, one does not need to accept the idea that courts
would or should confine themselves to a single overarching interpretive
methodology for all statutory or constitutional questions, or to an especially
formalistic methodology, to accept the idea that courts can and do adopt
different methodological decision rules (each with different amounts of
leeway) for various areas of constitutional law. Second, none of these
constitutional decision rules seems "universal" in the way that most statutory
interpretation principles do. And no one claims that these are mere rules of
thumb. Rather, these other metaprinciples are viewed positivistically-as tied
to a particular sovereign and related to specific areas of that sovereign's law.
3. Analogies to Burden-Allocation Principles
As a final analogy, many statutory interpretation principles are similar to
commonly employed burden-allocation devices, although statutory
interpretation is not typically described in this manner. The rule of lenity, for
instance, requires courts to construe ambiguous statutes in favor of criminal
defendants and so effectively creates a presumption in favor of the defendant,
276. See, e.g., Ark. Tobacco Control Bd. v. Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Co., 199 S.W.3d 656, 66o
(Ark. 2004) ("The United States Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test in analyzing
state regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause."); Lehman Bros. Bank, FSB v. State
Bank Comm'r, 937 A.2d 95, 107-08 (Del. 2007) ("To determine a statute's constitutionality
under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the United States Supreme Court has consistently
applied the Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady test." (footnote omitted)); Banner Life Ins.
Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 2o6 P. 3d 481, 495 (Idaho 2009) ("In order to
withstand intermediate scrutiny, gender classifications must serve 'important governmental
objectives' and the 'discriminatory means employed [must be] substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives."' (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996))); In re Warner, 21 So. 3d 218, 246 (La. 2009) ("Except for a few
well-defined exceptions, . . . a content-based regulation will survive a constitutional
challenge only if it passes the well-established two-part strict scrutiny test."); State v.
Bussmann, 741 N.W.2d 79, 94 (Minn. 2007) ("[T]he official acts of state judicial officers
must satisfy the three Establishment Clause requirements articulated by the Supreme Court
in Lemon v. Kurtzman. . . ."); Turnerv. Roman Catholic Diocese, 9 87 A.2d 960, 973-74 (Vt.




shifting the burden to the government to prove the statute should not be so
construed. Clear statement rules, such as the rule that statutes will not be
construed to abrogate state powers absent a clear statutory statement, do much
the same thing. These burden-shifting canons of statutory interpretation can
be both specific to particular subject areas (for example, lenity for criminal
statutes) and transsubstantive (for example, the canon against implied repeals,
which requires a clear statement for any later statute to repeal part of any
earlier statute).
But the Court's precedent is clear that state burden-allocation doctrines,
unlike the rules of statutory interpretation, apply in diversity cases. 77 So, too,
the "question of the burden of establishing contributory negligence is a
question of local law which federal courts in diversity . .. cases must apply. ""171
And most federal courts reach similar conclusions with respect to burden-
allocation schemes in discrimination cases.
277. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 212 (1939) (reversing a lower court holding
that the "question of how and by whom the facts shall be shown to the court" was "not
within the decision in Erie" (internal quotation marks omitted)); John Hart Ely, The
Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REV. 693, 714 (1974) ("[S]tate rules controlling things
such as burden of proof, presumptions, and sufficiency of evidence should be followed
when they differ from the federal court's usual practice . . . .").
278. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943) (citation omitted).
279. Most circuits have held that state, not federal, burden-shifting standards apply in state-law
discrimination cases. The Seventh Circuit disagrees and applies the burden-shifting
framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)-crafted by the U.S.
Supreme Court for employment discrimination claims brought under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964-in state-law retaliatory discharge cases, a particularly odd result
considering that some states in the Seventh Circuit, including Illinois, have explicitly
rejected the McDonnell Douglas framework for state-law claims. See Bourbon v. Kmart
Corp., 223 F.3d 469, 473 (7 th Cir. 2000); Melissa Kotun, Note, Applying the Erie Doctrine and
the McDonnell Douglas Burden-Shifting Analysis when a Conflict with State Law Arises
Through a Retaliatory Discharge Claim, 35 GA. L. REV. 1251 (2001); Matthew M. Petersen,
Note, The Erie Doctrine and McDonnell Douglas Framework: Much Ado About Nothing or an
Issue Worth Analyzing?, 53 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 927 (2oog).
Some evidentiary rules are also analogous to statutory interpretation rules, but the
analogy is not as direct because the Federal Rules of Evidence, unlike federal statutory
interpretive principles, are enacted by Congress and so do not pose the "typical ... unguided
Erie choice." Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). Nevertheless, it is interesting to
note that even though the Federal Rules of Evidence are viewed as mostly procedural and so
generally are applied in diversity, there are some state admissibility rules that are so
intertwined with state substantive law that they are viewed as substantive. See, e.g., Wray v.
Gregory, 61 F.3d 1414, 1418 (9 th Cit. 1995) (holding that the admissibility of medical
malpractice screen panel findings is substantive); Hottle v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 47 F.3d
1o6, 1o (4 th Cir. 1995) (holding that the admissibility of internal company procedures and
rules to be substantive); see also Alex Stein, Constitutional Evidence Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 65,
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An important argument in favor of the application of Erie in these other
burden-allocation contexts is that many of these "presumptions and allocations
... include[] substantive preferences."2"0 This argument also resonates for
statutory interpretation. In particular, the substantive canons of statutory
construction function as policy-infused presumptions, in addition to burden-
allocation devices. The presumption against preemption, for example, entails a
substantive preference for state law as the default rule. Similarly, the canon
that ambiguous bankruptcy statutes are to be construed in favor of the debtor
entails a substantive judgment that favors a fresh start for the debtor over the
expectations of creditors seeking payment."' Virtually all of the substantive
canons can be described in this manner. And they are used, just as are burdens
of proof, presumptions, and allocation devices, "as handicaps . . . against the
disfavored contention. "282
B. Applying the Erie Considerations to Statutory Interpretation
Let us now directly apply the various Erie considerations to statutory
interpretation. This Section first considers the arguments used to justify the
Erie rule for contract cases, in order to make the most direct comparison to that
context. The discussion then moves to the more general considerations that the
Supreme Court has held to govern the Erie inquiry in the absence of a federal
rule or statute: forum shopping, uniformity and fairness, federal interests, and
outcome-determinacy."I
1. The Contracts Argument: Statutory Interpretation and Primary Conduct
The main argument advanced in the contract cases is that the rules of
contract interpretation have an "'effect on the conduct of contracting parties
outside the courtroom, even though the rules operate through limiting the
98 (2oo8) (noting that Erie's "outcome-determinative category includes all decisional rules
that fix the standards and allocate the burdens of proof' and that "[e]videntiary privileges
that suppress probative evidence on confidentiality and privacy grounds fall into the same
substantive category").
280. Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE
L.J. 718, 721 (1975).
281. See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 373 (2007).
282. Fleming James, Jr., Burdens ofProof 47 VA. L. REV. 51, 61 (1961).
283. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 18, at 590 (summarizing commentary on the role of
federal and state interests in Erie analysis, in addition to the focus on outcome-determinacy,




kinds of evidence that are admissible.'"12S4 This line of argument evokes the
distinction between so-called substantive rules, which, as put by Justice Harlan
(and later John Hart Ely), affect conduct at the stage of "primary private
activity,"15 and procedural rules, which relate to "the fairness or efficiency of
the litigation process."
So do the rules of statutory interpretation affect "primary private activity"?
One difference from contract interpretation is immediately apparent: whereas a
contract's signatories are typically the litigating parties, a statute's drafters (the
legislators) almost always differ from the litigants. The question, then, is
whether statutory interpretation rules nevertheless affect the private parties -
the individuals, corporations, and governments -that must conduct their daily
lives under statutes. Most practicing lawyers likely would argue that these rules
do affect at least some such primary private conduct. Just as contracting
parties, before acting, seek legal advice concerning whether proposed behavior
is consistent with their contractual obligations, other parties seek legal advice
on countless statutory questions. Is a certain expense tax-deductible under a
state tax code? Is a type of employer behavior "retaliation" under a state
discrimination statute? Is someone a "qualified individual" under a health
insurance statute? These questions will be hardest to answer when the statutes
are ambiguous, and so good lawyers, to advise their clients, will think about
how courts will interpret those statutes (and how parties will take advantage of
doctrinal uncertainties if there are two possible routes of interpretation).
Similarly, most commentators agree that clear interpretive rules make evident
to "lower court judges, agencies, and citizens . . . what presumptions will be
entertained as to statutes['] scope and meaning, and what auxiliary materials
might be consulted to resolve ambiguities."
There is arguably another class of actors, absent from the "primary private
conduct" formulation, whose conduct is affected by rules of statutory
284. Bourbon, 223 F.3d at 475 (Posner, J., concurring) (quoting AM Int'l, Inc. v. Graphic Mgmt.
Assoc., 44 F.3 d 572, 576 (7 th Cir. 1995)).
285. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1964) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[T]he proper line of
approach in determining whether to apply a state or a federal rule, whether 'substantive' or
'procedural,' is to stay close to basic principles by inquiring if the choice of rule would
substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human conduct which our
constitutional system leaves to state regulation."); see Ely, supra note 277, at 725.
286. Ely, supra note 277, at 725; see also id. at 722.
287. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term -Foreword: Law
as Equilibrium, lo8 HARv. L. REv. 26, 66-67 (1994); see also, e.g., EINER ELHAUGE,
STATUTORY DEFAULT RULEs: How To INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 235 (2008)
(arguing that a lack of clear interpretive rules "increases legal uncertainty and the costs of
ascertaining what the law says").
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interpretation- namely, legislators. Anecdotal evidence from Oregon, where
the state supreme court already has imposed a controlling statutory
interpretation methodology, suggests that the legislature now drafts statutes
with those interpretive rules in mind.' Nevertheless, this notion-that rules
of interpretation affect legislative drafting practice-is an empirical question
about which we do not yet have sufficient information. On the federal side, for
instance, one study a decade ago suggested that congressional drafters pay little
attention to the rules of interpretation.2' But it seems hard to imagine that
congressional lawyers have not by now internalized at least some statutory
interpretation rules in their drafting- particularly some of the high-visibility
clear statement rules crafted by the Court-and even a casual perusal of some
recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports reveals that CRS takes
the Court's statutory interpretation seriously in analyzing statutory law.2"o
2. Statutory Interpretation Methodologies as Rules ofDecision
As explained in Part I, the Supreme Court has outlined a number of factors
for courts to consider in deciding whether state law provides a "rule of
decision" for Erie purposes, including whether the application of the state rule
would be outcome-determinative, discourage forum shopping, or avoid
inequitable administration of the laws. The cases in Parts II and III amply
illustrate how methodological choice implicates these factors. When federal
and state courts use different canons to resolve the same legal questions, we see
almost explicit encouragement of forum shopping, and we also see outcome-
determinacy -both caused by the fact that litigants' cases are adjudicated under
different principles depending on the court in which they appear. This
288. E-mail from Jack L. Landau, Judge, Oregon Court of Appeals, to author (Jan. 5, 2010, 1:55
PM) (on file with author).
289. Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics ofLegislative Drafting: A Congressional Case
Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 6oo-ol (2002). But cf McNollgast, supra note 262, at 715
(applying contract theory to legislative bargains and arguing that "[i]nterpretive principles
... are an integral part of the coalitional agreement about a statute").
290. See, e.g., YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS (Aug. 31, 20o8); Congressional Distribution
Memorandum from Jennifer A. Staman, Todd B. Tatelman & Ida Brudnick, Cong. Research
Serv., Analysis of § 1312(d)(3)(D) of Pub. L. No. 111-148, The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, and Its Potential Impact on Members of Congress and Congressional
Staff 1-4 (Apr. 2, 2010). Moreover, this is something of a chicken-and-egg problem: those
who argue against regularizing the rules of interpretation argue that Congress does not





Subsection will not further belabor these points except to anticipate one
objection to the outcome-determinacy argument and to emphasize the
connection between at least some rules of statutory interpretation and the
substantive laws that they implement, a connection highlighted by the Court in
Byrd as particularly relevant to the question of whether a state principle is a
"rule of decision" for Erie purposes.29
Outcome-determinacy is controversial in statutory interpretation. There
are some who believe that judges use statutory interpretation methodology as
cover to effectuate their own personal preferences and that it has no
constraining effect whatsoever. And it may be true that interpretive
methodology is manipulated more often in statutory cases than in, say,
contract cases, for the simple reason that statutory cases (like constitutional
cases) are often more politicized. But this does not mean, as I have detailed
elsewhere, that methodological principles do not confine judges'
decisionmaking in at least some portion of cases, particularly outside the "hard
cases" world of the U.S. Supreme Court. 92 Indeed, many lower-court judges
contend that the "attitudinal" model of adjudication significantly understates
the constraining effect of jurisprudential regimes and legal doctrine in most
cases. 293
Moreover, even those who dispute that statutory interpretation
methodology drives case results are not likely to dispute that it importantly
affects judicial opinion-writing. 94 This is because the reasoning employed in
judicial opinions, often as much as the holding, establishes the governing legal
norms. (And in at least some cases, if reasoning does not dictate outcomes, it
may rule some outcomes out.) For example, it says something very different
about the relationship between federal and state courts when a federal court
does not construe a state statute narrowly to avoid a constitutional question
because it says that it cannot, from when the federal court reaches the same
291. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 536 (1958) (listing as a relevant
consideration in Erie cases whether the state-law rule was "intended to be bound up with
the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties").
292. Gluck, supra note 3, at 1819-22, 1852-54; see Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They Not an
It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 557-58
(2005) (implying that the disproportionate number of "hard" cases before the Court may
lead it to view interpretive rules as less outcome-determinative and thus underestimate the
costs of uncertainty and disuniformity).
293. See Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt To
Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1908 (2009);
Patricia M. Wald, A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 235 (1999) (disputing a
study asserting correlations between judges' personal preferences and decision outcomes).
294. I have made this point at greater length elsewhere. See Gluck, supra note 3, at 17 68, 1855.
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result on the ground that it is acting in the same way as a state court would and
on equal footing with that state court. Likewise, and more generally, it will be a
very different opinion that aims to interpret a statute in a manner consistent
with the intention of the enacting legislature from one that aims to interpret a
statute using a cost-benefit analysis. In this important sense, the choice of
statutory interpretation methodology goes directly to the idea (expressed by
the Court in Hanna) that Erie is not only about the choice of regimes that affect
the "result" of litigation but also about the choice of regimes that affect its
"character."29s
At a more specific level, a number of interpretive rules are "bound up with"
the substantive law that they implement. 96 As discussed above, for example,
the many subject-specific canons of interpretation embody clear policy choices.
As just a few additional examples of such canons, we have those that protect
Native American rights, 9"' that tilt the scales against taxpayers claiming
deductions,98 that emphasize the importance of federalism and state
government functions," and that elevate the principle of notice before a
purported criminal can be convicted.300 This list of these so-called substantive
canons goes on and on, and there is a reason that Justice Scalia calls them
"dice-loading rules." 3o1
Finally, in the minds of many, one's choice of statutory interpretation
methodology is intimately related to one's vision of the constitutional role of
judges and their relationship to the legislative branch.30 2 Countless pages of
academic articles and judicial opinions devoted to debating statutory
interpretation rules on those constitutional and structural grounds attest to the
importance of that aspect of methodological choice. This deep discourse,
together with the other factors already discussed, indicates that, at least some
295. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965) ("The Erie rule is rooted in part in a realization
that it would be unfair for the character or result of a litigation materially to differ because
the suit had been brought in a federal court.").
296. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536.
297. See Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994).
298. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
299. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461-64 (1991).
300. See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931).
301. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 28 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); see ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 55,
app. B at 29-41 (listing approximately a hundred substantive policy canons).
302. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 34, at 1686 ("Any theory of statutory interpretation is at base a




of the time, choices of interpretive methodology are much more substantive
than decisions that relate only to litigation management or court-organizing
"housekeeping" principles (principles that usually do not implicate Erie's twin
aims).3 o3 This does not mean that all of the canons are equally substantive, but
if we can say that even some are, then we need to grapple with Erie.3o
3. Statutory Interpretation, Federal Interests, and Federal Judges
The Court's modern Erie jurisprudence sometimes asks an additional
question: whether there are strong federal interests that could be undermined
by application of the state rule.3os In the context of methodological choice for
state statutes, however, it is difficult to discern a federal interest that could
override the Erie rule absent an argument that a federal court's statutory
interpretation methodology is constitutionally derived or compelled. Although
there may be an interest in federal-court decisionmaking uniformity-that is,
the idea that federal courts should apply the same interpretive principles in all
cases, state or federal- there is a stronger federal interest (expressed in Erie as
rising to the level of a constitutional interest3o6) in the uniform treatment of
litigants in state and federal courts.
Of course, as Part II elaborated, Erie is not absolute. There may be cases in
which specific federal-law norms trump the Erie rule and so preempt state
methodology (for example, the hypothetical state supreme court's "racist
canon" of interpretation). There may also be cases in which courts should not
apply Erie to the full extremity of its logic. For example, Michael Dorf points
out that a federal court's Erie goal of "predicting" state law might include
assessing the ideologies of individual state supreme court justices.3 o7 Most
people, however, would not go so far as to argue that federal courts should
review state judicial campaign literature in determining how to interpret state
303. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1964) ("Erie and its offspring cast no doubt on the
long-recognized power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts even
though some of those rules will inevitably differ from comparable state rules.").
304. One possible implication of this observation is that Erie might counsel the application of
only certain such rules. In the evidence context, for example, some evidentiary principles are
viewed as substantive for Erie purposes, while others are viewed as procedural. See supra
note 279. Distinguishing among the statutory interpretation canons in this vein would be
complex and requires separate treatment.
305. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996); supra note 283 and
accompanying text (summarizing the doctrine).
3o6. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75, 77-78 (1938).
307. Dorf, supra note 2, at 681-82.
1985
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
statutes. Doing so would undermine the legitimacy and objectivity of judicial
decisionmaking, and the federal interest in those norms arguably would draw a
line at that point. 308
But putting aside those kinds of rarefied exceptions, the more fundamental
question is whether there is a constitutional argument that somehow
federalizes all federal-court statutory interpretation efforts. In other words, is
statutory interpretation methodology somehow rooted in the character of the
Article III judge, or inherent in the constitutional relationship between
Congress and the federal courts, such that Article III judges cannot shed their
interpretive methodology even when they interpret nonfederal law?
Arguments in this vein have some attraction but quickly raise questions. For
example, even if we believe that interpretive principles for federal statutes are
not federal common law but rather derive from and are inherent in the federal
judicial power, such that Congress could not enact Federal Rules of Statutory
Interpretation-and note that this is not the majority view-does such an
argument really have traction when federal courts are interpreting state
statutes? Federal separation-of-powers principles should be irrelevant in that
context if the federal courts conceive of their task (as virtually all apparently
do) as approximating or predicting how the state courts would decide. Instead,
state separation-of-powers principles, many of which encourage a more
interactive relationship among the branches,3 '09 should control.31 o
Similarly, even to the extent that one believes that a particular federal
statutory interpretation methodology is constitutionally compelled-as some
federal textualist judges do believe -those constitutional arguments should be
inapplicable once we are out of the federal statutory context. Textualism's
constitutional arguments, for example, are grounded not in the Article III
judicial power, but rather in the part of the Constitution that concerns
legislative authority; namely, Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution and the
resulting idea that the only "law" that exists is law that goes through the
process of bicameralism and presentment. Some textualists also ground their
disapproval of legislative history in Article I's nondelegation doctrine. Neither
308. Id. at 681 ("The concept of justice as impersonal occupies a central place in American law.").
309. See Gluck, supra note 3, at 1813 & n. 236.
310. But see Lawson, supra note 250, at 210-11 ("The judicial power of course includes the power
to reason to the outcome of a case. . . . [S]o a grant of the judicial power must include a
grant of the power to reason from facts and law to conclusions."). Although arguments of
this nature would seem to prohibit congressional overrides of judicially determined statutory
interpretation methodology, it is not clear that they necessarily affect Erie's judge-made rule




of those federal constitutional provisions, however, has any play in the state-
law context.
Moreover, no one seems to be arguing that federal courts should apply
their own federal constitutional interpretation principles to state constitutions.
The reason for this difference likely is not that statutory interpretation is more
inextricable from the federal judicial role than is constitutional interpretation,
or that statutory interpretation principles are necessarily more universal, but
rather that at least some specific constitutional decisionmaking principles have
been more clearly defined by the courts.
C. A General Common Law of Statutory Interpretation?
Might it be possible, despite the foregoing, to argue that the rules of
interpretation are general law? Under this view, federal courts that apply both
federal and state methodological principles to state statutes-or that do not pay
much mind to which they are applying-are simply recognizing this
universality. Similarly, under such a view, no need would exist to develop a
federal common law of statutory interpretation to guide state and lower federal
courts in the federal-statutory, reverse-Erie context.
It is true that the historical pedigree of statutory interpretation
methodology has a universal, even ancient, feel. Bill Eskridge has argued, for
example, that "[t]he strongest hypothesis" as to the Founding period
is that the delegates both assumed and accepted the traditional rules
and canons of statutory interpretation and did not see the "judicial
Power" to interpret statutes as deviating from the general methodology
laid out in the traditional cases and treatises that were considered
authoritative by the state judiciaries and that would have been known
by most of the thirty-four delegates who had legal training.... Most
... would have been familiar with Coke's Institutes, Bacon's Abridgment
and its list of interpretive canons, Blackstone's Commentaries . . . [and]
the mischief rule of Heydon's Case . . ."
For this same reason-the historical conceptualization of statutory
interpretation methodology as universal -it is likely that questions of the order
311. William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in
Statutory Interpretation, 1776-18o6, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 990, 1036-37 (2001).
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posed in this Article never entered the minds of the Founders or of the Justices
who decided Erie.""
But conceptualizations can change. As noted at the outset of this Article,
there is an interesting jurisprudential link between this Founding-era concept
of widely understood and seemingly universal statutory interpretation
principles and the pre-Erie conception of general universal common law, most
famously espoused in Swift v. Tyson."' In Erie, the idea of positivism-and the
possibility of distinctive laws for different jurisdictions - overtook the Swift
principle. I would argue that a similar time has now come for statutory
interpretation. 14
Modern theory has turned statutory interpretation doctrine into something
much more specific than it once was. The focus of jurists like Justice Scalia and
Judges Posner and Easterbrook and academics like Eskridge and Frickey
(building, of course, on earlier work, including Hart and Sacks's legal process
materials and Sutherland's famed treatise on statutory interpretation"') has
transformed statutory interpretation into a field of its own. There is now a
discourse about statutory interpretation that is self-conscious, internally whole,
and mostly divorced from the particulars of individual subject-matter areas.
These developments, in turn, have created a generation of judges, academics,
and lawyers who likewise speak about the methodology of interpretation as a
topic unto itself. Indeed, Erie may have had something to do with this
phenomenon, in that it trained the profession's focus on judge-made legal
principles.
What's more, the canons of interpretation as understood by the Founders
or even the Erie Court have not been frozen in time. The Supreme Court
continues, even in the post-Erie universe, to generate new interpretive rules -
for example, the federalism canon created out of whole cloth in Gregory v.
Ashcroft in 1991," or the presumption against preemption, first articulated in
312. Cf Green, supra note 40, at 629 ("[W]hatever one thinks was wrong with Swift or right
with Erie, it had nothing to do with general canons for interpreting federal statutes.").
313. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 12 (1842).
314. Jonathan Molot has made an interesting and related argument about the move from
purposivism to textualism as related to the move from Swift to Erie, see Jonathan T. Molot,
The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 1o6 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 24-26 (20o6), but my argument here
does not depend on textualism's ascendance.
315. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994);
J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1st ed. 1891).




1947. ' Indeed, most scholars agree that the Court's entire approach to
statutory interpretation has changed dramatically over the past thirty years,
with textual analysis now predominating over purposivist interpretation.318
The very existence of all of these changes-the fact that the law of statutory
interpretation looks different today from how it looked even thirty years ago -
furthers the idea of a more concrete conception of it than perhaps once
prevailed.
Other factors are likely in play as well, complicating the ultimate resolution
of the question of statutory interpretation methodology's legal status. The U.S.
Supreme Court remains profoundly divided over what the proper judicial role
in this context should be, and that surely is one factor that has prevented the
Court from settling on an approach. Even apart from this divide, the Justices'
own experience with judging, or with federal statutes, may be influencing their
desire to retain more interpretive flexibility.
But the time has come. The modern jurisprudential and scholarly work has
had a real impact. Today, we do have some state courts treating methodology
differently from how federal courts treat it. And we do see state and federal
judges labeling themselves as one or another type of statutory interpreter -be
they textualists, purposivists, eclecticists, intentionalists, or pragmatists. Even
the U.S. Supreme Court has articulated special rules of statutory interpretation
in a few limited areas, including for the FELA and ERISA statutes; for
implying private rights of action in federal statutes;"' and, perhaps most
317. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also Richard A. Epstein,
What Tort Theory Tells Us About Federal Preemption: The Tragic Saga of Wyeth v. Levine, 65
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 485, 487 (2010) (stating that Rice "established a presumption
against preemption").
318. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History? Patterns of
Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 229 (2oo6);
Molot, supra note 314, at 3.
319. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (describing the criteria for implying a
private right of action); Consol. R.R. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 541-42 (1994) (defining the
FELA interpretation test); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-44 (1984) (defining the agency deference test); McBride v. CSX Transp., Inc., 598
F.3d 388, 397-98 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying Gottshall for FELA interpretation); Overby v.
Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 595 F.3d 1290, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting the Supreme
Court for the principle that "ERISA . . . follows standard trust law principles" (citation
omitted)); Buce v. Allianz Life Ins. Co., 247 F.3d 1133, 1142 (1ith Cir. 2001) ("[T]he District
Court ruled- correctly- that when a federal court construes an ERISA-regulated benefits
plan, the federal common law of ERISA supersedes state law."); Aswad v. Norfolk S. R.R.,
No. 04-2536, 20o6 WL 1063297, at *8 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 18, 2006) (holding that the court
need not follow lower federal court interpretations of FELA but that it was bound to follow
the U.S. Supreme Court's articulated interpretive principles for FELA).
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significantly, for agency statutory interpretation (the Chevron regime) ,32 all of
which lower courts hold that they are bound to follow.
In short, there is enough differentiation-or at least sufficient possibility
for differentiation- among interpreters today that these principles no longer
should be conceived as universal. To be sure, there are rules that both state and
federal systems will apply. 2 ' But when these rules are applied, it should be
because, as Erie holds, a sovereign's court chooses to apply them, not because
they are ready to be plucked from the sky.
V. INTERSYSTEMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
By now, it should be evident that an intersystemic perspective captures the
reality of how statutory interpretation is actually done in American courts far
better than the federal-court-only (and really Supreme Court-only) model that
dominates the literature and is the basis of most theory. And it has shown us
some significant gaps in our theory and practice of statutory interpretation. As
this Article has argued, the normative and doctrinal underpinnings of Erie,
together with the way in which courts already treat analogous methodologies,
point to the conclusion that federal courts should apply state statutory
interpretation methodology to state statutory questions -or at least that they
320. Indeed, Chevron might be the most important exception to the Supreme Court's general
resistance to methodological stare decisis; state courts universally state that they are bound
to apply Chevron/Mead when they review federal agency interpretations, and the U.S.
Supreme Court describes Chevron/Mead as a doctrinal framework that binds it and lower
courts as a matter of stare decisis. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (setting out when courts should defer to agency federal
statutory interpretations); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001)
(explaining when Chevron applies); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)
(setting forth the less deferential "power to persuade" standard); Gluck, supra note 3, at
1817-18 (describing Chevron as an example of methodological stare decisis). But cf Connor
N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Test
of What Motivates Judges in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727 (2010) (noting
that courts characterize Chevron in this way but disputing that the Justices treat it as
controlling precedent in practice). At least one state court that has rejected Chevron for its
own state law holds that Chevron binds state courts for federal-law purposes. See Friends of
the Columbia Gorge, Inc. v. Columbia River Gorge Comm'n, 213 P-3 d 1164, 1172 (Or. 2009)
("Although that sort of deference is foreign to the administrative law of this state, we are
bound to apply it in our interpretation of federal statutes if the federal interpretive
methodology so demands." (citation omitted)).
321. Cf Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, io6 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (20o6) (arguing
that federal courts, in creating federal common law, still draw on "general law" as a source





should justify the decision to proceed as inconsistently as they have.' Many
of the same considerations challenge the continuing ambiguity of the legal
status of federal statutory interpretation methodology and, in my view, urge its
reconceptualization as law.
But in addition, an intersystemic perspective and the cases that this Article
has discussed highlight the longstanding but under-studied relationship
between American statutory interpretation and federalism. This critical
relationship is continuously negotiated, as state and federal courts interpret one
another's statutes on a daily basis, but its contours remain uncertain.
Answering the Erie question, moreover, does not answer the question of what
this intersystemic statutory relationship should look like. That is, even
accepting the doctrinal conclusion that state methodology should be used for
state statutes, there remains the distinct question of how much of one another's
work state and federal courts should seek to do in the first place. These
questions require separate treatment, but it is worth pausing briefly in this
final Part to consider the various forms that this relationship might take and
their implications for the jurisprudential questions that this Article has raised.
Our current system actually presents the option of avoiding the state-
federal overlap in this context almost entirely: presumptive federal-court
certification of state-law questions, as some scholars and judges favor, is a
solution that acknowledges the opportunity for intersystemic statutory
interpretation but strongly resists it. A more subtle form of resistance is visible
in cases like the dynamic and constitutional avoidance cases discussed in Part
II: in those kinds of cases, while state and federal courts accept their obligation
to interpret one another's statutes, they still try to keep to their own corners as
much as possible, even if that means using an interpretive approach that differs
from that of the home jurisdiction.
The third option, however, is that our courts could seize this opportunity
and embrace a "dialectical federalism""' for statutory interpretation -a
conversation between state and federal courts that could shape the evolution of
interpretive doctrine itself. At the moment that conversation does not exist.
When federal courts overlook state methodology and apply only federal
interpretive principles, they are not engaging with state practice. And even
322. An Erie-based rule for the choice of methodology also would likely give more state supreme
courts-and perhaps even the U.S. Supreme Court-an incentive to clarify their own
methodological rules for proper application by the outside world. In this manner, Erie's
application to statutory interpretation methodology might have the salutary effect not only
of bringing coherence to current crossover court practice but also of encouraging courts to
make their own, home-court statutory interpretation practices clearer and more predictable.
323. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1048.
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when they do recognize questions of state statutory interpretation, they often
shy away from these questions or answer them without reflecting on whether
there is anything in the state methodological developments that might be
relevant for their own federal statutory work. Either way, they are not in a
dialogue.
But imagine the possibilities. The Ninth Circuit might take a page from
Oregon's book and apply methodological stare decisis; the Sixth Circuit might
follow Michigan's lead and dramatically limit use of the substantive canons of
construction. The Supreme Court's failure to resolve its own methodological
debates with finality arguably licenses such lower federal-court
experimentation with methodology, and such experiments might even
percolate the question for the Court's own resolution, making concrete the
choices available and their consequences.3 *Many state courts are actually
ongoing laboratories of statutory interpretation, and the fact that state and
federal courts already are engaged in a constant exchange of methodology
means that there is a realistic possibility for cross-systemic pollination of
interpretive theory, should the federal courts allow themselves to be receptive
to it.32 s
Typically, suggestions for dialogue in law assume the value of
"polyphony,""' and so this suggestion may seem at odds with the drive toward
clarification that has animated this Article. But there is an important difference
between saying that we need to be clear with respect to the rules that apply at
any given time and saying that interjurisdictional learning might contribute to
a better conclusion about what those consistently applied rules should be."
For example, taking one of the hypothetical scenarios from the preceding
paragraph, if the Ninth Circuit adopted methodological stare decisis, that
experiment might both clarify present Ninth Circuit doctrine and provide data
for other courts considering the same move in the future. Trying out new
interpretive rules does not necessarily imply messiness and, even if it did,
324. See Robert M. Cover, The Uses ofJurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation,
22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 673-74, 678 (1981).
325. See Redish, supra note 70, at 866, 901 (arguing that "state-federal judicial dialogue places
the state courts in a better position to understand the nuances of parallel federal law, thereby
enabling them to enrich the development of their own state law," and that federal courts can
learn from the "state courts' normative discussion of the competing policies surrounding an
unresolved federal issue"); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism,
91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 249, 315 (2005) (advocating "polyphonic federalism").
326. Schapiro, supra note 325, at 288.




presumably such messiness would only be temporary if the goal is to settle on a
final choice.
Even beyond using the state developments to improve their own federal
practice, for a true dialogue to develop, the federal courts also should engage
more directly in state statutory interpretation itself. The questions raised in all
of these statutory interpretation cases, be they state or federal, are very much
alike, and there is no reason to assume that federal courts are not capable of
translating their already honed interpretive skills to the state-law context."" If
anything, the federal courts are experts in this area. That expertise not only
should give the federal courts confidence to apply state statutory interpretation
methodology in state-law cases but it also suggests that the federal courts
might have something more to contribute to the state cases.
For example, a federal-court opinion about state statutory interpretation
might provide a new perspective on whether a certain state interpretive regime
is unduly static or, alternatively, too flexible. Or a federal court might offer a
different view of the application of interpretive principles common to both
state and federal courts, such as constitutional avoidance. These federal-court
interventions would perform a particularly valuable function given that most
states have "unitary appeals system[s]" and so have no means to percolate new
legal theories on their own."' And relatedly, litigants could bring state-law
cases in the federal forum to try to influence and change the state methodology.
A more robust federal-court presence in state statutory interpretation also
might help to harmonize differences between state and federal courts when
both courts interpret federal statutes. This is because federal courts could use
the state cases as additional opportunities to move state courts on questions
related to the federal interpretive practices on which the state theories are
based. Even Judge Guido Calabresi, a vocal advocate of certification, has
argued that "having courts that are keenly aware of national law speak about
328. In fact, many state courts, in discussing their chosen interpretive methodologies, claim
direct inspiration from federally focused academic scholarship and U.S. Supreme Court
cases. See Gluck, supra note 3, at 1793; see also Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in
State Constitutionalism, 1o6 HARv. L. REV. 1147, 1163 (1993) ("State courts should be talking
with each other, as well as with the federal courts and even with academics. All are engaged
in a search for the meaning of common concepts. The unique authority of each does not
speak at all to the common substance of their interpretive effort."); David L. Shapiro,
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARv. L. REv. 317, 324-27 (1977)
(arguing that one of the virtues of the diversity jurisdiction is the ability of federal courts to
contribute to the development of state law).
329. Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CALIF.
L. REv. 1409, 1445 (1999) (arguing that federal courts can help percolate questions of state
constitutional law).
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state law does have a unifying effect."330 In fact, because the U.S. Supreme
Court "rarely reviews a construction of state law agreed upon by the two lower
federal courts," lower-federal-court engagement with state law takes on
critical importance: it may be the only opportunity for a federal-court
interpretive perspective.
On the reverse side, too, in the absence of finality from the U.S. Supreme
Court, the state courts have a role to play in influencing the development of
federal statutory interpretation. State-court trends toward textualism, for
example, if also used by state courts construing federal law, surely will have an
effect on how federal statutes are interpreted and might create additional
momentum for broader adoption, across more courts, of a textualist approach.
So, too, would a state-court focus on purposivist interpretation or an emphasis
on particular canons or legislative history." Justice Brennan famously argued
that state courts could influence federal constitutional law through their own
interpretations of federal constitutional provisions and analogous provisions in
state constitutions.3 Helen Hershkoff likewise has urged states to adopt a
more activist and expansive approach to their own constitutional law.334
Statutory interpretation offers the same possibilities for federal interpretive
methodology and federal statutory law to be influenced "from the bottom
up" -indeed, even more possibilities than in the constitutional cases, because
there are so many more statutory cases.
In fact, we already have seen the state courts embrace some of these ideas.
Some state courts have taken the lead in areas of statutory interpretation in
which federal courts have lagged behind. Some state courts have tried to chart
a new course toward interpretive determinacy, with controlling interpretive
frameworks, methodological stare decisis, legislated rules, and the like. As we
330. Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1293, 1301 (2003); see also Schapiro, supra note 72, at 1428-29 ("The opinion of a federal court
interpreting the same item might provide a useful perspective, perhaps compensating for
the perceived unpopularity of following a particular course . . . . The different perspective of
the federal court . .. might assist the state court in its search for the best interpretation.").
331. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 940 (2000) (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n,
484 U.S. 383, 395 (1988)).
332. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Leaky Floors: State Law Below Federal Constitutional
Limits, 5o ARIz. L. REV. 227, 231 (20o8) (stating, in the constitutional context, that "there are
many virtues in aggressive state interpretation of federal law" and that "[a] parsimonious
reading of federal law by high state courts helps to make that idea a reality").
333. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill ofRights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions
as Guardians ofIndividual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 550 (1986).
334. Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality




also have seen, the state courts have not shied away from their federal statutory
work.13 But this federalism cannot be "dialectical" if the conversation is going
in only one direction.
At the other extreme, there are those who argue that the federal courts
should stand down, that they should presume themselves less than competent
to interpret state law and should certify state-law questions as often as
possible. Brad Clark, Barry Friedman, and Judge Guido Calabresi adhere to
this position, and the federal courts may be trending in this direction.36 Clark
argues that the federal courts are in a "precarious position" when interpreting
state law;331 Judge Calabresi contends that "it seems 'grabby' for the federal
court to say what [a state] statute means."3' Friedman suggests that, likewise,
on the other side, state courts should stay out of federal-law business because
"there is a federal interest in having novel or open federal questions resolved in
federal courts."3 ' And, according to a recent study, the Second Circuit now
certifies more state-law cases on its own motion than on the motion of the
litigants.340
335. See, e.g., State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 862 (Ohio 2001) ("[W]e are reluctant to abandon
our role in the system of federalism .. .. Both inferior federal courts and state courts serve
as 'laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far
from clear."' (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995))).
336. See Calabresi, supra note 330, at 1301-02 ("We should think of ourselves as an intermediate
state court whose function it is to decide provisionally . . . . And then we should certify, so
that the New York Court of Appeals is able to decide (1) not to take the case . . . or (2) to
take it . . . ."); Clark, supra note 77, at 1549-56 (favoring a presumption of certification);
Friedman, supra note 238, at 1255-56 (favoring a "sequencing" of federal and state claims so
that each court hears its own case); see also Jonathan Remy Nash, The Uneasy Case for
TransJurisdictional Adjudication, 94 VA. L. REv. 1869, 1879 (2008) (noting that
"commentators advocate increased reliance upon, and development of new,
transjurisdictional procedural devices"). Judge Calabresi's position, it should be noted, is
harder to classify because at the same time that he asserts the inferiority of federal courts on
state-law questions, he also believes that there is value to retaining at least some federal-
court perspective in state-law cases. See supra note 330and accompanying text.
337. Clark, supra note 77, at 1461.
338. Calabresi, supra note 330, at 1305-06 n.41.
339. Friedman, supra note 238, at 1241.
340. See Memorandum from Advisory Grp. Comm. on Certification of Questions to the Court of
Appeals to N.Y. State & Fed. Judicial Council (Sept. 17, 2008) (on file with author).
Puzzlingly, many of these certification advocates do not call for the abolition of the diversity
jurisdiction, and none seems to call for the abolition of concurrent jurisdiction more
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To be sure, these debates about dialogue and separation extend far beyond
the terrain of statutory interpretation to all areas of interaction between state
and federal courts, and they implicate a deep literature well beyond the scope
of this Article.14' And I do not wish for this Article's more central points about
the specific interaction between Erie and statutory interpretation and the
question of the legal status of methodology to be lost in this broader landscape.
Importantly, one need not agree with my resistance to the trend toward
separation between state and federal courts to agree that, in the crossover cases
that remain outside the certification or abstention pool, federal courts should
actively engage the state statutory questions presented.
That said, it is important to recognize that considering whether a state
court has a particular interpretive approach for statutory questions informs
how we think about these broader questions of interactive federalism. Where
state courts have settled on some rules of interpretation, that consensus makes
it harder to argue that the workings of state law are a black box. And
concurrent jurisdiction-as long as it continues to exist-is at least partially
premised on the assumption that federal courts are capable of applying state-
law principles much of the time." That, of course, is also one legacy of Erie.
But, instead, many federal courts do not seem to begin from this
assumption. And so it has become almost impossible to determine in advance
when federal courts will try to interpret state statutes as state courts would; or
when they will apply a different approach entirely; or when they will,
generally. That, however, seems to be one possible extension of their arguments, because
underlying these arguments is the idea that federal and state courts do not really belong in
one another's business in the first place. Cf Redish, supra note 130 (arguing that federal
courts do not have discretion to implement a partial abstention doctrine and that such
changes require congressional amendment to the jurisdictional statutes). Compare Calabresi,
supra note 330, at 1300-01 (arguing that diversity jurisdiction serves a valuable function and
should be retained), with Clark, supra note 77, at 1564 (implying that Congress should
abolish diversity jurisdiction).
341. For two of the central articles in this debate as it pertains to abstention, compare Redish,
supra note 130 (arguing that broad judicial discretion to abstain conflicts with the statutory
jurisdictional framework), with Shapiro, supra note 128, at 545 (arguing that Redish's view is
"far too grudging in [its] recognition of judicial discretion in matters of jurisdiction").
342. Indeed, Clark (whose argument is mostly directed at federal courts deciding state common-
law questions) appears to leave open this possibility, acknowledging in a footnote:
State statutes that have not yet been interpreted by state courts may or may not be
indeterminate as applied to various circumstances. Whether the application of a
state statute yields a determinate answer to a particular legal question depends in
large part on the language of the statute and the background rules of state law
that govern the interpretation of state statutes.




alternatively, decide not to decide.14 ' The result is that the way in which
judicial federalism plays out in statutory interpretation is now something of a
paradox. As First Circuit Judge Bruce Selya has argued, it seems "important as
a matter of cooperative judicial federalism . . . [that] state courts cooperate by
resolving questions of federal law while federal courts cooperate by passing the
buck on questions of state law." 34
Finally, one has to ask, if federal courts have so much trouble interpreting
state statutes even in the face of some states' settled interpretive rules, how we
can assume that state courts and lower federal courts can interpret federal
statutes with much less methodological guidance from the U.S. Supreme
Court. And do so they must-at least as long as the Court resists treating
federal statutory interpretation methodology as law. After all, there is no
reverse-certification or abstention option that allows state courts or lower
federal courts to send statutory questions to the U.S. Supreme Court for mid-
case resolution.
CONCLUSION
Exploring the link between Erie and statutory interpretation methodology
reveals that many central questions about statutory interpretation remain
undertheorized. This Article has aimed to resolve the doctrinal question as it
pertains to Erie, and hopefully the reader is now convinced that Erie requires
federal courts, in most cases, to apply state interpretive methodology to state
statutory questions. More optimistically, perhaps the reader also is now
persuaded that the federal courts do not currently treat statutory interpretation
methodology as law but that it would be permissible, maybe even preferable,
for them to do so -or, at a minimum, that it is curious that the federal courts
have treated statutory interpretation differently from so many analogous
interpretive regimes without any justification for that practice. Certainly, the
reader should now be firmly aware that there is a large world of statutory
343. Cf Clark, supra note 136, at 294 ("If the rule of thus deferring decision is to be applied
uniformly, it must be applied in a very much greater number of cases, so much so that
certain forms of federal administration, notably bankruptcy, must literally break down.");
Shapiro, supra note 328, at 327 (observing that the increased use of certification could
decrease federal-court influence "and may in fact mark the return to state courts of
autonomy in deciding substantive state law questions").
344. Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question ... ,29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 677, 687
(1995); see also id. at 683, 689 (arguing that "[s]tate courts have absolutely no say in what
questions federal courts choose to certify" and that "problems frequently arise because the
question is not artfully presented or the record is insufficiently developed to permit a
dispositive answer").
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interpretation beyond the Supreme Court. Substantiating the importance and
prevalence of these state-court and lower federal-court actors is the critical step
toward reorienting our theory to include them. The remainder involves making
sense of how state and federal courts do and should interact and how our
landscape of intersystemic statutory interpretation coheres with both
traditional statutory interpretation theory and broader theories of federalism.
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